



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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WHITE HOUSE LIAISON

26 NOV 1996

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Honorable Leon E. Panetta  
Chief of Staff  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Panetta:

This responds to your letter of September 6, 1996, asking for a top to bottom review of DoD's executive support air fleet. On September 10, 1996, I appointed Vice Admiral (Retired) Donald D. Engen to conduct this review, and directed the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to provide him all necessary technical and administrative support. Admiral Engen's team has completed its review. His report, dated October 18, 1996, is enclosed.

Admiral Engen reports that, despite recent mishaps, DoD operates its executive support air fleet safely and reliably. In particular, Presidential airlift has been virtually flawless. However, Admiral Engen's team has made several recommendations to enhance the safe and efficient operation of executive support aircraft, most notably those aircraft which are not dedicated to transporting high government officials.

Admiral Engen recommends that the White House critically review the use of non-dedicated aircraft for Presidential airlift. The rest of his recommendations are specific to the Air Force and Marine Corps. I have referred them to the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy for appropriate action, and directed the Secretaries to report that action to me.

Admiral Engen's report affirms the dedication of DoD personnel to safe and reliable executive airlift. Please be assured that the Department remains committed to provide the safest possible transportation for all our passengers.

Sincerely,


*William J. Perry*

#839

Enclosure

26 NOV 96

W01632 196



# **DoD Executive Air Fleet Review**

## **Part III - Interviews**

18 October 1996

#839

W01632-96

**PART III**

**INTERVIEWS**

- A. Staff Sergeant Allen, USMC, 20 September 1996.
- B. Sergeant Major G. J. Amos, USMC, 17 September 1996.
- C. Major T. J. Anderson, USMC, 17 September 1996.
- D. Major T. J. Anderson, USMC, 17 September 1996.
- E. Lieutenant J. M. Andrews, USMC, 18 September 1996.
- F. Colonel Robert D. Barr, USAF, 23 September 1996.
- G. Lieutenant Colonel Randall H. Baxter, USAF, 18 September 1996.
- H. Lieutenant Colonel Baxter, USAF with Lieutenant Colonel Garber and Lieutenant Colonel Nagel, 2 October 1996.
- I. Captain Lloyd W. Beasley, USAF with Captain David D. Baldessari, USAF; Captain Maurine E. Baillie, USAF; and Captain Jon B. Cushman, USAF, 21 September, 1996.
- J. Colonel Thomas M. Belisle, USAF, 24 September 1996.
- K. Captain Werner Beyer, Jr, USAF, 19 September 1996.
- L. Major Brassard, USMC with Master Gunnery Sergeant Renaux, USMC, 19 September 1996.
- M. Major Brassard, USMC with Master Gunnery Sergeant Renaux, USMC, 19 September 1996 interviewed by Colonel Robert Leavitt.
- N. Chief Warrant Officer (4) J. E. Bronson, USMC with Master Gunnery Sergeant T. L. Downey, USMC 20 September 1996.
- O. Lieutenant Colonel George Cibulas, USAF with Chief Master Sergeant Stephen Maynard, USAF; Chief Master Sergeant Donald Brubaker, USAF; Senior Master Sergeant Karl Kaufman, USAF; and Master Sergeant Jeffrey Norvell, USAF, 19 September 1996.
- P. Brigadier General James L. Cole, Jr., USAF (ret), 23 September 1996.
- Q. Master Sergeant D. M. Cowan, USMC, 18 September 1996.
- R. Lieutenant Colonel Rickey I. Davis, USAF with Major Gregory D. Keller, USAF; Master Sergeant Carolyn D. Healy, USAF; Master Sergeant Donnell Smith, USAF; Master Sergeant Kurt A. Walker, USAF; and Technical Sergeant Glenn A. Sparkman, USAF, 19 September 1996.



- S. Major Bill Delano, USMC, 19 September 1996.
- T. Colonel Melvin De Mars, USMC, 1 October 1996.
- U. Major Kevin Devore, USMC, 20 September 1996.
- V. Lieutenant Colonel Mark S. Donnelly, USAF, 2 October 1996.
- W. Lieutenant Colonel Mark S. Donnelly, USAF, 3 October 1996.
- X. Brigadier General Paul R. Dordal, USAF with Colonel James L. White, USAF, 24 September 1996.
- Y. Colonel Roger H. Dougherty, USMC, 3 October 1996.
- Z. Master Gunnery Sergeant T. L. Downey, USMC, 17 September 1996.
- AA. Lieutenant Colonel Jack B. Egginton, USAF, 17 September 1996.
- BB. Major R. W. Ellinger, USMC with Master Gunnery Sergeant J. A. Northcott, Jr., USMC, 17 September 1996.
- CC. Major Ellinger, USMC with Master Gunnery Sergeant Northcott, USMC, 20 September 1996.
- DD. Major T. W. Fitzgerald, USMC, with Major J. A. Bowden, USMC; Captain R. G. Sypolt, USMC; Master Sergeant D. M. Cowan, USMC; Master Sergeant J.H. Haugh, USMC, and Gunnery Sergeant R. S. White, USMC, 19 September 1996.
- EE. Major Ronald E. Fontenot, USAF, with Major George F. Rhame, USAF and Major Robert S. Sherouse, USAF, 17 September 1996.
- FF. Colonel R. A. Forrester, USMC, 27 September 1996.
- GG. Major Frisbee, USAF with Senior Master Sergeant Cook, USAF; Staff Sergeant Kern, USAF; Staff Sergeant Buntjer, USAF; Mr. Gerleman; Chief Master Sergeant Graham, USAF and Master Sergeant McLaughlin, USAF, 21 September 1996.
- HH. Colonel Fred Geier, USMC, 23 September 1996.
- II. Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gleason, USAF with Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Hannin, USAF; Major Darlene K. Dejesus, USAF; and Chief Master Sergeant Bruce L. Culver, USAF, 18 September 1996.
- JJ. Lieutenant Colonel Gleason, USAF, 7 October 1996.

- KK. Major S. O. Gold, USMC, with Master Gunnery Sergeant B. J. Sigman, USMC, 18 September 1996.
- LL. Lieutenant Colonel Peter W. Gray, USAF with Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Garber, III, USAF, 20 September 1996.
- MM. Colonel Cone J. Hance, USAF, 17 September 1996.
- NN. Colonel Cone Hance, USAF, 1 October 1996.
- OO. Master Sergeant Healy, USAF with Staff Sergeant Willing, USAF, date unknown.
- PP. Mister D. G. Helie with Major A. Gierber, USMC, 18 September 1996.
- QQ. Major Rick Hodson, USAF, 23 September 1996.
- RR. Colonel Charles R. Johnson, Jr., USAF, 24 September 1996.
- SS. Colonel David L. Johnson, USAF, 24 September 1996.
- TT. Master Gunnery Sergeant M. A. Lapp, USMC, 17 September 1996.
- UU. Colonel Randall J. Larsen, USAF, 23 September 1996.
- VV. Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, 29 September 1996.
- WW. Brigadier General Robert Magnus, USMC, 1 October 1996.
- XX. Mister Hal Martin, Gates Learjet, 3 October 1996.
- YY. Lieutenant Commander V. D. Morgan, USN, date unknown.
- ZZ. Colonel Brian McGarry, USAF with Lieutenant Colonel Al Westrom, USAF, 19 September 1996.
- AAA. Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. McGreal, USAF, 18 September 1996.
- BBB. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel W. McKenzie, USAF with Lieutenant Colonel (s) James A. Mont, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Glenn A. Mackey, USAF and Major William C. MacKinzie, USAF, 21 September 1996.
- CCC. Colonel Nasby, USMC with Colonel Whittle, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel Judge, USMC, 27 September 1996.
- DDD. Master Gunnery Sergeant J. A. Northcott, USMC, 17 September 1996.

EEE. Colonel Kenneth D. Pesola, USAF with First Lieutenant Kelly R. Holbert, USAF, 24 September 1996.

FFF. Colonel Pruismann, USAF with Colonel Shefflette, USAF and Lieutenant Colonel Kreycik, USAF 21 September 1996.

GGG. Master Gunnery Sergeant B. G. Renaux, USMC, 17 September 1996.

HHH. Lieutenant Colonel Brian W. Sackett, USAF with Captain William S. McCallie, USAF; Captain Christopher Lambert, USAF; and Master Sergeant Timothy A. McCutcheon, USAF, 18 September 1996.

III. Major Seisel, USMC, 19 September 1996.

JJJ. Major Robert S. Sherouse, USAF with Chief Master Sergeant Ronald L. Cunningham, USAF; Senior Master Sergeant Ronald Allen, USAF; Master Sergeant Lynn J. Elmwood, USAF; Technical Sergeant Warren A. Pegram, USAF and Staff Sergeant Juan Lopez, USAF, 18 September 1996.

KKK. Major Robert S. Sherouse, USAF with Chief Master Sergeant Ronald L. Cunningham, USAF; Senior Master Sergeant Richard R. Watters, USAF and Master Sergeant James H. Vehr, USAF, 19 September 1996.

LLL. Major Robert S. Sherouse, USAF with Chief Master Sergeant Ronald L. Cunningham, USAF; Senior Master Sergeant Ronald Allen, USAF; Master Sergeant Steve R. Herb, USAF and Technical Sergeant Gussie M. Sykes, USAF, 23 September 1996.

MMM. Mister Lee Shifflet, Sikorsky Aircraft Company, 25 September 1996.

NNN. Mister Shockley, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Legislative Affairs, 20 September 1996.

OOO. Major B. W. Smith, USMC, 20 September, 1996.

PPP. CAPTAIN Richard Smith, USN, 1 October 1996.

QQQ. Colonel Philip W. Spiker, USAF with Colonel Alfred E. Cronk, USAF, 24 September 1996.

RRR. Major D. T. Spurrier, USMC, 20 September 1996.

SSS. Captain Tuan V. Tran, USAF with Chief Master Sergeant Shelton G. Lacy, USAF, 27 September 1996.

TTT. Major General Gary A. Voellger, USAF with Brigadier General William Welser, III, 21 September 1996.

UUU. Major General Voellger, USAF with Brigadier General Welser, 23 September 1996.

VVV. Brigadier General Charles J. Wax, USAF, 17 September 1996.

WWW. Colonel Bobby Wilkes, USAF, 23 September 1996.

XXX. Colonel Douglas Wood, USAF (ret), 20 September 1996.

YYY. Lieutenant Colonel Lester D. Worley, USAF with Lieutenant Colonel Loail M. Sims, USAF; Captain Daniel P. Stenson, USAF; Master Sergeant Carolyn D. Healy, USAF; Master Sergeant Kurt A. Walker, USAF; Technical Sergeant Glenn A. Sparkman, USAF; and Staff Sergeant Marcus W. Holling, USAF, 19 September 1996.

ZZZ. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Wright, USAF, 30 September 1996.

AAAA....., 1st Helicopter Squadron's Air Force Forms  
Non-Commissioned-Officer-in-Charge, 25 September 1996.

BBBB. ...., 89th Logistics Group's Senior Non-Commissioned Officers,  
20 September 1996.

CCCC....., Logistics Groups, Air Mobility Command, 23 September 1996.

**Security Department**

**Interview with:** Staff Sergeant Allen Security Counter Intelligence

**1. Describe the process to get a Yankee White (YW) access and have you encountered any delays/problems? Where have the delays occurred?**

The process requires the applicant to:

- a. pass a HMX-1 Security Administration initial screening interview per MCO 1326.7C (enclosure (3) of the Security Addendum).
- b. pass a Security Administration local records check covering Provost Marshall's Office (PMO) records, Officer Qualification Records (OQRs), Service Record Books (SRBs), and medical records.
- c. obtain a Top Secret (TS) clearance based on a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI).

1) the Defense Investigation Service (DIS) conducts the investigation.

2) the Department of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility (DONCAF) adjudicates the SSBI and grants the TS clearance.

3) DONCAF sends the adjudication letter and the investigation to squadron Security Admin for a quality assurance review and recommendation for suitability for YW access.

4) Security Admin then forwards the original package to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) White House Liaison Office.

5) SECNAV conducts the final review of the SSBI, after the TS clearance is granted by DONCAF, to determine suitability for Presidential support duties.

6) SECNAV forwards the investigative results to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for final approval of YW access.

7) OSD notifies Security Admin of approval or disapproval of the YW access and returns the package to Security Admin.

This entire process can take from six months to a year. Once a clearance is in formal review, delays are extremely rare and not a trend.

**2. What measures do you take towards personnel reliability? Are psychological evaluations part of your screening or clearance process?**

Continuous eligibility is managed through Security Admin. Key indicators (legal, financial, substance abuse, domestic, mental instability, and other problems) are reported to Security Admin

via co-workers, supervisors, legal officer, Substance Abuse Control Officer (SACO), medical, chain of command, and other means.

Security Admin documents incidents in the individual case files, and, based upon circumstances, Security Admin will recommend to the Commanding Officer (CO) whether:

a. TS clearance should:

- 1) continue
- 2) be revoked for cause by DONCAF

b. YW access should:

- 1) continue.
- 2) be temporarily suspended by the CO, SECNAV, or OSD until resolution of current matters.
- 3) be permanently revoked for cause by OSD.

Security has been studying psychological screening since June of 1996. The Security Officer has been consulting with Dr. Peter Finley on the feasibility of incorporating such screening into our acquisition process. HMX-1 representatives observed this screening during a recent Marine Security Guard (MSG) recruiting trip to Camp Lejeune. Security will use psychological screening, as a pilot program, on a recruiting trip to Ft. McClellan in October.

### **3. How has field screening of personnel been working? How would you change it?**

The field screening process is adequate and reliable. Problems rarely occur, but those that do fall into two categories:

a. applicants execute their orders and arrive unscreened. When this happens, Security Admin screens them and if:

- 1) successful, they are joined and the TS clearance and YW access process continues.
- 2) unsuccessful, they are joined and held pending:
  - a) HMX-1 billet availability not requiring TS clearance or YW access
  - b) transfer to another duty station.

b. Applicants are not entirely forthcoming during the screening or clearance process. If they are not clearable, they may be:

- 1) assigned to an HMX-1 billet not requiring TS clearance or YW access or
- 2) transferred to another duty station.

**4. How many Marines were not screened in the field by their parent command before receiving orders to HMX-1? Were not screened by the HMX-1 Team?**

HMX-1 has a turnover of 300-350 hands annually. Security Admin does not maintain a hard record of applicants who are not field screened by their parent commands; however, a high estimate is about 10%. HMX-1 does conduct recruiting trips and the Security Admin team screens applicants, new volunteers, and interested personnel on site.

All applicants are screened upon arrival prior to officially joining. Security Admin, as previously stated, screens those who arrive in need.

**5. How does the monitor support you for MP personnel selection/assignment?**

The Security Department has outstanding relationships with the 5800 monitor, GySgt Marren, and the NCOIC MARDET of the Military Police (MP) and NBC Basic school at Ft. McClellan, AL, MGySgt Lovejoy. The monitor fully supports Security, knows that we are an excepted command and that our Table of Organization (T/O) is based on all Marines having TS clearance and YW access. Security conducts quarterly recruiting trips to Ft. McClellan. The MP field is small and Security has close ties within it to source the most qualified NCOs, SNCOs, and officers.

**6. What part do you play in screening MP/security personnel?**

During the quarterly recruiting trips:

- a. All applicants are screened by Security Admin on site.
- b. All applicants who pass the screening are interviewed by the:
  - 1) Security Chief
  - 2) Counter Intelligence Officer (Scty Admin)
  - 3) Security Officer
- c. Security has its choice from qualified applicants.

All Security personnel coming from other sources are screened by command or local Counter Intelligence (CI) assets.

**INTERVIEW WITH SGTMAJ G. J. AMOS  
SQUADRON SGT MAJOR  
17 SEPT, 1996**

**1. IS AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT TO HMX-1 ADEQUATE?**

Yes

**2. ARE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL A REGULAR PRESENCE IN SQUADRON SPACES?**

They are members of the squadron who take an active role and are a frequent, often daily presence in the squadron spaces, and are readily accessible for assistance.

**3. DO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL REGULARLY PARTICIPATE IN SAFETY ACTIVITIES? STAND-DOWNS? -TRAINING?**

They take a very proactive role in safety and training activities.

**4. IS MEDICAL READILY ACCESSIBLE FOR CONSULTATION REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS WITH INDIVIDUALS?**

Yes, they are easily approachable and willing to help with any problems or questions.

**5. WHAT MECHANISMS DO YOU USE TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE AT RISK FOR SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSES?**

There are no specific, formal mechanisms in place. Squadron members are very close and watch out for each other. The relationships are such that problems are identified early so that action can be taken. Our senior leadership, both officer and enlisted understand the critical nature of the HMX mission, and foster a sense of teamwork in all hands, and the importance of seeking help early wherever it is required.

**6. WHAT ARE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU ENCOUNTER WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITH SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSORS OR PROBLEMS?**

Because of the sensitivity of the mission of HMX-1, and the necessity to avoid adverse publicity in any White House support activity, it is sometimes necessary to get personnel out of the squadron expeditiously when they are identified as troublemakers, are unclearable through security or otherwise lack reliability. No mechanism exists to do so. DUI's are relatively easy, but other personnel problems are much more difficult, resulting in retention of an individual who is unusable in a squadron billet.

**7. ARE LOCAL/MCB SUPPORT ACTIVITIES SUFFICIENT? E.G. FINANCIAL, FAMILY SERVICES, STRESS MANAGEMENT CLASSES, ALCOHOL, FAMILY PLANNING, ETC..**

Yes. There is a good network of support for Marines when these services are needed.

**8. IS LOSS OF TIME FROM WORK FOR MEDICAL VISITS ACCEPTABLE? DOES MEDICAL TRY TO MINIMIZE THOSE LOSSES?**

Yes, it's very easy to get someone seen at medical in a short time.



9. HOW WELL DOES MEDICAL COMMUNICATE BACK TO THE SQUADRON ON THE STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS?

Very good two way communications exist.

10. HOW WELL ARE FAMILY MEDICAL PROBLEMS ADDRESSED? ARE THEY TIMELY?

Very well locally, with delays in obtaining appointments at referral centers.

11. HOW WELL DOES MCB BRANCH CLINIC SUPPORT THE SQUADRON?

Most medical problems are handled by HMX-1 medical, but when referral to the mainside clinic is required, there are no difficulties except some additional time loss from work.

12. HOW WELL ARE MEDICAL REFERRALS TO OTHER MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES HANDLED?

There are sometimes long delays in getting appointments with larger centers like Bethesda, sometimes with loss of personnel until they can be seen.

I have reviewed the foregoing 2 pages on this the 10th day of Oct., 1996 and it accurately summarizes the information provided by me.

George J. Amos  
S/Maj. USMC

**Interview with Major T.J. Anderson  
Director of Safety and Standardization  
HMX-1**

**POLICY**

**IS HMX-1 ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED, ORGANIZED, AND MANNED FOR CURRENT OPTEMPO?**

-Yes, but assignment of first tour personnel creates difficulties for both the unit and the assigned Marine. Due to high optempo, less time is available to conduct the regularly scheduled training needed by first tour personnel. Meanwhile, until such training is accomplished and a modicum of experience gained, the first tour Marine has less utility to the unit than more experienced, senior Marines. This also impacts negatively on the individual because he usually is afforded less opportunity to shoulder the level of responsibility he would eventually undertake in a Fleet squadron which must rely on more junior personnel and has a more systematic and timely training program.

- Also, some manning inefficiency results from assignment of personnel to HMX-1 who cannot qualify for the full range of security clearances needed to be fully functional at HMX-1.

**IS SAFETY POLICY PREVALENT?**

-Yes. The CO publishes a Safety policy letter (Policy Letter #1) which is posted prominently throughout the squadron and is included in the Read and Initial (R&I) file and as Indoctrination program.

**DOES IT ALLOW MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

-Yes. The policy seeks to enhance resource preservation, both human and material. I think it accomplishes this goal.

**WHAT POLICIES DIRECT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS?**

- Safety and Standardization SOP; Standardization manuals; Operations SOP; NVD (Anacostia) SOP.

**IS THERE ANY CONFLICTING GUIDANCE? WHAT?**

- No.

**DO YOU OPERATE ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT WITHIN PRESCRIBED FLIGHT REGIMES (AIRSPEED, RANGE, WEATHER CONDITIONS)?**

- Yes.

**ARE ANY WAIVERS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION?**

- Yes. Waivers exist for additional NATOPS evaluators, both officer and enlisted, based on optempo and availability of personnel. Also, passenger waivers for the CH-46 (20) and the CH-53 (34 ) are in effect.

## **TASKING**

### **HOW ARE CHANGES TO THE MISSION RELAYED BOTH BEFORE AND DURING EXECUTION?**

- Fluctuation in all phases of planning is routine and driven by the WHMO. However, HMX-1 command and control links keep all players in the loop and on top of changes as they occur.

### **WHAT TRAINING IS GIVEN TO THOSE WHO SCHEDULE AND EXECUTE THE MISSION? (WHLO/ FLIGHT O)**

- There is a WHLO syllabus and evaluation system. However, DSS has no oversight of that training or routine interaction with WHLO operations, other than in his participation in White side missions. Overall there is no routine "outside" the shop review of WHLO operations. This is a somewhat insular operation.

### **WHAT OUTSIDE AGENCIES DO YOU INTERFACE WITH?**

- DSS routinely interfaces with the FAA, Naval Safety Center, HQMC (SD), and MCCDC (Ground Safety).

### **WHAT POLICIES HINDER YOUR OPERATIONS?**

- Fleet Support of Presidential Support operations creates difficulties. For example, Fleet unit aircraft are not maintained at the same standard as those at HMX-1, and equipment differences, particularly lack of adequate communication and navigation equipment, occur when such aircraft are used. In addition, Fleet units are often reluctant to accept HMX-1 waivers, such as passenger waivers, without time consuming approval through their chain of command.

### **DO YOU FEEL PRESSURED TO GO BEYOND STATED POLICIES?**

- No. Existing policies cover every contingency, which makes decisions routine.

### **DO YOU EMPOWER YOUR CREWS?**

- Yes. The Command Pilot can call a change whenever needed. Command climate also encourages a team approach, where everyone uses his expertise to contribute to mission safety.

### **DO YOU HAVE ANY UNWRITTEN POLICIES / AGREEMENTS ?**

- No.

### **DO YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED "GO / NO GO" CRITERIA?**

- Yes. Weather "go / no go criteria" dictates that a decision must be made two hours prior to launch time based on the existing weather.

### **HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH "GRAY" AREAS NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED BY EXISTENT SOPS?**

- Experience and judgment are exercised to evaluate the situation and make the appropriate decision. If the circumstances exceed the Command Pilot's frame of reference, he has the option to consult with the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer in making a decision.

**WHO HAS DECISION AUTHORITY FOR ABOVE AND HOW DO YOU ANALYZE ASSOCIATED. RISK?**

- The lift Command Pilot has on scene authority. Experience and judgment are used to analyze risk.

**WHAT AIDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR MISSION PLANNING, BOTH IN TRANSIT AND ON SITE?**

- PanAm Weather Vision is available at home base and Anacostia. In addition, computer programs facilitate flight planning and binders with step by step checklists for most situations are used both in the planning phase of a mission and on the road.

**HOW DO YOU DO NEAR / MID / LONG TERM PLANNING?**

- All planning is driven by frags received from the WHMO, HQMC ATCO, and MCCDC. These requirements are then balanced with aircraft and personnel availability as well as training requirements to maximize all phases of the planning cycle.

**HOW STABLE ARE ABOVE PLANS AND DAILY FLIGHT SCHEDULES?**

- Fluctuation in all phases of planning is routine and driven by the WHMO. This is mitigated, in part, by an ODO writing the flight schedule he will execute the next day. However, I do not believe that these fluctuations in scheduling and planning have an unmanageably negative impact on safety.

**OPERATIONS TEMPO**

**DOES OPTEMPO AFFECT CREW PERFORMANCE?**

- No.

**WHAT IS YOUR PERCEPTION OF CURRENT OPTEMPO?**

- It is currently higher than usual due to the reelection campaign.

**EFFECTS ON TRAINING?**

- Training is harder to do because less time is available. Personnel and aircraft availability are determining factors.

**HOW DOES THE PREVIOUS ANSWER REGARDING TRAINING IMPACT ON MISSION PERFORMANCE?**

- No discernible affect. Designations and qualifications are maintained in spite of higher than usual optempo.

**DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL PROCEDURES WHICH REQUIRE WAIVERS TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION? IF SO, WHO APPROVES IN WRITING? WHEN LAST VALIDATED?**

- Yes. Passenger waivers for the CH -46 and 53 were granted by DC/S Air. A waiver also exists for an excess of officer and enlisted NATOPS evaluators.

**DO YOU ROUTINELY USE THEM?**

- Yes. The passenger waivers are only used by the White side.

**CREW QUALIFICATIONS**

**HOW DO YOU MONITOR CURRENCY AND QUALIFICATIONS?**

- There is a 30-60-90 day report that goes out to Operations and the CO monthly. We also have a matrix which monitors pilot and aircrew and qualification and currency requirements. Operations also maintains a matrix for "last flew" and "night" currency ( to include NVG currency). End of month expirations are monitored by the DSS and Flight Officer to avoid expirations.

There is no Safety specific method to insure no one on flight schedule has expired qualifications or currency.

**HOW DO YOU MONITOR CREW DAY?**

- A "snivil log" is used very extensively at HMX-1. This allows a pilot to be more responsible for his own crew day. On the road, the ODO monitors crew day; however, the lift Command Pilot is primarily responsible.

**IS CURRENT CREW DAY GUIDANCE SUFFICIENT FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- Yes.

**DOES THIS GUIDANCE LIMIT FLEXIBILITY FOR DV OPERATIONS?**

- No.

**DO YOUR CREWS RECEIVE ADEQUATE PRE / POST MISSION CREW REST?**

- Usually.

**TRAINING**

**HOW DO YOU ACCOMPLISH INITIAL AIRCREW TRAINING AND DESIGNATIONS ?**

- Training is accomplished IAW NATOPS (Chap 5 VH NATOPS), OPNAVINST. 3710, and the T & R Manual. Sikorsky Ground Training is also a part of the training program.

**WHO EVALUATES HMX-1 STANDARDIZATION / INSTRUMENT CHECK PILOTS?**

- There are Standardization Board and Command Pilot Meetings which address mission related issues. Also, every aircraft commander is an instrument check pilot. For NATOPS checks, every pilot can give a check in his primary MOS aircraft. For VH aircraft, Command Pilots as well as the NATOPS officer for that aircraft ( VH-3 or VH-60) give check flights. Only Command Pilots can give White House HAC syllabus hops in VH aircraft; only the CO / XO are authorized to give Command Pilot certification or check flights.

**WHAT HAS BEEN THE IMPACT OF LOSS OF GREEN TOP AIRCRAFT ON TRAINING?**

- Certainly, aircraft availability is a key factor in timely, systematic training, and more aircraft would enhance training efficiency. In particular, an additional UH-60 would positively impact on both pilot and aircrew training.

**IS ADEQUATE SIMULATOR SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR THE EXECUTIVE SUPPORT MISSION?**

- Yes. HMX-1 sends personnel TAD to NAS Jacksonville, FL for simulator training. While not ideal, this support is adequate for overall requirements and safety of flight considerations.

**WHAT IS THE MINIMUM TIME FOR UPGRADE TO FLIGHT DESIGNATIONS?**

- None that I am aware of, other than a pilot must be a mission qualified HAC before he can enter the White House HAC syllabus. This may be an unwritten rule.

**HOW ARE EVALUATORS SELECTED FOR UPGRADE?**

- The CO decides who will be designated as a Command Pilot.

**DO YOU HAVE DEDICATED FACILITIES FOR CLASSROOM TRAINING?**

- Yes.

**DO YOU HAVE APPROPRIATE TRAINING AIDS AND DEVICES?**

- A VH -60 Trainer would be useful. Also, some enhancement to training aids available to Green side maintenance would be helpful.

**HOW IS ACT CONDUCTED?**

- A requirement exists for annual ACT. HMX-1 includes it in each of two standdowns per year. Formally trained ACT facilitators are used in all formal training and video tapes on ACT are also available. Combined pilot and aircrew ACT sessions are conducted.

**ARE ACT PRINCIPLES ACCEPTED?**

- Yes.

**WHO INSTRUCTS ACT AND WHO TRAINS THEM?**

- Three school trained officers and one locally trained officer instruct formal ACT. Four enlisted school trained ACT instructors are also on hand.

**HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH "WEAK" PILOTS / AIRCREW??**

- The Human Factors Council, which meets monthly, is designed to address these problems. There is both an officer and enlisted board. The Human Factors Council identifies problems and subsequently sets standards and timelines for correcting deficiencies. If deficiencies are not corrected within the preceding guidelines, a Human Factors Board is convened to take punitive action, as appropriate. Within memory, such a board has not been convened by HMX-1. The Executive Officer and Sergeant Major chair the officer and enlisted boards, respectively.

## **ORGANIZATION**

### **WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN SQUADRON ACTIVITIES??**

- Very good. Any squadron member can call a halt to operations, based on safety concerns, at anytime.

### **HOW IS AIRCREW RETENTION?**

- Excellent.

### **HOW DO YOU ASSESS MORALE OF THE ORGANIZATION?**

- Morale is very good. All hands are volunteers who were aware of the demands of HMX-1 before arriving. They are proud of the reputation for excellence enjoyed by HMX-1 and take a personal interest in maintaining it.

### **HOW DO YOU EVALUATE HUMAN FACTORS / PRP??**

- See section on "HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH "WEAK AIRCREW" above. In addition, HMX-1 has two Flight Surgeons assigned who are involved in the Human Factors and PRP programs.

### **IS C2 SUFFICIENT TO KEEP YOU IN THE LOOP?**

- Yes. HMX-1 maintains an excellent flow of information between all squadron departments and individuals therein.

### **WHAT CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE TO ENHANCE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- The experience level and security clearances of inbound Marines are discussed above. In addition, acquisition of an ILS capability for NAF Quantico and a fuel flow gage for each aircraft would enhance HMX-1 operations. Flight and Voice Data Recorders, GPS, and TCAS would also be important enhancements.

Ramp and hangar space is also a problem in terms of operations and safety. This will become worse with the introduction of the CH-53E to HMX-1, beginning in September.

### **ARE FACILITIES ADEQUATE?**

- No. Ramp and hangar space are inadequate for the type and number of aircraft assigned to HMX-1.

### **RELATIVE TO HMX-1 MISSION, WHAT ARE STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF AIRCREW STAN PROGRAMS??**

- Overall experience level is relatively high; Standardization manuals are detailed and checklists are available for a broad range of activities. There is also an active safety awareness and standardization program.

No noted weak points.

## **SAFETY**

### **HOW DO REVIEW SAFETY INDICATORS AND METRICS?**

- Safety surveys and questionnaires are a part of HMX-1's safety standdowns. Also, the Anymouse program and established Safety Councils provide additional indicators and metrics for the command climate and overall safety program.

### **WHAT ARE YOUR CORRECTIVE MISHAP PREVENTION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES?**

- The standard Safety School repertoire of message boards, R&I files, and mishap review briefs are part of the mishap prevention program.

OPNAVINST. 3750 and the current MOU with DC/S Air for mishap reporting define the squadrons mishap reporting procedures.

Class C mishaps and Hazard Reports are usually disseminated only within HMX-1. This does not necessarily comply with the addressees contained in the DC/S Air MOU on reporting procedures.

### **WHAT IS THE SAFETY STRUCTURE WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION?**

- There is a Safety Department, headed by a Director of Safety and Standardization (DSS), a NATOPS officer for each type aircraft, and a Ground Safety officer.


### **IS THERE ANY EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO INCREASE MISSION SAFETY?**

- Passenger manifesting on White side missions is a problem. Creating accurate manifests when passenger substitutions routinely occur upon arrival at the LZ is very difficult. Technology might be available to scan identification tags and provide quick printouts of passengers as soon as they check in.

### **HAS LACK OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY AFFECTED MISSION SAFETY?**

- No.

**I HAVE REVIEWED AND CONCUR WITH THE ABOVE INTERVIEW SUMMARY.**

  
SIGNATURE



**INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR T. J. ANDERSON  
DIRECTOR OF STANDARDIZATION AND SAFETY  
17 SEPT, 1996**

**1. IS AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT TO HMX-1 ADEQUATE?**

Yes. Medical support is as good or better than any other squadron.

**2. ARE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL A REGULAR PRESENCE IN SQUADRON SPACES?**

Yes, they are a frequent presence in hangars, flight line and shops.

**3. DO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL REGULARLY PARTICIPATE IN SAFETY ACTIVITIES? STAND-DOWNS? -TRAINING?**

They play a very active safety role, including participation in safety stand-downs, AOMs, squadron training, basic life support and buddy aid training and sit on our Human Factors Council monthly meetings to provide the medical and psychological perspective.

**4. IS MEDICAL READILY ACCESSIBLE FOR CONSULTATION REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS WITH INDIVIDUALS?**

They are rapidly accessible and available for any concerns regarding medical or psychological status of squadron members.

**5. WHAT MECHANISMS DO YOU USE TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE AT RISK FOR SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSES?**

Primarily, it is through a very strong networking capability within the squadron, which relies heavily on leadership at all levels, a strong squadron esprit, and mission orientation.

**6. WHAT ARE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU ENCOUNTER WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITH SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSORS OR PROBLEMS?**

Most problems can be promptly sent to medical for evaluation and referral for help from the various support activities.

**7. ARE LOCAL/MCB SUPPORT ACTIVITIES SUFFICIENT? E.G. FINANCIAL, FAMILY SERVICES, STRESS MANAGEMENT CLASSES, ALCOHOL, FAMILY PLANNING, ETC..**

Yes, they seem to be well organized and active in support.

**8. IS LOSS OF TIME FROM WORK FOR MEDICAL VISITS ACCEPTABLE? DOES MEDICAL TRY TO MINIMIZE THOSE LOSSES?**

Yes.

**9. HOW WELL DOES MEDICAL COMMUNICATE BACK TO THE SQUADRON ON THE STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS?**

Very good. Follow up is routine.

10. HOW WELL ARE FAMILY MEDICAL PROBLEMS ADDRESSED? ARE THEY TIMELY?

Handled quite promptly and efficiently. Everyone seems pleased with the level of medical support.

11. HOW WELL DOES MCB BRANCH CLINIC SUPPORT THE SQUADRON?

Quite well when that is required.

12. HOW WELL ARE MEDICAL REFERRALS TO OTHER MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES HANDLED?

There are considerable delays and travel involved in referrals to other medical treatment facilities.

I have reviewed the foregoing 2 pages on this the 10<sup>th</sup> day of OCT, 1996 and it accurately summarizes the information provided by me.

  
Thomas P. Anderson MAT USMC

**INTERVIEW WITH LT. J. M. ANDREWS  
HMX-1 AEROMEDICAL SAFETY OFFICER  
18 SEPTEMBER, 1996**

**1. WHAT DOCUMENTS PROVIDE POLICY AND GUIDANCE FOR THE AEROMEDICAL SAFETY OFFICER?**

General NATOPS and various squadron SOPs which pertain to the unique HMX-1 mission.

**2. HOW DO YOU MONITOR AIRCREW PHYSIOLOGY QUALIFICATION CURRENCY, AND WHAT MECHANISMS ARE USED IF QUALIFICATIONS EXPIRE?**

The NATOPS officer maintains a calendar of aircrew qualification refresher needs. Refreshers are scheduled well in advance of expiration dates, but if necessary, physiology training may be provided on site to maintain that currency, and altitude chamber/swim reqs delayed until a more appropriate time.

**3. IS THERE ADEQUATE TIME FOR TRAINING?**

Yes. Training does require considerable flexibility because of complex deployment schedules and requirements, but there is almost continuous training being conducted at HMX-1.

**4. WHAT PHYSIOLOGY/SAFETY TRAINING IS REQUIRED FOR PASSENGERS ABOARD HMX AIRCRAFT?**

Safety and aircraft egress briefs are provided by the crew chief of the aircraft. Press corps and other passengers coordinated through the White House are to be briefed by them prior to pick up.

**5. WHAT POLICY EXISTS FOR MONITORING CREW REST CYCLES AND HOW IS THAT ENSURED?**

General NATOPS provides the basic guidance, with squadron SOP's being more stringent. Crew rest briefs are provided as part of the aeromedical safety officer brief package. While that has been a concern because of high ops tempo, crew rest requirements are carefully adhered to. Cancellation of lifts when crew rest cycles are threatened are accomplished through a combination of strong leadership, squadron teamwork and the White House Liaison Officer. While there may be a sense of political pressures, the Commanding Officer will not permit safety to be compromised.

**6. WHAT CONCERNS DO YOU HAVE ABOUT AEROMEDICAL SAFETY IN THE SQUADRON?**

This is a very highly motivated squadron with a strong "can do" attitude. While this is sometimes a concern in pressing human physiologic limits, the squadron members also have a very well developed sense of concern for their mission and each other and are proactive if problems are identified. The "can do" attitude is a valuable asset, but is secondary to safety of operations.

**7. WHAT KINDS OF AEROMEDICAL TRAINING DO YOU PROVIDE AIRCREW?**

Physiologic training issues such as oxygen requirements for lifts requiring mountain travel, disorientation, visual illusions, crew rest, survival equipment, OT&E systems and the like, plus mission specific training.

**8. WHAT KINDS OF TRAINING DO YOU PROVIDE FOR AIRCREW ASSIGNED TO THE EMERGENCY PRESIDENTIAL RELOCATION MISSION?**

There is a restricted access squadron SOP which covers planning for this mission, including comprehensive aeromedical support in LASER protection, flash blindness, night vision devices and others. There is also a "night vision laboratory", which provides aided and unaided night vision acuity training for all aircrew.

# **Presidential Aircraft Commander**

## **Interview Summary, 23 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

### **Col Robert D. Barr**

#### **BACKGROUND**

In 1988, Col Barr was nominated by the Air Force to the Director of the White House Military Office (WHMO) for the Presidential Aircraft Commander (PAC) position. The Director of WHMO sent his name forward to the President's Chief of Staff (Sen Howard Baker). President Reagan interviewed and selected Col Barr as the Presidential Aircraft Commander.

#### **ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PILOTS OFFICE**

The Presidential Pilot Office (PPO) is organized under the 89th Airlift Wing (89 AW). Operational guidance comes from the Director of WHMO straight to the PPO; the 89 AW supplies funding and support. This organizational arrangement allows the PPO to concentrate entirely on their bottom line: providing safe, reliable transportation to the President of the United States. PPO has 57 (69 auth) crewmembers assigned including 4 pilots, 1 navigator, and 51 other (engineers, communications specialist, Inflight Passenger Service Specialist (IPSS), and information management personnel). Additionally, there are 72 (81 auth) maintenance, 8 administrative support, and 7 security personnel assigned to the unit. PPO has selected personnel assigned to the 89 AW (18 total - pilots, navigators, engineers, communicators and IPSS) augment the mission when needed. They are included in the 57 assigned to PPO.

#### **TASKING**

WHMO Airlift Operations tasks PPO directly. Good rapport and close cooperation between WHMO and PPO guarantee missions are executed as close to customer requirements as possible. WHMO coordinates destinations with PPO to ensure aircraft suitability before scheduling a mission. As the tasking agency, WHMO must approve mission changes. While the White House staff does not always understand PPO operational limitations, WHMO does, and provides appropriate coordination with the staff. Due to the amount of equipment and personnel that must be moved in advance of the President, e.g. USSS and WHCA, adequate time is normally available for mission planning and last minute itinerary changes are infrequent. While the PPO prefers to fly the C-20 or VC-25, depending on airfield/mission requirements, the President's preference to fly the C-9 is a point of discussion.

#### **MISSION EXECUTION**

From takeoff to landing, WHMO Airlift Operations maintains flight following and mission direction authority through communications provided by the White House Communications Agency (WHCA). A dispatch office would be of little value since the present system already has built-in "dispatch" capability. Col Barr prefers that PPO crewmembers do their own flight planning for each mission. This ensures quality planning; further, each crewmember is then completely familiar with all requirements for the mission.

### **SAFETY/OPS TEMPO**

PPO's foremost responsibility is safety of the President. The unmatched safety and reliability record of the unit speaks for itself: 52 years without an accident or even a maintenance glitch requiring the use of the back up aircraft. "Safety in Every Action" is a day-in, day-out philosophy throughout the unit. Col Barr sees his mission as maintaining the reputation of the unit and facilitating communication between the White House and the Air Force One crew. PPO participates in formal wing programs on a mission non-interference basis. When unavailable for meetings, PPO receives information from their wing augmentees and Flight Crew Information Files maintained for their secondary (non-VC-25) aircraft. PPO maintains exceptional cross-talk channels with Boeing Aircraft Company through in-house company representatives and immediately receives the latest company information on operational and maintenance practices. The PPO maintenance section tailored its Quality Assurance program after the 89 AW. The PPO's operations tempo varies depending on current events. The unit is busy but not over tasked.

### **MANNING**

PPO selects their augmentees from the wing and permanent personnel from the augmentees. Each volunteer's records are thoroughly screened and each candidate is interviewed before Col Barr approves any assignment to PPO. PPO hires only the best. An MOA between the Air Force Personnel Center, AMC/DP, 89 AW/CC, and PPO outlines the crew hiring process and requirements. Once selected as PPO augmentees, personnel begin 4-year controlled tours. Assignments to PPO are at the discretion of the Presidential Pilot.

### **DUAL QUALIFICATION/TRAINING**

All pilots maintain currency in two types of aircraft. Crewmembers receive initial and recurring training from both 89 AW instructors and contracted commercial facilities. Contract B-747 training is with United Airlines at Denver CO, while FlightSafety International provides the contract portion of C-9 (St Louis MO) and C-20 (Savannah GA) training. Instructors from 89 AW accomplish C-137 simulator training in the Pan Am facilities in Miami FL.

### **STAN/EVAL**

The Stan/Eval pyramid system is rather limited in the case of the VC-25 since there are so few Air Force pilots qualified in B-747 type aircraft, and even fewer in the VC-25. Lt Col Tillman, 89 Operations Group Stan/Eval, gives checkrides to the senior PPO evaluator pilot; he in turn evaluates the other PPO pilots. Secondary aircraft evaluations are administered within the normal 89 Stan/Eval pyramids. To preclude any perception of self-evaluation, Col Barr will soon begin to receive annual FAA-administered checkrides.

### **MODERNIZATION**

New FAA regulations require commercial carriers install some type of windshear advisory system. PPO would like a predictive windshear system on the VC-25. Current modification plans provide for installation of reactive and predictive windshear systems during FY98 heavy

maintenance. Regarding avionics and system upgrades, Col Barr noted that when new systems appear on the market or the FAA mandates equipment changes, commercial companies procure/contract almost immediately with their available funds. The less responsive AF acquisition process makes it difficult to maintain FAA Part 121 certification on the aircraft. Rather than create unique systems and configurations, PPO would prefer to follow the general aviation/commercial carrier trends. PPO maintains a dynamic 5-year plan which provides an outline for systems modification and enhancement.

//SIGNED//

ROBERT D. BARR, Colonel, USAF  
Presidential Aircraft Commander

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

# **1 HS/CC Interview Summary, 18 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

## **Lt Col Randall H. Baxter**

### **BACKGROUND**

Lt Col Baxter assumed command of the 1st Helicopter Squadron (1 HS) on 26 Aug 96 and has less than one month in command. The unit maintains alert commitments and provides support of VIP airlift missions in the Andrews AFB area. The unit recently celebrated an unprecedented milestone in helicopter safety, surpassing 38 years and 175,000 hours of accident-free flying.

### **MEDICAL**

The flight surgeon's office provides timely notification of medical grounding. The squadron does well dealing with the normal turbulence caused by the unexpected holes in the flying schedule when someone becomes sick. The timely medical grounding notifications enable the unit to maintain full coverage of the flying schedule.

### **SAFETY**

The squadron commander is responsible for the overall safety program. There is a squadron safety officer, as well as a squadron safety representative at the wing. The overall safety program is evolving from a hazard and mishap tracking program to more of a risk management perspective. This helps the unit to track, measure, and try to identify possible problems, and then take preventative actions to reduce risk. A Supervisor of Flying (SOF) is available 24 hours-a-day, providing immediate oversight for ground and flight operations. Attendance at safety meetings is very good because there is a low TDY commitment. Most of the crewmembers are able to attend the monthly meetings and briefings.

### **MANNING**

Overall manning is still above average, but not excellent. Maintenance crews are probably the best manned within the squadron. There is only one 3-level technician in the squadron. On the flight crew side, flight engineer manning is the weakest link. Pilot manning is temporarily low, but the squadron projects a get-well date in February. The problem stemmed from a temporary closure of the training pipeline at Ft Rucker, AL.

### **ASSIGNMENT HIRING**

Air Force Personnel Center submits personnel information on volunteers to the squadron commander for review. This allows the unit to review the candidate's history, qualifications, and career progression before hiring. A four-year controlled tour at Andrews AFB will continue to help attract those pilots desiring a more stable lifestyle.

### **CREW EMPOWERMENT**

In the opinion of Lt Col Baxter, the level of empowerment given to crews is very high. Squadron aircrews have a highly challenging and rewarding mission, often flying under visual meteorological conditions at low altitudes through congested Washington airspace with a single



pilot at the controls. Stabilized tour lengths and low TDY commitments build unit identification and esprit de corps.

### **TASKINGS**

The Air Force Operations Group (AFOG), located in the Pentagon has primary tasking responsibility for 1 HS. The squadron is available for USAF Special Missions Office, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, (CVAM) taskings if uncommitted by AFOG. The unit has a letter of agreement between AFOG and CVAM to this effect. AFOG has responsibility to notify CVAM if a scheduled exercise may be in conflict with a CVAM request. There is a current memorandum of understanding transferring daily operational control to the 89 OG.

### **SUPERVISION**

The dedicated SOF program provides continuous operational supervision. In addition, there is a squadron current operations function, a training function, and dedicated flight commanders--typically senior captains and majors--to provide leadership and supervision of younger officers.

### **RETENTION**

Helicopter retention is high, but it seems to be somewhat lower than past years. Lt Col Baxter believes this is due in part to the split up of the helicopter community into separate areas of expertise. Air Rescue Service divested into Special Ops Command, Space Command, and a single unit in Air Mobility Command. The displacement of the helicopter community from one central rescue service appears to have hurt retention.

### **TRAINING**

The 1 HS has a fairly standardized daily training function in addition to assigned daily alert commitments. The VIP lift business has dropped off dramatically, which in turn lengthens the time for young pilots to upgrade to full mission qualification. Further, for the first time in squadron history, new graduates from Undergraduate Helicopter Training at Fort Rucker are being assigned to the unit. These pilots require a training syllabus to bring them up from a level of complete inexperience to fully qualified and experienced. Formerly all pilots brought a base of experience to build upon after arrival.

//SIGNED//

RANDALL H. BAXTER, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander, 1st Helicopter Squadron

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Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
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**Initial Training for 89 AW Squadrons  
Telephone Interview, 2 Oct 96, Andrews AFB, MD  
Lt Col Baxter, Lt Col Garber, Lt Col Nagel**

**MEMO FOR RECORD**

On 2 October 1996, I conducted telephonic interviews with Lt Col Michael J. Garber, III, the Operations Officer for 1 AS, Lt Col Kenneth P. Nagel, the Asst Operations Officer of the 99 AS, and Lt Col Randall H. Baxter, the Commander of 1 HS. These officers provided background information for initial qualification training, both ground school and flying, for the C-9, C-20, C-137, and UH-1. Simulator training in each aircraft emphasizes Cockpit Resource Management (CRM).

For the 1 AS, initial academic classes for the C-137 are taught at Andrews AFB by instructor flight engineers. These ground school lessons last for two weeks and concentrate on checklist procedures and aircraft systems knowledge. After completing the initial academic phase, 89 AW instructor pilots conduct one week of combined academic and simulator training at the Pan Am simulator facility in Miami FL. After completing the simulator work, pilots return to Andrews for flying training consisting of six flights in squadron aircraft with 89 AW instructor pilots, followed by a qualification check ride.

The 99 AS C-9 and C-20 initial pilot qualification is similar to the 1 AS program, but FlightSafety International conducts all academic and simulator instruction. C-9 training is conducted in St. Louis MO, while C-20 training occurs in Savannah, GA. The FlightSafety International program lasts three weeks--evenly divided between systems academics and simulator training. After completing the contractor-provided ground school, C-9 pilots report for flight training/initial aircrew qualification at Scott AFB followed by qualification in the C-9C at Andrews AFB.

After completing simulator training, C-20 pilots return to Andrews AFB for additional academic training designed to familiarize them with the unique features of the 89 AW's Gulfstream IIIs and IVs. Training in the aircraft is conducted by 89 AW instructors and consists of seven flights followed by a qualification check. Flight training profiles emphasize such mission-specific training as small airfields operations (5,000 ft of runway), limited navigation aid approaches, and short field landings.

Unless previously UH-1 qualified, 1 HS pilots attend UH-1 qualification training at Kirtland AFB, NM. After two weeks of systems academics, four weeks of flying training, and a successful flight evaluation, the students are fully qualified in the aircraft. At Andrews AFB,

newly assigned pilots complete eight more hours of academics covering the Washington DC area route structure.

Flying training consists of three local-area orientation flights. Pilots are fully mission qualified after successfully completing 11 mission training flights and a comprehensive mission flight evaluation.

**//SIGNED//**

**FREDERICK L. JAKLITSCH, Lt Col, USAF**

**Executive Travel Review Board**

**These interviews were conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group**

**The interviewees' statements were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
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## **375 AW/DOV, 458 AS FLT CC, Scheduler**

**Interview Summary, 21 Sep 96, Scott AFB, IL**

**Capt Lloyd W. Beasley**

**375 OGV/Stan Eval**

**Capt David D. Baldessari**

**458 AS/Flt Commander**

**Capt Maurine E. Baillie**

**458 AS/Scheduler**

**Capt Jon B. Cushman**

**458 AS/DOV**

### **BACKGROUND**

The 458 Airlift Squadron (458 AS) mission is Operational Support Airlift (OSA). The mission of OSA is priority movement of personnel and cargo with time, place, or mission-sensitive requirements in peace and war. OSA aircraft provide low-cost flying experience for recent Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) graduates and, as a by-product, transportation for official business travel of government employees, specialized couriers, mission critical parts, and movement of patients, medical personnel, and/or medical supplies/equipment. DV-support airlift is a bi-product of the OSA mission purpose. This interview was conducted with the Operations Group Chief of Standardization and Evaluation, a 458 AS Flight Commander, a 458 AS Scheduler, and the 458 AS Chief of Standardization and Evaluation.

### **SAFETY**

The safety program in this squadron is basically like any other squadron in the command. The wing conducts quarterly safety meetings which cover topics pertinent to all crewmembers in wing aircraft. The squadron Flight Safety Officer also gives monthly briefings on aircraft specific topics and items of interest with regard to seasonal requirements. There is a strong crosstell program in the C-21 community which provides valuable safety information to the units.

One of the safety concerns voiced is the fluid nature of the scheduling process in the C-21. There is often no set schedule or "rhythm" built into the schedule. The problem with that is a crew might fly a night sortie, and then, following prescribed crew rest, fly an early morning sortie. The crew never really gets acclimated. There is also concern for the low crew experience in the C-21 units. This is primarily due to the basic nature of the C-21 mission of pilot seasoning and the fact that 75% of the authorized pilots come directly from Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT). There are several problems which stem from the low experience levels. There are times when less experienced pilots might feel pressure to complete the mission to the point of compromising their safety. Another crew member concern is an apparent lack of depth in the regulations. They believe the guidance is not tailored to the inexperienced pilots in the C-21 crew force. The new AFI and MCR formats took out detailed guidance and there is limited opportunity for the "old heads" to pass on their experiences to the new guys. Another concern is

that the 24-hour pre-mission planning period, which is required for overnight sorties, is often infringed upon by the TACC due to the fluid nature of the mission and changing requirements. If a scheduler needs to contact a crew or to some degree change a mission based upon the needs of the customer, they may waive the 24-hour pre mission preparation period to 12 hours which is also the minimum time required for crew rest.

### **CRM**

CRM training begins when pilots are first brought into the aircraft. Additional training occurs during annual continuation training blocks. As a result of the C-21 mishap in Alexander City in 1995 the mishap board recommended strengthening the CRM program. There is an additional two hours of CRM training and additional systems training for initial and recurring training as a result of the SIB recommendation. The results of this additional training are yet to be seen, however the intent of the mishap board was to provide an adequate basis for effective crew communications and operations.

### **SIMULATORS**

There are sufficient simulator resources to train all pilots in the unit. Occasionally the unit runs into scheduling difficulties trying to train a new pilot. These crew members stated there hasn't been a problem with someone going non-mission ready due to the lack of simulator availability.

### **MANNING**

The current manning ratio is at 1.13 pilots per aircraft. Crews stated this makes it difficult to perform many of the additional duties and still fly all tasked missions. There may be a 15% reduction of flying hours going into effect during the next quarter which will ease some of the current work load.

### **RETENTION**

Retention of the right people has always been an issue for flying squadrons. The young crews are going to stay in the unit for their entire tour, but the senior people with major weapon system experience are often looking for a higher headquarters job. The unit seldom denies a person the opportunity to take a good job on the staff, but it does put a burden on the experience pool the unit builds up. The Chief of Stan/Eval is a first assignment UPT pilot who has been in the unit for about 2 years. He is only the second Chief of Stan/Eval the unit has had who is a UPT hire. The low experience levels means there are few "Old Heads" in the unit to pass on experiences to the younger pilots. The most experienced pilot in the aircraft may be a UPT initial hire with three-and-a-half years experience in the aircraft.

### **SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS**

The only DV special qualification requirement is there must be an instructor in the seat if a general officer is flying. The crewmembers stated that it is possible to have the youngest crew in the unit placed against a mission launched from alert to fly a senior DV such as the SECAF. There is currently no special requirement for scheduling pilot crews for DV passengers; some crewmembers believe such a restriction would be a good idea. One way the unit is preparing crews for daily missions is the development of continuity books which provide information on strange fields and special requirements for operation at certain airfields.

### **POLICY**

Differences in command restrictions sometimes confuse DV airlift customers. One aircraft may be restricted from taking off under severe bird conditions and there may be an aircraft from another command that can roll right by and takeoff due to their commands' interpretation of bird conditions and guidance. Another situation occurs during forecast mountain wave turbulence, AMC crews are restricted from proceeding in this condition while other commands allow their crews to proceed without restriction. There is some concern and confusion over standardization between the commands where DV support airlift is concerned. Crews believe the issue should be addressed at the higher headquarters level.

### **TASKINGS**

Taskings for DV support are received from the TACC about three days prior to the mission. The scheduler and the TACC work out the details, and the unit gets the firm tasking for the mission. Typically the crews don't actually get notified until the day prior to the mission due to changes that take place after the customer's initial request for support airlift. Except for flying Generals, there is no requirement to build any specific crew compliment with respect to the DV who is supported. The unit attempts to put more experienced crews with the very senior DVs, but this isn't always possible.

### **OPS TEMPO**

The mission tempo varies. It's not uncommon to fly 60 or more hours in a month. Crews stated an instructor pilot may fly 23 or 24 sorties, which makes for a pretty tough schedule. The younger crewmembers build experience rapidly and don't complain very much about the heavy flying commitment. The training flight has built progression charts which flow out the timeline for upgrades, but heavy flying demand may prevent the co-pilots from getting the training they need, even though they get the flying hours. If there is any other training taking place, the copilots are always the first taken out of the seat, losing the opportunity to complete some required training events. Upgrade often takes longer for co-pilots due to continuity problems.

### **CREW DUTY AND CREW REST**

Standard pre-mission 12 hour crew rest periods are not waived. The basic crew duty day has been reduced from 16 hours to 12 hours as a result of the Alexandria C-21 mishap. Crews

believe that TACC mission scheduling could be more realistic and should add necessary ground turn time. Several crews remarked on the TACC predilection to schedule "minimum turn times" between sorties. When things don't go as planned, this failure to adequately schedule proper turn time can impact a 12 hour-crew duty day and necessitate the need for a crew day extension. Waiver authority to exceed 12-hour crew duty day rests with the ops group commander. This really isn't a problem, there just needs to be a "check and balance" of scheduled missions.

//SIGNED//

DAVID D. BALDESSARI, Capt, USAF  
458 AS/Ft Commander

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Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
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# **HQ ACC/LG Interview Summary, 24 Sep 96, Langley AFB, VA**

## **Col Thomas M. Belisle**

### **BACKGROUND**

Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC) Logistics at Langley AFB, VA is responsible for providing overall policy and guidance on logistics activities for subordinate units.

Representatives from key logistics functional areas were interviewed to assess the availability of guidance on DV aircraft selection criteria and preparation. Additionally, the C-21 manager provided comments regarding the C-21 program within ACC.

### **OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS, CHECKLISTS, OR POLICY LETTERS**

HQ ACC logistics has not issued any operational instructions, checklists, or policy letters related to maintenance procedures for selecting and preparing aircraft for DV missions.

Managers felt it was common knowledge to ensure the appropriate resources were dedicated to priority missions (No need to "direct" the obvious). Ensuring compliance with technical data for aircraft inspections and maintenance actions inherently make the aircraft safe.

Although there is no HQ ACC guidance, maintenance managers were confident maintenance procedures for DV missions are available and used at unit level.

Guidance used at unit level is verified by the HQ ACC Logistics and Operations Consultant and Assistance Team (LOCAT) whose purpose is to assist units in reaching higher levels of logistics management effectiveness and combat readiness. Team members review unit comprehension and compliance with current logistics directives as a means to determine the adequacy of these directives. The HQ ACC Inspector General (IG) provides another source of validation of unit compliance with maintenance procedures, inspections and safety criteria. HQ ACC managers determine unit health by reviewing reports and taking appropriate actions to correct any deficiencies mentioned above.

### **CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT**

HQ ACC routinely monitors C-21 performance. Quality performance measurements are reviewed monthly to ensure the contractor meets requirements. Additionally, there are biweekly teleconferences with Quality Assurance Representatives from all units. The contractor has maintained a 90 percent mission capability rate. The statement of work requires a minimum of 85 percent.

//SIGNED//

THOMAS M. BELISLE, Col, USAF

HQ ACC/ALG

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Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

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# **89 OSS Aircrew Training Flight Commander Interview Summary, 19 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD Captain Werner Beyer, Jr.**

## **BACKGROUND**

The 89th Operations Support Squadron (89 OSS) Training Flight Commander is responsible for initial, continuation, upgrade, ground and flight currency training of over 500 crew members in the 89th Operations Group (89 OG), and 89th Airlift Wing (89 AW). Within the 89 AW, this includes all crew positions and qualification levels in the 1st Airlift Squadron (1 AS), 99 AS, 457 AS, and the 1st Helicopter Squadron (1 HS). He also distributes the 89 OG Commander's training policy to line units, oversees the Training Review Panel, and oversees the operation of the 89 AW Aircrew Training Center.

## **COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM)**

The 89 AW CRM course follows all Air Force and AMC guidance. The training office is now working with FlightSafety International on a facilitators course to aid the CRM course. The FlightSafety course allows cross-talk between the Air Force instructors and their civilian counterparts. The requirement within the wing is to attend CRM training once a year in classroom, and it is tracked through the AFORMS computer database. Pilots, flight engineers, and flight mechanics require a CRM Simulator once a year.

## **INSTRUMENT REFRESHER COURSE (IRC)**

IRC is taught at the wing aircrew training center for those personnel who annually require it. There are three courses taught due to the varied missions and flying experience levels of the 89 AW. One course is strictly for 1 HS crews, one for 457 AS and their relatively inexperienced C-21 crews, and one for the VC-25, C-137, C-9C, and C-20 crews. The latter course concentrates on international instrument procedures, while the C-21 course concentrates on basic procedures.

## **JEPPESEN TRAINING**

Jeppesen (a commercial publishing corporation) instrument procedures are taught during the annual IRC. When personnel are in initial training for C-137, C-9C, and C-20B/H they receive one-on-one training from their instructor over these same procedures. This process is repeated when individuals are upgraded to aircraft commander and instructor.

## **TRAINING TRENDS**

The 89 OSS Training Flight tracks discrepancies annotated during flight evaluations to see if a training trend is developing. In conjunction with the 89 OSS Standardization and Evaluation branch, they analyze possible deficiencies in the various squadron training programs and review procedures to correct them. A Training Review Panel (TRP) is held quarterly by the squadrons,

to review training folders, currency tracking, CRM and IRC currency, and instructional materials being taught. A TRP is held quarterly by the Operations Group (OSS Training Flight) to review broad based operations group wide policy issues relevant to training.

### **FACILITIES**

The 89 AW aircrew training center is the single location for the majority of ground training activities within the wing. CRM, IRC, life support classes, airfield familiarization, and other required ground training classes for wing personnel.

### **ANNUAL REFRESHER SIMULATORS**

C-137 aircrew members requiring simulator training receive it every 6 months. In addition to the normal emergency procedures training, one simulator period is dedicated to line operational flying training (LOFT). A crew is given an emergency, and in real time must take the emergency to completion and safe landing. The LOFT is filmed for later CRM discussion, critiquing how the crew handled the emergency. The C-20 and C-9 aircrews receive similar training from their civilian contractor supported simulator training.

//SIGNED//

WERNER BEYER, JR., Capt, USAF  
89 OSS Aircrew Training Flight Commander

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**USMC Aircraft Maintenance Department**  
**("Greenside " or "Stake")**

**Interview with:**      **Maj Brassard**                      **Aircraft Maintenance Officer**  
                                 **MGySgt Renaux**                      **Maintenance Chief**

**1. Are Table of Organization (T/O) and manning adequate for current tasking?**

**A. T/O comments.** This T/O is patterned after a standard USMC aircraft maintenance department, but the tasks required to support all the squadron missions are not fully supported by the T/O. This department, unlike its Whiteside counterpart, supports every mission assigned to the squadron to include Executive helicopter transport, contingency support, operational test & evaluation and USMC mission tasking in the local area. Greenside support includes a limited intermediate maintenance capability for both VH and standard USMC aircraft configurations.

1) **General.** Experience requirements, support for deploying detachments and Whiteside manning are the major factors that are not properly reflected in the Greenside T/O. Since the Greenside is integral to the Executive support mission, maintenance above that required to meet fleet standards is part of the daily routine and is usually not reflected in maintenance man-hour per flight hour statistics. Daily aircraft cleaning, nightly hangaring, maintenance of VIP kits and tighter limits on routine leaks and wear are examples of increased maintenance requirements.

Additionally, the Maintenance Chief pointed out an existing error in the T/O where the Maintenance Chief billet, the senior enlisted assignment in the department, is listed as an E-8, whereas the Avionics Chief billet is listed as an E-9.

2) **Deployment/Detachment Support.** For most Executive support missions, Greenside aircraft and personnel are assigned as either a part of the detachment involved in Executive lift or in a logistics support role to ferry equipment and personnel to the trip site. Unlike fleet counterparts, this unit deploys aircraft in detachments of from one to three or more aircraft to support White House Military Office tasking. Current deployment tempo may require as many as three or four detachments to be deployed simultaneously. These dets are often "leap-frogged" from one site to another in order to cover Executive travel schedules with the assets available. In some recent missions, Greenside aircraft have been used for Presidential movement, instead of VH aircraft, and have been placed in a contingency support status at Anacostia. These missions drive manning, clearances and qualifications for Greenside personnel to the same standards as the Whiteside maintenance department. Personnel requirements exceed the T/O in areas such as Maintenance Control and Quality Assurance to meet supervisory needs. These areas are "overstaffed" at the expense of work center manning.

3) **Peculiar Equipment.** The squadron maintains and operates the obsolete GTC-85 Ground Power Unit ("Huffer") for auxiliary starting of the VH-60N. This ground support equipment is required to meet VH-60 air transportability requirements and is the only model available which can be transported in Marine helicopters. The Greenside is required to support this equipment with intermediate level maintenance in the Ground Support Equipment work center. This shop is usually overtasked due to inadequate personnel numbers on the T/O.

**B. Manning comments.** By Marine Corps policy, HMX-1 is an Excepted Command which will receive manning to 100% of T/O. However, due to security requirements, the

Executive Maintenance Department's sole source for manning of aviation maintenance MOSs is the "cleared" personnel population within the Greenside maintenance department. The impact of this requirement is explained below in questions 2 and 5.

**2. Describe personnel flow between "Greenside" and "Whiteside" maintenance departments. Does the T/O support this process?**

All personnel for the Whiteside maintenance department are drawn from the Greenside, but only after they have been cleared. Monthly meetings are held between the two departments to accomplish such transfers. If Whiteside personnel encounter a clearance problem, they are immediately transferred back to the Greenside which must either employ the "unclearables" or hold them until they can be transferred. The same philosophy applies to new personnel. If clearances are a problem, they are held on the Greenside until the situation is resolved. This causes "bottlenecks" where the clearable population available to the Whiteside becomes decreasingly smaller until personnel are transferred and new candidates arrive on the Greenside. In cases where there are shortages of a particular MOS, the two maintenance departments equally split the available population and, logically, the resultant "holes" in manning. If there is an unequal number of billets that will go unfilled, the larger Whiteside T/O will absorb the difference.

The Greenside T/O is smaller than its Whiteside counterpart. If the Greenside was forced to fill all billets on the Whiteside, the Greenside maintenance effort would be crippled and could not function safely, thus the squadron policy on equal distribution of available personnel. When personnel shortages occur due to clearances, Whiteside Marines are extended to avoid vacating billets. This can cause the build-up of a "bow wave" of personnel that need replacement and can increase the demand on the smaller Greenside manning.

Near the end of a Marine's tour with HMX-1, the Whiteside will move him back to the Greenside for "refresher" experience on fleet aircraft in preparation for his return to the fleet. This can help with Greenside manning numbers, but these individuals are usually within a few months of transfer and may not be current on Greenside aircraft.

**3. What percentage of enlisted personnel come directly from primary MOS schools? Percentage of aircrew? What is the squadron's ability to use them in the "Greenside" mission?**

A recent count revealed that about 25% of squadron personnel are first tour Marines. For enlisted aircrew this figure can be as high as 33%. First tour personnel hamper the department's ability to man billets requiring years of experience. Examples are Quality Assurance and Maintenance Control where overstaffing is required and only the most experienced personnel are assigned. Rarely will a first tour Marine gain enough skill and experience to serve in these billets. As a result, assignment of first tour Marines limits the experience base on which the department depends for manning of these critical billets.

There is also an unplanned side effect on the fleet. Many of these Marines will arrive as a lance corporal (E-3) or corporal (E-4) and depart for a fleet tour as a staff sergeant (E-6) with little experience on fleet aircraft. Unless they are exceptional performers, these Marines will struggle in subsequent fleet tours which can effect their promotions and also leave a poor impression of HMX-1 in the fleet.

In the case of enlisted aircrew, training is difficult to accomplish to fleet standards since the squadron does not routinely conduct missions to meet basic aircrew training requirements

such as night vision goggles. To qualify first tour aircrew, waivers to USMC Training and Readiness standards must be granted. This often leads Greenside supervisors to notify mission pilots of the restricted capabilities of such aircrewmen. Aircrew qualified under these waivers will require extensive training by fleet units before they can achieve full combat capability.

**4. Do you have personnel assigned for reasons other than primary duty with HMX-1 (for instance, Exceptional Family Members)?**

There are currently eleven Marines assigned to the department who cannot deploy for various reasons. Four have been assigned due to Exceptional Family Members who require special care available in the area. Four are receiving medical treatment from facilities in the D.C. area. Three are single parents. Current estimate is that about half of this group will remain in the squadron for a full tour. Since these individuals cannot deploy, they will remain in this maintenance department and will effect the deployment tempo of other assigned personnel.

**5. Are screening and assignment procedures effective and do they meet your needs? What part does the clearance process play in the maintenance department's ability to do the mission?**

(See question 5 or the Executive Maintenance Department Interview for details on the formal HMX-1 screening and assignment process also applicable to this department. Additional Greenside comments are listed below)

Like the Whiteside, this department must deploy aircraft to many locations to support the squadron's missions. Unlike the Whiteside, there is often very few Greenside maintenance representatives assigned to these detachments. This requires very capable Marines with a stable family life and no financial problems to meet the demands of the squadron's deployment tempo. Assignment of either uncleared or non-deployable personnel reduces the manpower base available to meet these mission demands.

The full impact of the clearance process is described in question 2 above.

**6. How do you train for peculiar equipment required for this mission?**

Primary training is accomplished to fleet standards under the Marine Aviation Training Management and Evaluation Program. Peculiar equipment is accomplished by on the job training with the technical publications available.

**7. Describe your aircrew training program.**

Training is accomplished in identical fashion to the fleet via the appropriate aircraft Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures program and USMC Training and Readiness standards. To create adequate numbers of trained crewchiefs, the department trains many enlisted aircrewmen from non-aircrew MOSs as secondary MOS crewchiefs as stipulated in current USMC policy guidelines. A complicating factor is the requirement to provide aerial observers as part of the aircrew complement. These positions are filled from volunteers manning other billets and are difficult to fill due to demands placed on the available time of volunteers.

**8. Have you evaluated increased contractor support?**

Clearances could cause difficulties in hiring contractor support. A contract for pick-up and cleaning of aircraft cleaning rags is being evaluated.

**9. If you could get increased contractor support of any kind, where would you apply it?**

Contract support for the mess hall and maintenance of buildings and grounds would free up Marines currently assigned to those duties.

**10. What maintenance trainers do you have for new personnel to accomplish training?**

Since this department maintains fleet aircraft, the requirement for dedicated training devices has already been met during primary MOS training prior to an individual's arrival at HMX-1. However, the current transition of the squadron from the CH-53D to the newer CH-53E will require re-training of personnel who have worked only on the CH-53D. Some schooling with training devices could be required.

Computer Based Training would also be of great benefit. As an example, the current MTIP system would facilitate refresher training for maintenance personnel.

**11. What retention/re-enlistment incentives are offered to HMX-1 Marines?**

None, other than those offered to any other Marine in the fleet. In fact, for Marines serving their first-tour with HMX-1, re-enlistment often appears as a threat of further family separation due to the likely possibility of reassignment to deploying fleet units. This, coupled with a first-termers lack of MOS and fleet experience, often acts as a disincentive for re-enlistment.

**12. In your opinion, would offering HMX-1 as a re-enlistment incentive for qualified fleet Marines help you do your mission?**

Offering HMX-1 as a re-enlistment incentive is not proactively done in the Marine Corps. In preparation for squadron screening trips to fleet units, HMX-1 representatives attempt to contact unit career planners to coordinate such efforts. At present success depends on the efforts of individuals unfamiliar with the unit's mission, on "advertising" such opportunities to individual Marines, and on fleet perceptions of HMX-1. Service with the squadron is not universally considered a career enhancing assignment.

## SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Major R.R. Brassard, 6002, Green Side Aircraft Maintenance Officer (AAMO) (B)  
Master Gunnery Sergeant B.G. Renaux, 6391, Greenside Maintenance Chief (R)

Conducted by Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, on 19 September 1996.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- (B) The campaign most intense flight operations squadron faces
- (B) Trying to get another CH-46E to replace the mishap aircraft. Working with HQMC and AirLant. OPNAV's position is that PAA for CH-46 is 6, the squadron has 6 on hand. One is OT&E aircraft, doesn't fit well into mission profile. Payload is not usually the issue, it is the number of sites that must be supported.
- (B) In the midst of transitioning from CH-53D's to CH-53E's. Will send all on hand CH-53D's to AMARC. On hand fleet configured and painted CH-53E's will be transitioned to the Reserve's. Transition won't occur until after the election.
- (R) One CH-53D already at AMARC. ASPA inspection precluded continued operational service without SDLM. Didn't make sense to send aircraft to SDLM then retire, so retired direct to AMARC.
- (B) Aircraft are properly configured to meet the mission requirements.
- (B) Greenside Maintenance maintains our aircraft in accordance with OPNAVINST 4790.2F and all applicable AirLant instructions.
- (B) Issue is more of cosmetics. Hangar aircraft every night, constant attention to detail, don't let discrepancies build up. Soundproofing is an example, have to maintain cleanliness, keep up the quality. Preventive maintenance pays dividends. Can't afford to breakdown on the road. Tighten limits, if you see going bad, change it now. Pitch Change Rod bearings as an example, change when approaching limits, don't wait until at limits.
- (R) Every Phase aircraft get full audit. All discrepancies written up then work off.
- (B) There is no limit of open discrepancies on the aircraft. As soon as discrepancy is found it is written up. Cosmetics big issue, lot of those types of discrepancies, but work hard to keep aircraft ready for the mission.
- (B) Greenside uses the standard Mission Essential Subsystems Matrix (MESM)
- (B) Configuration of the aircraft is standardized, although non standard installations exist. CH-46 has VOR/ILS installations, authorized through OPNAV and AirLant. CH-53D has the Airstair door installed, again approved for use in this specific mission.
- (B) American Flags on the side of the aircraft have to be hand painted, very time consuming to ensure proper cosmetics.
- (R) Liaison for trip support effected through the greenside Trip Leader. Trip Leader effects coordination with whiteside Trip Leader, Operations and WHLO. There is a syllabus to qualify personnel as a Trip Leader.

### Internal/External Mission Support Aircraft:

- (B) When local USMC assets are tasked to provide support the greenside will provide "plaque holder". Consists of mission crew and some additional maintenance support to ensure local aircraft is clean and local aircrew understand mission parameters.

- (R) Including in "plaque holder" support are cleaning supplies and usually a VIP kit, makes it easier on Fleet squadrons to provide support.
- (B) Trip Leader effects coordination with supporting unit.
- (B) Also provide USMC support to organizations that pass through Quantico, troubleshooting support, NDI support and tech rep support.
- (R) Most significant issue with USMC Fleet support aircraft is cosmetics. Takes great deal of effort to bring Fleet assets to HMX standards.
- (B) Whiteside coordinates external aircraft support.

#### External Agency Support:

- (B) Don't require much additional support beyond what the Fleet requires. Most additional support requirements met through tech reps.
- (B) Tech reps provide in-service training which assists in keeping aircraft up.
- (B) OTE provides logistic support for OTE tasking through the test plan.
- (B) Invest a great deal of effort in supporting ILSMT's, MLER's, etc. Participate in all venues available to better the logistic support of weapon systems assigned.
- (B) Work closely with PMA's in developing and refining requirements for new systems. Worked closely with PMA-209 on the ARC-210, working closely with PMA-261 and their contractor EER on GPS install in the CH-53E, as well as IMD Early Operational Assessment for the CH-53E.

#### Logistics Elements:

##### Manpower:

- (B) Manpower is always an issue. Cage always has the trump card, as they should.
- (R) Need personnel coming in to be Level 4 MATMEP qualified
- (R) Unclearables stay on the greenside, must eat them for a while until moved. Difficult as greenside is the little fish trying to feed the bigger fish.
- (R) Being unclearable is a stigma, become almost a non person.
- (B) Need to have sufficient qualified personnel to operate across multiple sites.
  
- (R) HQMC has directed about a dozen Marines into HMX for Exceptional Family Program or for Humanitarian reasons. Mission requires great deal of time away from home, most not capable of meeting that criteria.
- (B) Had one sergeant sent here on Exceptional Family Program, wife has MS. Deployed once, wife had problem had to come back. Not allowed to deploy anymore.
- (R) Most of these Marines are good Marines, impact on them is they feel need to do their part, not deploying to support mission makes that difficult.
- (R) The Fleet needs to do a better job of prescreening Marines before they come. Have turned away better than a dozen in the last six months just from reviewing prescreening requirements.
- (B) After body goes away it is another 6 months before you can expect a replacement.
- (E/N) The increased usage of personnel direct of out FREST training adversely impacts the ability to meet mission requirements. First term Marines do not have the background necessary for effective use in squadron. Currently about 25% inbound personnel are right out of FREST training.



- (R) Anybody listed as inbound is considered on board by HQMC, regardless if they are clearable or not.
- (B) November, December and January will be high turnover months in the cage, greenside will have to support.
- (R) 20% of inbounds are unscreened or unqualified on arrival, must get them sent away immediately.
- (B) T/O needs to be reviewed, last review was in 1992. Currently rate 6114/6124/6174 MOS's. Have to hold on greenside until cleared. Don't own H-1 aircraft, makes it difficult to effectively utilize these personnel
- (B) The greenside maintenance department manages 300 pieces of Support Equipment with 6 people. A Marine Aircraft Group with 600 pieces will have 50 to 60 people. These 6 people have to support SE for the whiteside, greenside, Anacostia and Camp David.
- (R) There are insufficient billets for Maintenance Control, Quality Assurance and GSE personnel. GSE particularly to support van complex. Need to review T/O especially as it relates to number of detachments that greenside has to support.
- (B) Integrated the I Level programs, has eliminated isolation and makes them part of the team.
- (B) Need to reduce officer churn. Troops just get to know their division officer and he is gone. No continuity.
- (B) 25.5% of new joins are right out of school. Makes it difficult to support mission. They are not qualified to support aircraft on the road.
- (B) At times last summer 33% of the aircrew were right out of school.
- (B) Aircrew selected based on MOS, although can grow own crew chiefs.

#### Supply:

- (B) Supply system support is good as it gets, FAD 1. Don't abuse the system, will use Pri 2 unless an absolute must have. Coordinate issues with AirLant to find happy medium.
- (B) Supply system is adequate to meet mission, switch to AVCAL from SHORECAL was great help.
- (B) Support trips with Pack Up kits. They are constantly reviewed to make sure only taking the right things.
- (B) Transportation of supply items to aircraft on the road done the most expeditious manner, coordinate through WHLO to see if anything going that way. Otherwise use overnight transportation, own aircraft, etc, whatever meets the mission requirement.
- (R) Trip Leader calls to coordinate supply requirements, works with Supply for source of part then coordinates transportation to site.
- (B) With NALCOMIS initiate document from the field, near real time data for Supply department.

#### Technical Data:

- (B) Squadron initiates a lot of TPDR's, pubs are a far cry from cage pubs. They are Fleet pubs so work to keep them up as best as can.
- (B) Use the standard Fleet process to submit publication discrepancies.
- (B) Receive updated publications on same cycle that Fleet experiences.

- (B) Take a publications packup for each Type/Model/Series that is part of the detachment.
- (B) Send Tech Rep on all detachments for scheduled Presidential lifts. Augments technical data available to maintainers.
- (B) Working on technical publications libraries. Review as part of the quarterly audit program. Helps to make sure that all the changes are being properly incorporated. Getting better.
- (B) Correct TPL discrepancies by a page by page verification for central TPL. Will send more people to TPL school to ensure trained personnel maintain libraries.

#### Facilities:

- (B) Cannot get a dedicated phone line for NALCOMIS. 3 phone lines for all of maintenance and the I level.
- (R) Office space is not sufficient to do what needs to be done. Inadequate lighting, bench support for maintenance and space for people.
- (R) Have to put covers over computers in Maintenance Control when it rains the roof leaks so badly
- (B) Heads always back up, SE had to build their own head.
- (B) SE Washrack built with oil water separator, but couldn't get water for a long time. Ran hose from inside to wash rack, just recently got water on the wash rack.
- (B) Aircraft wash rack only has one spot with scupper drain. Can only wash one aircraft at a time, wash all aircraft at least once a month, whiteside even more.
- (B) Most of the window airconditioners were installed by the squadron. Most everything that has been done has been done through self help. More cosmetics than anything else. Facilities need work.
- (B) Flight Equipment roof leaks badly, one flourscent light half full of water, safety hazard. Several months to fix the airconditioner, couldn't maintain controlled environment required for some of the maintenance required to be performed.
- (B) Transitioning to CH-53E, won't fit into our half of the VAL hangar. When we get V-22 the silver hangar will only accommodate 4 V-22's. There will be no space to hangar the CH-53E's that we will have. Hangar space is becoming a problem.
- (B) Ramp doesn't comply with P-80 requirements, will get worse with CH-53E's. There is a work request in to enlarge.
- (B) FOD from concrete between hangars, there is a contract to fix. Becoming a problem on the rest of the ramp.
- (B) No covered storage area for SE, exposed to elements.
- (B) Welding Shop and Paint Booth exhaust systems are not EPA compliant.

#### Training:

- (B) Unique mission training through the Trip Leader's syllabus and the rare case where 46 stands duty at Anacostia.
- (B) Formal training is an issue. To maintain readiness of aircraft have invested 1077 mandays training 178 Marines in aviation training. Funding has come from HMX budget not funded externally.
- (B) Don't have on hand formal training systems like the whiteside, we use existing schools.

- (B) Computer based training is a good idea, would assist in training. Might even consider contract training.
- (B) In-service training is two hours a week. Monday night for night crew and Tuesday morning for day crew. Training listed in the Monthly Maintenance Plan. If don't comply with scheduled training the shop must submit a deviation report. Keeps training visible and makes it important.
- (R) Use NAESU out of Norfolk, as well as local NASEU reps.
- (E) Use tech reps extensively, also used NAMTRA folks out of Memphis, especially when made change to single Airframes MOS. Helped both sides understand all the tasks involved.
- (R) Use MATMEP to standardize training.
- (B) Beginning to show all leaders that trained personnel do better maintenance which translates into better readiness. Job is easier to get done.


Support Equipment:

- (B) The existing support equipment sufficient to meet mission.
- (B) Pax River serves as SECA, problem there because sometimes upgraded SE goes to Fleets, and none to Pax. Working closely with Pax to solve problem.

3. Safety/General Operations:

- (B) Trip Leader controls maintenance on road. Trip Leader goes through syllabus to become qualified and certified for safe for flight and understands requirements of maintenance control
- (B) Aircraft go/no go decisions based upon Shop/QA/Maintenance Control analysis. Down aircraft is down. Greenside AMO on every trip, involved only if required. If really gray area call squadron and get more assistance. Has not been a significant issue.
- (B) Aircraft on the road are controlled by SOP, MI's and recently the CO issued a policy letter on taxiing. SOP's/MI's are key, do business the same on the road as we do at home.
- (R) QA is overstaffed to make sure doing best job we can. Maintenance Control is also overstaffed for same reason. Control and ensure quality. Both are "sacred". Work together well.
- (R) QA and Safety work together well, good rapport.
- (B) Overall good rapport with Operations, although think that some of the ODO's don't understand what it takes to get a launch out.

I have, on this the 27<sup>th</sup> day of September, 1996, reviewed the above summary of the interview consisting of 5 pages.

  
 Major R. R. Brassard

B.G. Renaux  
Master Gunnery Sergeant B.G. Renaux

## SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

CWO-4 J.E. Bronson, 6004, Green Side Aircraft Maintenance/Material Control Officer  
(MMCO) (B)

Master Gunnery Sergeant T.L. Downey, 6116, Greenside Maintenance/  
Material Control Chief (D)

Conducted by Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, on 20 September 1996.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- (B) Trying to get another CH-46E to replace the mishap aircraft. Rest of the mix of aircraft is sufficient for the mission. Additional aircraft come and go in support of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), never provide additional manpower to support. OTE taskers adds a heavy burden.
- (B) Mission aircraft are properly configured to accomplish mission.
- (B) Assist maintaining readiness with FAD-1 designation. Real key is preventive maintenance efforts. Aircraft going into phase get 1 week to complete, bring out with 5 AWM discrepancies although MI says 10. Make sure to fix aircraft in phase.
- (D) Aircraft always seem to break on road, maintenance effort designed to prevent as much as possible through preventive maintenance. CDI's look at aircraft going into from preventive maintenance aspect, if close fix it.
- (B) QA does an audit on aircraft coming out of phase to ensure all required maintenance was performed. Also good way to train CDI's, show them what they missed, also get chance to evaluate capability of CDI's.
- (D) Greenside Maintenance maintains our aircraft in accordance with OPNAVINST 4790.2F and all applicable AirLant instructions.
- (D) No specific limits on the number of open discrepancies against the aircraft, try to keep to a minimum. Fix the aircraft to prevent breaking on the road. Will put aircraft on maintenance hold to clean up if too many gripes start to pile up. Driven by Op tempo.
- (R) Every Phase aircraft get full audit. All discrepancies written up then work off.
- (B) There is no limit of open discrepancies on the aircraft. As soon as discrepancy is found it is written up. Cosmetics big issue, lot of those types of discrepancies, but work hard to keep aircraft ready for the mission.
- (B) Don't accept A-799 (No Defect Found) sign offs on MAF's, force technicians to review system to make sure aircraft is clean. Pilots are cut above normal, gripes they right have validity.
- (B) Greenside more stringent than Mission Essential Subsystems Matrix (MESM), heater is a "C" gripe, but aircraft is down if the heater is inop in the winter. Need Full Mission Capable (FMC) aircraft for the mission.
- (B) Configuration of the aircraft is standardized, although non standard installations exist. CH-46 has VOR/ILS installations, authorized through OPNAV and AirLant. CH-53D has the Airstair door installed, again approved for use in this specific mission.
- (B) Did stop shops from printing messages through MDS, found they were attempting to comply with Technical Directive Changes (TDC's) without direction from Maintenance Control or QA
- (D) Liaison for trip support effected through the greenside Trip Leader. Trip Leader effects coordination with whiteside Trip Leader, Operations and WHLO. There is a daily

meeting between Operations, WHLO's, Whiteside maintenance and Greenside maintenance to look at what is coming up and help coordinate.

- (D) There is a syllabus to qualify personnel as a Trip Leader.

- (D) Greenside and Whiteside Maintenance Control work closely together as do the Trip Leaders, ensure that each mission comes off successfully.

#### Internal/External Mission Support Aircraft:

- (D) When local USMC assets are tasked to provide support the greenside will provide "plaque holder". Usually 2 or 3 from Airframes to help clean up aircraft. Included are cleaning supplies and usually a VIP kit, makes it easier on Fleet squadrons to provide support.

- (B) Trip Leader effects coordination with supporting unit.

#### External Agency Support:

- (B) ILSMT's are beneficial. HMX's knowledge and participation are a big assistance to programs.

- (D) Attend as many as we can, also attend any other maintenance related conferences that will help us know what is going on and provide our input to the programs.

- (D) Work with AirLant a great deal to help with mission equipment, recently got authorization for modifications of CH-53D internal aux fuel tanks for use in a CH-46.

#### Logistics Elements:

##### Manpower:

- (B) Manpower is always an issue. SE and Airframes are short.

- (D) Unclearables stay on the greenside, must eat them for a while until moved. Difficult as greenside is the little fish trying to feed the bigger fish.

- (D) Fleet needs to do a better job in prescreening.

- (B) Personnel joining HMX straight out of school is not a good idea. They are not qualified to meet the mission requirements when they hit door. They need to be as the mission never stops, always have something going.

- (D) Combining airframes MOS's and making NDI a secondary MOS was not smart. Hydraulicsmen and metalsmiths are different trades, hard to get them dual qualified. NDI as a secondary MOS means they are hard to track, with increasing requirements need to know where they are.

- (B) Personnel turnover is terrible, had 5 NCOIC's for Maintenance Admin in a year. Hard to maintain continuity.

- (D) With the smaller bucket filling the larger bucket, the only way we can keep some continuity is through some of the unclearables. They stay around and are the continuity. The unclearable LCpl is a problem, no knowledge, just takes a boat space.

- (B) Need some officer stability, just like the troops cannot rotate them through so fast there is no continuity. Troops need to learn and respect their officers.

### Supply:

- (B) Supply system support is good as it gets, FAD 1. Don't abuse the system, will use Pri 2 unless an absolute must have. Coordinate issues with AirLant to find happy medium.
- (B) Supply system is adequate to meet mission, switch to AVCAL from SHORECAL was great help.
- (B) Support trips with Pack Up kits. They are constantly reviewed to make sure only taking the right things.
- (B) Transportation of supply items to aircraft on the road done the most expeditious manner, coordinate through WHLO to see if anything going that way. Otherwise use overnight transportation, own aircraft, etc, whatever meets the mission requirement.
- (B) Navy Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia (NAVICP(P)) need to understand mission constraints and assist with rightsizing the AVCAL.
- (B) Sending the Supply Officers as assistant WHLO's not a good idea, need them at home to coordinate issues. If they want the control and have everyone go through them then they need to be home.
- (B) On NALCOMIS OMA, real time passing of documents. When on road use NALCOMIS and then work back through home Maintenance Control to ensure everything is OK.

### Facilities:

- (B) Office space is not sufficient to do what needs to be done. Inadequate lighting, bench support for maintenance and space for people. A work around for Production Control would be to put to Mobile Maintenance Facility vans on the hangar deck and work out of there.
- (D) Have to put covers over computers in Maintenance Control when it rains the roof leaks so badly.
- (D) Facility needs to be upgraded so it is easier to do maintenance.
- (B) There are only 3 lines into Supply, makes communications very difficult and slows process of getting aircraft up.

### Training:

- (B) Unique mission training through the Trip Leader's syllabus and the rare case where 46 stands duty at Anacostia.
- (B) Everyday is a training day, need to train constantly and we do.
- (D) Use MATMEP to standardize training.
- (B) Beginning to show all leaders that trained personnel do better maintenance which translates into better readiness. Job is easier to get done.

### Support Equipment:

- (B) The existing support equipment sufficient to meet mission.
- (B) Pax River serves as Support Equipment Cognizant Activity (SECA), problem there because sometimes upgraded SE goes to Fleets, and none to Pax. Working closely with Pax to solve problem. Should look at AirLant being SECA
- (B) Greenside MMCO is the IMRL manager, there shouldn't be an IMRL MOS

maintained in the cage. Has to come back when we do inventories or transactions anyway.

3. Safety/General Operations:

- (B) Trip Leader controls maintenance on road. Trip Leader goes through syllabus to become qualified and certified for safe for flight and understands requirements of maintenance control. Spends two weeks in Maintenance Control.
- (D) QAR's serve as Trip Leaders.
- (B) Aircraft go/no go decisions based upon Shop/QA/Maintenance Control analysis. Down aircraft is down. Greenside AMO on every trip, involved only if required. If really gray area call squadron and get more assistance. Has not been a significant issue.
- (D) Anyone can stop the show if they think something is unsafe. Stop then sort out what is the right
- (B) Aircraft on the road are controlled by SOP, MI's and recently the CO issued a policy letter on taxiing. SOP's/MI's are key, do business the same on the road as we do at home.
- (D) QA is overstaffed , still not enough for all the dets, but best comprise we can come up with.



## **201 AS Maintenance Flight**

**Interview Summary, 19 Sept 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

**Lt Col George Cibulas, CMSgt Stephen Maynard, CMSgt Donald Brubaker, SMSgt Karl Kaufman, and MSgt Jeffrey Norvell**

### **BACKGROUND**

Lt Col Cibulas is the Chief of Maintenance for the 201 Airlift Squadron. CMSgt Brubaker is the Chief of Quality Assurance (QA), CMSgt Maynard is the Aircraft Generation Branch (AGB) Chief, SMSgt Kaufman is the Assistant QA Chief, and MSgt Norvell is the NCOIC of Plans and Scheduling. The interview took place in the 201 AS maintenance area. The 201 AS aircraft maintenance is organic with Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for supply actions. There are currently 3 C-22s and 4 C-21s assigned. This interview was conducted because the 201 AS provides DV code 1 and 2 support as part of their normal mission taskings.

### **RESOURCES & FUNDING**

Resources and funding are adequate. There are no areas impacting safety.

### **SUPPLY/PARTS**

There are no parts shortages that effect safety; the contractor is very responsive when an aircraft is down for parts. A vast number of parts are on hand, and when one is not available most of the time it is received the next day.

### **PERSONNEL**

Manpower is adequate; 121 full-time authorized (plus 6 part-time) with 115 full-time individuals assigned. Currently organized into 4 branches; component repair branch (CRB), equipment maintenance branch (EMB), aircraft generation branch (AGB), and maintenance staff such as quality assurance and plans and scheduling. Currently planning for a complete reorganization into the current AMC structure with specialist assigned to the AGB. Maintenance is conducted on a three shift operation 5-days per week, with weekend work as required. Submitted recommended reorganization structure and 120 required manpower positions to the Guard Bureau for staffing in preparation to stand-up the new structure.

### **LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION**

Leadership and supervision are very good. Every mission is handled like a DV mission. There are no special actions taken when an aircraft is going to carry a DV. All maintenance actions are professionally accomplished with the appropriate level of oversight provided. Everyday we operate like we are in an ORI. We do things smart, professional, and at the appropriate pace. There is a clear line of authority and responsibility through the production supervisors or flight chiefs to maintenance leadership. There is also a very good line of communication between maintenance and operations with the Squadron Commander always receptive to maintenance

requirements and needs. The Commander has branch calls monthly and he has a computer LAN rumor icon for his people to ask about rumors they hear about. He provides an answer for all he is aware of and takes for action those he is not knowledgeable about. It is ingrained in the unit that the aircraft will not go if it is not safe. When peak periods of maintenance appear people are moved to the peak work shift to cover the work load and everyone pitches-in. Morale, in the organization, is very high for the most part; the reorganization and the vast number of potential changes has people worried; but the lines of communication helps keep all the apprehension in check. One morale building activity undertaken is the set-up of an FAA approved airframe and powerplant general (A&P) test instruction contractor to come and teach the course to unit personnel that wanted to take the A&P test. This course was widely attended and received great reviews from those who participated.

### **FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT**

There are no known facility or equipment shortfalls that impact safe operations.

### **IMPOUNDMENT PROCESS**

The impoundment process is managed within the maintenance section. Quality assurance manages the aircraft and insures the aircraft is properly repaired. The Chief of Maintenance or the QA Chief will formally impound the aircraft from the recommendations of any maintenance person who feels there is a serious problem.

### **TRAINING**

Training is centrally managed through the assigned training manager. All training is current. A stable work force within the unit requires very little initial training but training plans are available when a new person comes into the unit. Recurring training is the largest workload and is also centrally managed.

### **AIRCRAFT GENERATION**

There are no special aircraft preparation standards. All aircraft are prepared the same, following all maintenance technical manual requirements and standard maintenance practices. Time changes are accomplished at the nearest maintenance action prior to it becoming overdue.

### **SAFETY**

Safety is first and foremost in everyone's minds in all activities. Pressure to accomplish the mission is always present but never to the point where safety is compromised. Operations and maintenance have a great working relationship. The ground safety program is managed by the Quality Assurance (QA) section. QA has established a safety information net within the squadron so that safety tips/bulletins are disseminated electronically. Information is passed out much faster with this electronic net set-up. Commercial safety bulletins are also received and sent out for everyone to see. Safety info is also passed out during rollcalls and maintenance and commanders calls.

**MODERNIZATION**

Product improvement is accepted by everyone. Product improvement is not only directed towards aircraft hardware but also towards all the technical manuals used throughout the maintenance complex. Technical manual changes are submitted and improvements are made, even to the commercial books; although changing commercial technical manuals is a slower process than changing an Air Force technical manual.

**BOTTOM LINE**

Safe reliable aircraft are provided everyday.

//SIGNED//

DONALD E. BRUBAKER, CMSgt, USAF  
Chief, Quality Assurance

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statements were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**BRIGADIER GENERAL USAF (ret) JAMES L. COLE, JR.**

Former 89th Airlift Wing Commander  
and USAF Safety Officer

Interview Date: 23 September 1996

The Presidents Pilot's Office (PPO) is operationally part of the 89th Airlift Wing but reports directly to the White House Military Office. Second tier Presidential airlift support can consist of many other aircraft and units that are tasked to provide operational airlift support to move everything from White House Communications Agency equipment, Secret Service vehicles, and others.

The following are suggested 89th Airlift Wing area of interest:

- Criteria for flight crew selection
- Experience levels and promotion potential
- Promotion selection rates
- Follow-on assignments, good or bad?
- HQ AMC understanding of VIP airlift manning and support

The following are second tier airlift areas of intent:

- Flight crew experience levels and selection criteria for mission manning
- Command and control mission monitoring
- VIP Orientation training
- Selection and schedule authority for VIP airlift
- Recognition given for participation

## SUMMARY OF WITNESS INTERVIEW

Master Sergeant D.M. Cowan, 6119, Executive Flight Detachment Quality Assurance Chief (N)

Conducted by Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, on 18 September 1996.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- The campaign most intense flight operations squadron faces.
- Need two additional VH-60N's to be meet campaign and added mission requirements. The H-60 is a more transportable aircraft
- Aircraft systems better than what the Fleet has. Easy to work on, dedicated training. If technician can work on H-60 can work on either aircraft in the cage.
- Checks and balances in system, half lives for Time between Overhauls (TBO's) and finite lives, 62 hour inspections for the H-3 and SPAR provide better care for the aircraft. The care shown these aircraft helps sustain reliability
- Special Progressive Aircraft Repair (SPAR) is the scheduled depot level maintenance. Their is no Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) inspection, it is a hard requirement. It is only adjusted a few months when required to meet committments.
- Greater preventive maintenance applied to aircraft. Cannot hide discrepancies during phase. Do an aircraft audit on 62 hour inspections. Use many sets of eyes on aircraft to ensure material condition.
- School training essential, teach everyone the right way to do maintenance and then monitor closely. The IPR's on the manuals ensure manuals are accurate and up to date. Manuals better than anyone else's.
- QAR's spend as much time as possible on hangar deck to watch maintenance and procedures.
- Maturity of personnel recruited and working in cage helps assure SOP's and proper maintenance techniques are employed.
- Allow no more than 5 discrepancies on the aircraft, but strive for 0. The mission won't allow gripes to build up. Helps make sure aircraft are always ready for the mission.
- No non standard installations in the VH aircraft.
- Compliance with applicable technical directives handled through QA in accordance with established instructions. Work closely with NAVAIR (specifically the APML) and local Sikorsky Tech Reps to know what will affect the aircraft.
- The cage gets support from the greenside for NDI, Flight Equipment (primarily CAD's) and for tire and wheel. The I level does some black boxes. Good coordination. Coordination done Maintenance Control to Maintenance Control.

### Internal/External Mission Support Aircraft:

- Provide "plaque holders" for like type aircraft missions to supporting Fleet squadrons. Mission crew from HMX helps smooth issues.
- WHLO coordinates for SE and facility support. WHLO's know understand maintenance support requirements. WHLO's work well with cage maintenance.
- Air Force C-130 and C-5 crews interface well with HMX. COM 5.2, a load plan program kept in QA. Q A does all the load plans for the squadron regardless of type of aircraft, includes local assets. Provide WHCA support for load plans, take on road on NALCOMIS laptops.

- Squadron works well with vendors. Squadron personnel working with Pax River test folks on upgrade to Com/Nav system software. Ensure involvement in all applicable processes, more like arm than fingers in the pie.

#### External Support - Other Agencies:

- Squadron participates in ILSMT's. Work closely with NAVAIR on issues for ILSMT's, a pre ILSMT meeting on 24 September to review issues.
- Program coordinators for VH aircraft provide a single point of contact for information flow.

#### Logistics Elements:

##### Manpower:

- 24 month requirement to work in the cage. Even with this need to look at bringing back experienced personnel to provide stronger knowledge base.
- Since only operators of aircraft school essential. School dates are hard requirements. No formal school no qualifications, no CDI, no CDQAR or QA.
- If you have a aircrew MOS you fly. Home grow crewmembers as well. 50 hours Crew Member under Training (CMT) then NATOPS eval, plane captains and crew chief boards. This is not a paper process.
- Standardize training through formalized schools, use of local tech reps and MATMEP. Local tech reps are well utilized, attend Maintenance meetings and know where problems are.
- Real fear is that after campaign there will be a big flush of people. Recruiting trips help, but need to come up with way of better stabilizing experience. Short period to get people up to speed on unique aircraft.

##### Technical Data:

- More involvement in the development of manuals than in fleet.
- Semi annual In Process Review (IPR) of publications. Involves NAVAIR, NATSF, Sikorsky and HMX. Review pubs and have Sikorsky tech pubs writer on site to update publication.
- Redline pubs are available with 30 days. Formal copies are available within 90 days usually.
- Hold complete file of aperature cards, have access to any drawing if required to sort out gray area of a discrepancy.
- Aperature cards also used in IPRs to ensure accuracy of the publications.
- Use digital video camera on discrepancies. Data sent to the factory where engineers overlay on drawing. Reduces turn around time for answers.

##### Facilities:

- Great training facilities.
- From QA perspective, aircraft movement is dangerous, a "kabuki dance" to get aircraft out. Ding blades since required to lift up and pull down blades and rotate head to get aircraft out. Lots of aircraft movement required.

- If fire in hangar best we could do would be to get 3 VH assets out.
- They are old buildings and spaces show it.
- Hangar deck is a real problem, uneven, have to watch as tow aircraft inside and out.
- Lose space in hangar from hangar door motors, cut off 6' of space.
- Everyone must always be watching, dangerous and without everyone watching too easy for dings.
- Ancostia is a good facility.
- Facilities maintenance sometimes good, appears to be base on dollars available.

Training:

- Availability of local school is great. Hard school requirements important to maintain high standards.
- Use of tech reps and instructors for in-service training is good.
- Developed a MATMEP syllabus for VH aircraft. No MATMEP, no stamp

Support Equipment:

- SE is sufficient. Use the right tool for the job. Work arounds are not acceptable.
- Developed new containers for use on 46/53 aircraft. New containers are better way of transporting trip pickups.
- Ship boxes for C-5 transport of H-60 and H-3 provide everything.
- Address SE issues through ILSMT. No real pressing issues today.

3. Safety/General Operations:

- Maintenance Control controls maintenance on road. The trip leader is usually the Maintenance Controller, qualified and certified. Maintenance controlled and done in accordance with 4790.
- QA has final say on whether an up or down discrepancy. Use all the resources available is there is a question. Tech rep availability helps.
- SOP and CO's new policy govern how aircraft handled on the road.
- QA is overstaffed, need to be that way to ensure quality of maintenance.
- NAMDRP reporting unique do to nature of mission and limited number of aircraft. All NAMDRP reporting coordinated through NAVAIR.
- Hazreps have not been big issue, stay on top of issues and keep them from being problems.
- QA is maintenance department's own best police. Maturity and seniority of QA along with strong leadership is key element to ensuring best maintenance possible.

I have, on this the 30th day of September, 1996, reviewed the above summary of the interview consisting of 3 pages.

  
Master Sergeant D. M. Cowan

## **1 AS/Chiefs of Aircrew Specialties**

**Interview Summary, 19 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

**Lt Col Rickey I. Davis, Maj Gregory D. Keller, MSgt Carolyn D. Healy,  
MSgt Donnell Smith, MSgt Kurt A. Walker, TSgt Glenn A. Sparkman**

### **BACKGROUND**

The group interviewed supervise primary crew positions aboard the VC-137 in the 1st Airlift Squadron (1 AS), and include a Navigator, Pilot, Inflight Passenger Service Specialist, Communications Systems Operator, and two Flight Engineers. These crew positions are representative of a typical Air Force Two aircrew. Their motto, the SAM FOX motto, is: Safety, Passenger Comfort, and Schedule Reliability.

### **SAFETY**

The monthly meeting is normally held in conjunction with commander's call. Summary notes are published in the Flight Crew Information File (FCIF) and reviewed by all squadron members not at the meetings. Safety boards are posted throughout the squadron and individual awareness of the unit's outstanding reputation and safety record is prevalent. Good cockpit resource management is exercised during every mission, and each crewmember makes an important contribution to the success of each flight. A computer database, post-mission trip reports, and unit bulletin boards help pass on a continuity of knowledge and safe operating procedures.

### **ASSIGNMENT POLICY AND SELECTION**

All 89 AW crew positions are selectively manned. An exhaustive records review is accomplished, and candidates undergo a formal application and interview hiring process. As part of the pilot hiring process, invited applicants are requested to attend informal meetings and a series of interviews. The rigorous screening process results in a highly select group of well-qualified individuals able to represent the Air Force and the United States throughout the world. Minimum experience criteria are outlined in the 89 AW/HQ AMC/HQ AFPC memorandum of agreement on the 89 AW hiring process. Electronic bulletin board advertisements are run in cycle with the normal Spring and Fall hiring cycle, but additional hiring may be accomplished as necessary.

### **MANNING**

Overall manning is healthy. The hiring process allows for manning each crew position at 100 percent. There are two retention problems. High-year tenure rules impact retention for enlisted crew members. This, along with reduction in force and early-out programs, which provides avenues and incentives for highly qualified and competent crewmembers to depart the Air Force, continued to draw down experience.



**CREW REST**

Every effort is made by the crew and the contact on the DV party to make sure crew rest is not interrupted. During missions that require extended operations, crew positions are augmented by additional qualified crewmembers. Safety is never compromised, and crews are empowered to declare when further operations would jeopardize safe operations.

//SIGNED//

RICKEY I. DAVIS, Lt Col, USAF

Chief Navigator

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**Interview with Major Bill Delano  
HMX-1 Flight Officer  
19 September 1996**

**POLICY**

**IS HMX-1 ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED, ORGANIZED, AND MANNED FOR CURRENT OPTEMPO?**

- Yes. However, in high optempo periods, we must remain very flexible. Late breaking requirements necessitate "leap frogging" assets from one site to another on short notice. This requires good communication and coordination between all the key players, such as the Command Pilot and crews on the road as well as the Operations and Maintenance departments at Quantico.

**IS SAFETY POLICY PREVALENT?**

- Yes. All concerned try to leave nothing to chance.

**DOES IT ALLOW MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- Yes. If there are conflicts which can't be worked out at our level, the CO is advised of the problem, and he coordinates with the WHMO to resolve it.

**WHAT POLICIES DIRECT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS?**

- Safety/Standardization SOP; NATOPS Manuals; Operations Orders; NVD (Anacostia) SOP; White House SOP; White House Operations Plan (classified); Letter of Agreement with MCAF Quantico and 2nd Marine Air Wing for closed field operations.

**IS THERE ANY CONFLICTING GUIDANCE? WHAT?**

- No. However, there are differences, covered by waivers, between White and Green side rules. For example, the passenger limits are waived for the White House mission.

**DO YOU OPERATE ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT WITHIN PRESCRIBED FLIGHT REGIMES (AIRSPEED, RANGE, WEATHER CONDITIONS)?**

- Yes.

**ARE ANY WAIVERS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION?**

- Yes. Waivers exist for NVG qualifications, i.e., enlisted aircrew only need 15 vice 25 hours for initial qualification. Also, pistol and rifle qualifications are done every two years, vice annually. Also, passenger waivers for the CH-46 (20) and the CH-53 (34) are in effect for the White side mission.

**TASKING**

**HOW DO YOU RECEIVE TASKERS FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULES / MISSIONS?**

- Airlift Operations calls the WHLO who notifies Operations. Hard copy tasking follows later. We currently have an HMX-1 Liaison Officer working in Airlift Operations. This is paying major

dividends in regard to improved planning and coordination. ATCO and MCCDC also task missions. ATCO is notified by HMX of MCCDC tasking. Silence is consent. OT&E can also task internally via a written "frag" to squadron operations.

**WHO VALIDATES ABOVE TASKERS (AIRCRAFT MIX, CREW DUTY DAY, SUITABLE FIELDS/ LZS, SERVICING)?**

- The WHLO, Operations, and Maintenance officers collaborate on feasibility of taskings. If questionable, the Operations officer will then make a recommendation to the CO who will make the final decision.

**HOW DO YOU SAY NO? HOW DO YOU DECLINE A MISSION? WHO SAYS NO??**

- The CO will make the decision on rejecting a mission after recommendations from his staff.

**HOW ARE CHANGES TO THE MISSION RELAYED BOTH BEFORE AND DURING EXECUTION?**

- Changes are relayed through the WHLO to HMX-1. On the road, the Military Aide will relay changes to the WHLO who then relays them to HMX-1. Green side missions are verified through ATCO a week prior to the event.

**WHAT TRAINING IS GIVEN TO THOSE WHO SCHEDULE AND EXECUTE THE MISSION? (WHLO/ FLIGHT O) ?**

- New ODOs are coupled with an experienced ODO for two weeks. After observing working ODOs and studying appropriate directives for one week, the new ODO will write and execute, under close supervision, a daily flight schedule during the last week of training. Thereafter, he is assigned regular ODO duties.

**WHAT OUTSIDE AGENCIES DO YOU INTERFACE WITH?**

- We routinely interact with ATCO, WHMO, and MCCDC.

**WHAT POLICIES HINDER YOUR OPERATIONS?**

- A continuing difficulty is the late submission or verification of missions from the WHMO.

**DO YOU FEEL PRESSURED TO GO BEYOND STATED POLICIES?**

- No.

**DO YOU EMPOWER YOUR CREWS?**

- Yes. The CO supports the required "on scene" decisions that aircrews must often make in the demanding environment of the Presidential support mission. However, this empowerment is within the well defined parameters of established rules and regulations.

**DO YOU EMPOWER YOUR CREWS?**

- Yes. The Command Pilot can call a change whenever needed. Command climate also encourages a team approach, where everyone uses his expertise to contribute to mission safety.

**DO YOU HAVE ANY UNWRITTEN POLICIES / AGREEMENTS ?**

- No.

**DO YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED "GO / NO GO" CRITERIA?**

- Yes. Weather "go / no go criteria" dictates that a decision must be made two hours prior to launch time based on the existing weather.

**HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH "GRAY" AREAS NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED BY EXISTENT SOPS?**

- Experience and judgment are exercised to evaluate the situation and make the appropriate decision. If the circumstances exceed the Command Pilot's frame of reference, he has the option to consult with the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer in making a decision.

**WHO HAS DECISION AUTHORITY FOR ABOVE AND HOW DO YOU ANALYZE ASSOCIATED RISK??**

- The lift Command Pilot has on scene authority. Experience and judgment are used to analyze risk. The CO is then back briefed on the circumstances and the resultant decision.

**WHAT AIDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR MISSION PLANNING, BOTH IN TRANSIT AND ON SITE?**

- Computer programs facilitate flight planning and binders with step by step checklists for most situations are used both in the planning phase of a mission and on the road.

**HOW DO YOU DO NEAR / MID / LONG TERM PLANNING?**

- I define "long" as two months, "mid" as two months to three weeks, and "near" is less than three weeks.

Long and mid term planning is difficult due to a lack of information from the WHMO for longer range events. Nothing really becomes firm until the near term. This is driven entirely by the WHMO.

**HOW STABLE ARE ABOVE PLANS AND DAILY FLIGHT SCHEDULE?**

- See last question. The flight schedule routinely fluctuates, but is manageable without compromising safety. However, the WHMO drives our inability to plan other than near term. This creates major inefficiencies in both personnel and equipment.

### **.OPERATIONS TEMPO**

**DOES OPTEMPO AFFECT CREW PERFORMANCE?**

- Yes. But it is not a significant or unacceptable degradation .

**WHAT IS YOUR PERCEPTION OF CURRENT OPTEMPO?**

- It is currently very high due to the reelection campaign.

**EFFECTS ON TRAINING?**

- Training is stretched out over a longer period of time. The syllabus is not compromised in regard to quality; however, it becomes less efficient due to competing demands on personnel and aircraft.

## **CREW QUALIFICATIONS**

### **HOW DO YOU MONITOR CURRENCY AND QUALIFICATIONS?**

- There is a 30-60-90 day report that goes out to Operations and the CO monthly. We also have a matrix which monitors pilot and aircrew and qualification and currency requirements. Operations also maintains a matrix for "last flew" and "night" currency ( to include NVG currency). End of month expirations are monitored by the DSS and Flight Officer to avoid expirations.

### **HOW DO YOU MONITOR CREW DAY?**

- The ODO uses the aids described in the previous question as well as the previous day's flight schedule and "snivel" log to insure crew day limits are not violated when writing the flight schedule.

### **IS CURRENT CREW DAY GUIDANCE SUFFICIENT FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- Yes.

### **DOES THIS GUIDANCE LIMIT FLEXIBILITY FOR DV OPERATIONS?**

- No.

### **DO YOUR CREWS RECEIVE ADEQUATE PRE / POST MISSION CREW REST?**

- Yes. Built in weather and maintenance days allow additional flexibility in complying with crew day requirements .

## **TRAINING**

### **HOW DO YOU ACCOMPLISH INITIAL AIRCREW TRAINING AND DESIGNATIONS ?**

- Training is accomplished IAW NATOPS, OPNAVINST. 3710, and the T & R. Manual. Sikorsky Ground Training is also a part of the training program. In addition, an initial course rules test and other indoctrination requirements are monitored via a grease board in the Ready Room. .

### **WHAT SYLLABUS IS USED FOR TRAINING?**

- A locally produced VH T&R syllabus and the standard T&R syllabus for the CH-46 and CH-53 are used for training.

### **WHO EVALUATES HMX-1 STAN / INSTRUMENT CHECK PILOTS?**

- Every aircraft commander is an instrument check pilot. For NATOPS checks, every pilot can give a check in his primary MOS aircraft. For VH aircraft, Command Pilots as well as the NATOPS officer for that aircraft ( VH-3 or VH-60) give check flights. Only Command Pilots can give White House HAC syllabus hops in VH aircraft; only the CO is authorized to give Command Pilot certification or check flights. No one evaluates the CO.

**WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF LOSS OF GREEN TOP AIRCRAFT ON TRAINING?**

- The effect on training is not significant; however, an additional H-60 would significantly enhance training opportunities in that type aircraft and lower utilization on existing H-60s.

**IS ADEQUATE SIMULATOR SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR THE EXECUTIVE SUPPORT MISSION?**

- Yes. The squadron uses simulators at NAS Jacksonville, FL. Crews are sent TAD for that training.

**WHAT ARE YOUR RECURRING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS?**

- The standard as required by NATOPS, such as water survival, egress, etc.

**WHAT IS MINIMUM TIME FOR UPGRADE TO FLIGHT DESIGNATIONS**

- Guidelines are 40 hours to mission co-pilot; 100 hours to White House HAC plus 12 months from the time designated a mission co-pilot plus 2000 hours total.. No formal instruction mandates these guidelines.

**DO YOU HAVE DEDICATED FACILITIES FOR CLASSROOM TRAINING?**

- Yes.

**DO YOU HAVE APPROPRIATE TRAINING AIDS AND DEVICES??**

- They are probably adequate, but certainly could stand improvement.

**HOW IS ACT CONDUCTED?**

- A requirement exists for annual ACT. HMX-1 includes it in each of two standdowns per year. ACT is also included in instrument exams.

**ARE ACT PRINCIPLES ACCEPTED?**

- Yes.

**WHO INSTRUCTS ACT AND WHO TRAINS THEM?**

- Three school trained officers and one locally trained officer instruct formal ACT. Four enlisted school trained ACT instructors are also on hand.

**HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH "WEAK" PILOTS / AIRCREW?**

- The Human Factors Council, which meets monthly, is designed to address these problems. In addition, HMX-1 applicants are carefully screened to avoid recruiting weak pilots / aircrew.

## **ORGANIZATION**

### **WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN SQUADRON ACTIVITIES?**

- Excellent. Departmental meetings are held weekly, or more often if necessary.

### **HOW IS AIRCREW RETENTION?**

- Excellent.

### **HOW DO YOU ASSESS MORALE OF THE ORGANIZATION?**

- Excellent. Standards are known and accepted. All HMX Marines are volunteers who knew what to expect before arriving in the squadron, and they remain highly motivated, either in spite of or because of the highly demanding mission.

### **IS C2 SUFFICIENT TO KEEP YOU IN THE LOOP?**

- Yes. HMX-1 maintains an excellent flow of information between all squadron departments and individuals therein.

### **DO CREWS KEEP YOU INFORMED OF MISSION CHANGES?**

- Yes. Key people for any mission are always in the information loop.

### **WHAT CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE TO ENHANCE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- Better planning and notification by the WHMO would promote less turbulence in mid to near term scheduling of aircraft and crews.

Also, an improved manifest system for White side operations would enhance the Presidential support mission .

### **ARE FACILITIES ADEQUATE?**

- No. Ramp and hangar space are inadequate for the type and number of aircraft assigned to HMX-1.

### **RELATIVE TO HMX-1 MISSION, WHAT ARE STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF AIRCREW STAN PROGRAMS?**

- Overall HMX-1 has a very strong program. However, the amount of time deployed often prevents timely, systematic training progression. While this does not degrade mission performance or compromise safety, it does often degrade training efficiency.

## **EQUIPPED**

### **WHAT ARE YOUR RESOURCE SHORTFALLS?**

- As mentioned earlier, hangar space is inadequate. Also, training devices should be upgraded.

### **ARE OPERATIONS AFFECTED BY NOT HAVING INTEGRATED GPS AND TCAS II ?**


- Operations could be improved by adding these systems, particularly if used by Nighthawk 3 and 4. These aircraft frequently must land in the zone ahead of Marine One and Nighthawk 2.

**SAFETY**

**IS THERE ANY EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO INCREASE MISSION SAFETY?**

- Yes. GPS, Weather Vision, and TCAS in all Green side aircraft would improve safety.  
Weather Vision is also needed in VH-3 aircraft

**I HAVE REVIEWED AND CONCUR WITH THE ABOVE INTERVIEW SUMMARY.**

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\_\_\_\_\_  
**SIGNATURE**



**COLONEL MELVIN De MARS USMC**

**Former CO HMX-1**

**Telephone Interview Date: 1 October 1996**

There are cyclical operating tempos with each major election year having the highest operating tempo. In a campaign year short notice requests are more frequent. Normally communication with White House support groups was good. On the rare occasion when HMX-1 could not meet the tasking because of flying safety, weather, landing site desired, etc., this was explained and the support people adjusted accordingly. Secret Service personnel cooperation was always good.

AMC provided good lift support. However, there were times when AMC airlift aircraft had maintenance problems and helicopters had to be downloaded into other AMC airplanes. The flight crews appeared to be well qualified and AMC tried to meet all needs, however the airplanes are old and require continuous maintenance. HMX-1 always added one day to the airlift transit time for maintenance contingencies.

**Interview with Major Kevin Devore  
HMX-1 Operations Officer  
20 September 1996**

**POLICY**

**IS HMX-1 ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED, ORGANIZED, AND MANNED FOR CURRENT OPTEMPO?**

- Overall, yes. However, we are short aircraft. In addition to the CH-46 just lost, we are short one or two VH-60s, based on average operational tempo. Also assignment of first tour personnel creates difficulties for both the unit and the assigned Marine. Due to high optempo, less time is available to conduct the regularly scheduled training needed by first tour personnel. Meanwhile, until such training is accomplished and a modicum of experience gained, the first tour Marine has less utility to the unit than more experienced, senior Marines. This also impacts negatively on the individual because he usually is afforded less opportunity to shoulder the level of responsibility he would eventually undertake in a Fleet squadron which must rely on more junior personnel and has a more systematic and timely training program.
- Also, some manning inefficiency results from assignment of personnel to HMX-1 who cannot qualify for the full range of security clearances needed to be fully functional at HMX-1.

**IS SAFETY POLICY PREVALENT?**

- Yes. The CO publishes a Safety policy letter (Policy Letter #1) which is posted prominently throughout the squadron and is included in the Read and Initial (R&I) file. It is also emphasized in the initial indoctrination program for new arrivals.

**DOES IT ALLOW MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- Yes.

**WHAT POLICIES DIRECT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS?**

- Safety/Standardization SOP; NATOPS Manuals; Operations Orders; NVD (Anacostia) SOP; White House SOP; White House Operations Plan (classified); Letter of Agreement with MCAF Quantico and 2nd Marine Air Wing for closed field operations.

**IS THERE ANY CONFLICTING GUIDANCE? WHAT?**

- No.

**DO YOU OPERATE ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT WITHIN PRESCRIBED FLIGHT REGIMES (AIRSPEED, RANGE, WEATHER CONDITIONS)?**

- Yes.

**ARE ANY WAIVERS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION?**

- Yes. Waivers exist for NVG qualifications, i.e., enlisted aircrew only need 15 vice 25 hours for initial qualification. Also, pistol and rifle qualifications are done every two years, vice annually. Also, passenger waivers for the CH-46 (20) and the CH-53 (34) are in effect.

## **TASKING**

### **HOW DO YOU RECEIVE TASKERS FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULES / MISSIONS?**

- Airlift Operations calls the WHLO who notifies HMX Operations. Hard copy tasking follows later. ATCO and MCCDC also task missions. ATCO is notified by HMX of MCCDC tasking. Silence is consent. OT&E can also task internally via a written "frag" to squadron operations.

### **WHO VALIDATES ABOVE TASKERS (AIRCRAFT MIX, CREW DUTY DAY, SUITABLE FIELDS/ LZS, SERVICING)?**

- The WHLO, Operations, and Maintenance officers collaborate on feasibility of taskings. If questionable, the Operations officer will then make a recommendation to the CO who will make the final decision.

### **HOW DO YOU SAY NO? WHO SAYS NO??**

- The CO will make the decision on rejecting a mission after recommendations from his staff.

### **HOW ARE CHANGES TO THE MISSION RELAYED BOTH BEFORE AND DURING EXECUTION?**

- Changes are relayed through the WHLO to HMX-1. Green side missions are verified through ATCO a week prior to the event

### **WHAT TRAINING IS GIVEN TO THOSE WHO SCHEDULE AND EXECUTE THE MISSION? (WHLO/ FLIGHT O)**

- New ODOs are coupled with an experienced ODO for two weeks. After observing working ODOs and studying appropriate directives for one week, the new ODO will write and execute under close supervision a daily flight schedule during the last week of training. Thereafter, he is assigned regular ODO duties.

### **WHAT POLICIES HINDER YOUR OPERATIONS?**

- MCAF does not have the manning level to man the airfield during all HMX operations. This sometimes creates difficulties or delays during marginal weather.

### **DO YOU FEEL PRESSURED TO GO BEYOND STATED POLICIES?**

- No.

### **DO YOU HAVE ANY UNWRITTEN POLICIES / AGREEMENTS ?**

- No.

### **DO YOU EMPOWER YOUR CREWS?**

- Yes. The Command Pilot can call a change whenever needed. Command climate also encourages a team approach, where everyone uses his expertise to contribute to mission safety.

### **DO YOU HAVE ANY UNWRITTEN POLICIES / AGREEMENTS ?**

- No.

**DO YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED "GO / NO GO" CRITERIA?**

- Yes. Weather "go / no go criteria" dictates that a decision must be made two hours prior to launch time based on the existing weather.

**HOW DEAL WITH "GRAY" AREAS NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED BY EXISTENT SOPS?**

- Experience and judgment are exercised to evaluate the situation and make the appropriate decision. If the circumstances exceed the Command Pilot's frame of reference, he has the option to consult with the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer in making a decision.

**WHO HAS DECISION AUTHORITY FOR ABOVE AND HOW DO YOU ANALYZE ASSOCIATED RISK??**

- The lift Command Pilot has on scene authority. Experience and judgment are used to analyze risk. CO is then back briefed on circumstances and decision.

**WHAT AIDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR MISSION PLANNING, BOTH IN TRANSIT AND ON SITE??**

- PanAm Weather Vision is available at home base and Anacostia. In addition, computer programs facilitate flight planning and binders with step by step checklists for most situations are used both in the planning phase of a mission and on the road.

**HOW DO YOU DO NEAR / MID / LONG TERM PLANNING?**

- Weekly Friday departmental meeting are held to do mid to near term planning. Long term planning is difficult due to a lack of information from the WHMO for longer range events

**HOW STABLE ARE ABOVE PLANS AND DAILY FLIGHT SCHEDULES?**

- All phases of planning are in a state of constant fluctuation. As a result, long term planning is difficult at best. This is the result of information flow from the WHMO.

**OPERATIONS TEMPO**

**DOES OPTEMPO AFFECT CREW PERFORMANCE?**

- Yes. This is especially true for first tour personnel assigned to the squadron. Also, newly assigned pilots are affected in regard to timely completion of the prescribed training.

**WHAT IS YOUR PERCEPTION OF CURRENT OPTEMPO?**

- It is currently very high due to the reelection campaign.

**EFFECTS ON TRAINING?**

- VH-60 training has all but stopped. This delays the training progression of new pilots and creates an extremely compressed VH-60 training schedule following the November election. This compression will drive an already high VH-60 utilization rate.

**CREW QUALIFICATIONS**

#### **HOW DO YOU MONITOR CURRENCY AND QUALIFICATIONS?**

- There is a 30-60-90 day report that goes out to Operations and the CO monthly. We also have a matrix which monitors pilot and aircrew and qualification and currency requirements. Operations also maintains a matrix for "last flew" and "night" currency ( to include NVG currency). End of month expirations are monitored by the DSS and Flight Officer to avoid expirations.
- ODO, Assistant Operations Officer, and Operations Officer review the daily flight schedule for currency prior to submission to CO for signature..

#### **HOW DO YOU MONITOR CREW DAY?**

- There is a CO Policy Letter which clearly defines crew day parameters. The ODO, lift Command Pilot, and individual pilots and aircrew monitor crew day. Limits are known and observed.

#### **IS CURRENT CREW DAY GUIDANCE SUFFICIENT FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- Yes.

#### **DOES THIS GUIDANCE LIMIT FLEXIBILITY FOR DV OPERATIONS?**

- No.

#### **DO YOUR CREWS RECEIVE ADEQUATE PRE / POST MISSION CREW REST?**

- Yes. Built in weather and maintenance days allow additional flexibility in complying with crew day requirements .

### **TRAINING**

#### **HOW DO YOU ACCOMPLISH INITIAL AIRCREW TRAINING AND DESIGNATIONS ?**

- Training is accomplished IAW NATOPS (Chap 5 VH NATOPS) , OPNAVINST. 3710, and the T & R Manual. Sikorsky Ground Training is also a part of the program. In addition, initial course rules test and indoctrination is monitored via a grease board in the Ready Room. .

#### **WHO EVALUATES HMX-1 STANDARDIZATION / INSTRUMENT CHECK PILOTS?**

- There are Standardization Board and Command Pilot Meetings which address mission related issues. Also, every aircraft commander is an instrument check pilot. For NATOPS checks, every pilot can give a check in his primary MOS aircraft. For VH aircraft, Command Pilots as well as the NATOPS officer for that aircraft ( VH-3 or VH-60) give check flights. Only Command Pilots can give White House HAC syllabus hops in VH aircraft; only the CO is authorized to give Command Pilot certification or check flights..

#### **IS ADEQUATE SIMULATOR SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR THE EXECUTIVE SUPPORT MISSION?**

- No. Although the squadron uses NAS Jacksonville FL simulators annually, the devices are mainly useful for compound emergency training. Overall effectiveness is degraded because the cockpit layout is different from HMX-1 aircraft. Adequate simulator support at Quantico would

assist significantly with initial pilot training during high optempo periods. To date, the facilities and equipment cost has prohibited location of such support locally.

**WHAT ARE YOUR RECURRING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS?**

- The standard as required by NATOPS, such as water survival, egress, etc.

**WHAT IS MINIMUM TIME FOR UPGRADE TO FLIGHT DESIGNATIONS?**

- Guidelines are 40 hours to mission co-pilot; 100 hours to White House HAC plus 12 months from the time designated a mission co-pilot plus 2000 hours total.

**HOW ARE EVALUATORS SELECTED FOR UPGRADE?**

- Recommendations for Command Pilots are made to the CO by currently designated Command Pilots. The CO after careful consideration makes the decision on designations. Other designations are part of normal progression and as prescribed in the Operations SOP.

**DO YOU HAVE DEDICATED FACILITIES FOR CLASSROOM TRAINING?**

- Yes.

**DO YOU HAVE APPROPRIATE TRAINING AIDS AND DEVICES??**

- The squadron needs to improve the existing computer based training devices. Options for upgrading the current devices were researched; however, all worthwhile alternatives exceeded the funds available for upgrade.

**HOW IS ACT CONDUCTED?**

- A requirement exists for annual ACT. HMX-1 includes it in each of two standdowns per year. Formally trained ACT facilitators are used in all formal training and video tapes on ACT are also available. Combined pilot and aircrew ACT sessions are conducted.

**ARE ACT PRINCIPLES ACCEPTED?**

- Yes.

**WHO INSTRUCTS ACT AND WHO TRAINS THEM?**

- Three school trained officers and one locally trained officer instruct formal ACT. Four enlisted school trained ACT instructors are also on hand.

**HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH "WEAK" PILOTS / AIRCREW??**

- The Human Factors Council, which meets monthly, is designed to address these problems. In addition, such individuals are selectively scheduled.

**ORGANIZATION**

**WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN SQUADRON ACTIVITIES?**

- Excellent. Departmental meetings are held weekly, or more often if necessary

**HOW IS AIRCREW RETENTION?**

- Excellent. Our detailed screening process eliminates most potential problems. Four years is a normal tour. Attrition is minimal.

**HOW DO YOU ASSESS MORALE OF THE ORGANIZATION?**

- Excellent.

**HOW DO YOU EVALUATE HUMAN FACTORS / PRP?**

- See section on "HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH "WEAK AIRCREW" above. .

**IS C2 SUFFICIENT TO KEEP YOU IN THE LOOP?**

- Yes. HMX-1 maintains an excellent flow of information between all squadron departments and individuals therein.

**DO CREWS KEEP YOU INFORMED OF MISSION CHANGES?**

- Yes. Key people for any mission are always in the information loop.

**WHAT CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE TO ENHANCE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- The experience level and security clearances of inbound Marines are discussed above. In addition, more VH-60s and a replacement for the recently destroyed CH-46 is needed. Greater flexibility in MCAF operating hours to preclude closed field operations would also be helpful.

**ARE FACILITIES ADEQUATE?**

- No. Ramp and hangar space are inadequate for the type and number of aircraft assigned to HMX-1. Maintenance Instructions (MIs) address "work arounds" for non-compliance with OPNAVINST mandated aircraft clearances.

**RELATIVE TO THE HMX-1 MISSION, WHAT ARE THE STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF AIRCREW STANDARDIZATION PROGRAMS?**

- Overall HMX-1 has a very strong program. However, no official VH T&R exists. A syllabus has been submitted for approval by MCCDC and HQMC. In the interim, the locally approved version is used. Also, enlisted aircrew are not trained to full FMF T&R standards. Waivers are in place for sorties such as EW and aerial gunnery.

**EQUIPPED**

**DO YOU TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEWEST TECHNOLOGY OFFERED?**

- Yes and no. Acquisition of an ILS capability for NAF Quantico and a fuel flow gage for each aircraft would enhance HMX-1 operations. Flight and Voice Data Recorders, GPS, and TCAS would also be important improvements. Ramp and hangar space is also a problem in terms of operations and safety. This will become worse with the introduction of the CH-53E to HMX-1, beginning in September. Additional cell phones for use on the road are also needed.

**SAFETY**

**HOW DO REVIEW SAFETY INDICATORS AND METRICS?**

- Safety surveys and questionnaires are a part of HMX-1's safety standdowns. Safety and Human Factors Councils and training are used to provide readily available indicators and metrics.

**WHAT ARE YOUR CORRECTIVE MISHAP PREVENTION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES?**

- The standard Safety School repertoire of message boards, R&I files ,and mishap review briefs are part of the mishap prevention program.

OPNAVINST. 3750 and the current MOU with DC/S Air for mishap reporting define the squadrons mishap reporting procedures. The squadron is complying with all applicable reporting procedures.


**IS THERE ANY EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO INCREASE MISSION SAFETY?**

- See above comments above under "EQUIPPED".

**HAS LACK OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY AFFECTED MISSION SAFETY?**

- It has some impact on training and aircraft utilization. It is not currently a significant degrader of mission safety. Its greatest impact will be felt in the compressed training requirements when optempo slows after election..

**I HAVE REVIEWED AND CONCUR WITH THE ABOVE INTERVIEW SUMMARY.**

  
SIGNATURE



## **Presidential Pilot's Office, Telephone Interview, 2 Oct 96**

### **MEMO FOR RECORD**

On 2 October 1996, I conducted a telephonic interview with Lt Col Mark S. Donnelly who is assigned to the Presidential Pilot Office, covering some PPO training issues. Lt Col Donnelly stated that appropriate crew members receive annual Instrument Refresher Course (IRC) and Crew Resource Management (CRM). Additionally, since PPO crewmembers are dual qualified, pilots and flight engineers (VC-25, C-137) receive two annual simulator refresher courses--one in each aircraft. PPO assigns their crewmembers' training levels (TLs)--all maintain TL "A". The organization is subject to no-notice flight evaluations however, no PPO crewmember has received one in a long time. Lt Col Donnelly feels no-notice evaluations are more necessary and useful for less experienced crewmembers in the wing than for the highly experienced PPO crewmembers.

//SIGNED//

MAURICE J. INKEL, JR., Maj, USAF  
Executive Travel Review Board

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
Executive Support Air Fleet Review, provides instructions for handling.

## **Presidential Pilot's Office, Telephone Interview, 3 Oct 96**

### **MEMO FOR RECORD**

On 3 October 1996, I conducted another telephonic interview with Lt Col Mark S. Donnelly of the PPO concerning Stan/Eval issues. Lt Col Donnelly explained Pilot in Command checks the PPO pilots receive in the simulator during annual contractor provided refresher training. Each PPO pilot is checked under part 61.58 and part 121 by FAA evaluators and receives a card to that effect. Lt Col Donnelly further stated that PPO pilots are dual-qualified (in the VC-25 and another wing aircraft) and fall under the wing pyramid system when taking a check ride in their second aircraft. When asked about their participation in other wing-level inspections such as ASEV, QAFA, or ORIs, Lt Col Donnelly said PPO does not participate. However, PPO has contributed a bank of test questions to 21AF to use during future ASEVs. When questioned as to when PPO pilots receive no-notice check rides, Lt Col Donnelly said his last no-notice evaluation was in 1993, when he was a PPO augmentee. When questioned if any PPO full-time pilots received no-notice evaluations, Lt Col Donnelly said they had not received any since he was in the office.

//SIGNED//

FREDERICK L. JAKLITSCH, Lt Col, USAF  
Executive Travel Review Board

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
Executive Support Air Fleet Review, provides instructions for handling.

## **23 WG/CC, 23 WG/CV**

### **Interview Summary, 24 Sep 96. Pope AFB, NC**

#### **Brig Gen Paul R. Dordal, Col James L. White**

#### **BACKGROUND**

Pope AFB, NC is home of the 23rd Wing. The unit is a composite wing flying A-10 Thunderbolts and the C-130 Hercules. In relation to this review, the wing's C-130s provide airlift for personnel and equipment supporting Presidential (Phoenix Banner) and Vice Presidential (Phoenix Silver) movements. They also fly Phoenix Copper missions that provide airlift for US Secret Service movements for other than the President or Vice President. As the Wing Commander, Brig Gen Paul Dordal is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the forces assigned to his wing. Col James White, the Vice Commander, implements the commander's policy and guidance and executes command duties in Brig Gen Dordal's absence.

#### **SAFETY**

The commander imparts his safety philosophy to his people at quarterly safety meetings. Wing personnel know the senior leadership will fully back their decisions concerning safety. Safety will not be compromised by pressure to accomplish the mission.

#### **BANNER PROCEDURES**

The only published guidance the wing has governing Banner missions is MCR 55-89 (Multi Command Regulation) and MCR 55-130 Chap 10 outlining billeting and transportation procedures for alert crews. (Note: MCR 55-130 is the regulation covering C-130 operations. Each wing using this regulation publishes their own Chapter 10 containing local wing procedures.) Following the 23d Wing C-130 mishap in April 96 while on a Banner mission, the Wing Commander told the Operations Group Commander to use experienced crews on Banner missions. Col White has personally flown several Banner missions with crews to further emphasize the significance the wing leadership places on these missions.

#### **TRAINING/SPECIAL QUALIFICATION**

The wing's missions requiring a special qualification include Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS), Airdrop Formation Lead, and Airfield Certification Aircrews. There are formal training programs and certification boards for aircraft commander upgrade as well as instructor and evaluator upgrades in all crew positions. Although there are no specific Banner training or certification procedures, squadrons schedule Banner-experienced crewmembers with those new to the mission.

#### **BANNER TASKING/PLANNING**

The wing usually flies two to three Banner missions a month, mostly supporting HMX-1. They are expecting an increase as the election draws closer. After receiving mission requirements from the White House Military Office (WHMO) Airlift Operations section, TACC current

operations coordinates with Air Combat Command (ACC owns state-side C-130s) for available aircraft. After TACC formally tasks the appropriate wing's current operations, the wing coordinates requirements with the customer. If the customer has not provided specific takeoff times within two days of a mission, the aircrew preflights and seals their aircraft, then enters alert status. Alert crews are billeted on base with transportation to meet a one-hour response time. Approximately, 90% of the Banners are flown by alert crews/aircraft. At the customer onload location, the crew coordinates mission details with the customer POCs (usually Marine personnel at Quantico, VA) including route of flight and weather divert options.

**MANNING/EXPERIENCE**

Manning problems usually occur from too few personnel to accomplish operations efficiently. However, in the case of pilots, the 23 WG actually has 40% more pilots than authorized pilot positions. While not a major problem, much of the wing's pilot force lacks previous operational experience. A significant number of the pilots are on their first operational assignment. Many are straight out of pilot school, while others are First Assignment Instructor Pilots (FAIPs). FAIPs are individuals who performed exceptionally well in pilot school and remain after graduation as instructors. Pilot over-manning combined with limited flying hours makes it difficult to "season" the force as rapidly as desired. Bottom line; the wing's C-130 pilot experience level is adequate but not as high as the senior leadership would like.

**AIRCRAFT SELECTION**

From a maintenance perspective, the wing selects an aircraft fully capable of completing the mission. They also ensure it is properly configured and equipped (i.e. cargo tie down devices, etc) in accordance with the Banner regulation (MCR 55-89). There are no significant maintenance or aircraft requirements for Banner missions.

//SIGNED//

PAUL R. DORDAL, Brig Gen, USAF  
23d Wing Commander

//SIGNED//

JAMES L. WHITE, Col, USAF  
23d Wing Vice Commander

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

## STATEMENT OF COLONEL ROGER H. DOUGHERTY, U.S. MARINE CORPS

1. I was assigned from the Naval Safety Center for reviewing the Marine Corps' presidential lift mission from a safety and risk management perspective. I reviewed all applicable squadron and external governing directives; interviewed the Commanding Officer, Senior White House Liaison Officer, Safety Director, and the Assistant Operations Officer/Flight Officer; observed aircraft maintenance, mission planning, scheduling and briefing within the squadron area and at a presidential lift site. In conjunction with the Commanding Officer, HMX-1, I arranged for a Naval Safety Center squadron Safety Survey. The results of that survey were voluntarily provided to the review team by the Commanding Officer.

2. My observations are as follows:

A. **Standard Operational Procedures (SOP).** The squadron maintains sound Flight Ops, Human Factor, Training, and Safety SOPs.

(1) **Flight scheduling.** The White House SOP provides detailed guidance on required experience levels for presidential lift; rehearsal flight requirements prior to actual lift; and provides detailed weather criteria for go-no-go operations with prescribed time lines for making a weather call. The squadron Flight Ops SOP adequately addresses safety, taxing, crew day and currency requirements.

(2) **Training.** The squadron's type/model/series (TMS) standardization manuals provide standard procedures for syllabus training, emergency procedures simulation, and training instruction. Conversion training is conducted in house using the Marine Corps Training and Readiness manual for either the CH-46 or CH-53 aircraft and uses a locally produced syllabus for the VH-3/VH-60 aircraft supplemented with the Stan Manuals that describe the specific training maneuvers and where this training will take place (i.e., autorotations only at prescribed airfields with crash fire rescue resources).

(3) **Crew Rest.** The White House SOP and the Squadron Flight Ops and CO's policy letter establishes a 14 hour day as normal with a maximum of 18 hours. If 18 hours are exceeded, the CO or command pilot may waive after thoroughly reviewing the details. If the crew exceed 18 hours, they must be afforded 15 hours of uninterrupted rest prior to rescheduling.

B. **Operations.** The White House Liaison Officer (WHLO) initially receives the tasker from White House Airlift Operations. He reviews the tasker and determines that it is supportable. If it is not, he coordinates with Airlift Ops for resolution. If resolution is achieved, the tasker is passed to Squadron Operations and the CO for approval and scheduling. If resolution is not achieved, the CO is briefed and intervenes to reach a supportable position. The Flight Officer then assigns the flight crews based on a thorough scheduling matrix that shows last lift, flight currency, NATOPS currency, and T/M/S currency. The ODO then takes the list when it is time to put it on the flight schedule and cross checks the currency requirements prior to actually scheduling. This establishes a sound check and balance within the operations department to ensure all crews are current prior to flying White House lifts.

## STATEMENT OF COLONEL ROGER H. DOUGHERTY, U.S. MARINE CORPS

C. **Briefings.** During the period I spent with HMX-1, I observed two mission briefs. The first was prior to departure from MCAF Quantico for the New York Presidential lift mission detachment, and the second was on 24 September, which was the actual mission brief for the Presidential lifts from Newark International Airport to the Wall Street Heliport, and from Wall Street To Freehold, New Jersey and return to Newark. **All missions were well-briefed.** A thorough ODO brief and weather brief was provided prior to the Flight Lead's brief. His brief was clear, concise, and in accordance with NATOPS. He stressed Aircrew Coordination (Cockpit Resource Management (CRM)), emergency procedures, and basic flight discipline. Briefings at the lift site were impressive. WHLO had made all arrangements. Rehearsal flight was scheduled. WHLO briefed all takeoff and landing sites with detailed diagrams, flight and landing sequencing, communication requirements, obstacles to flight, locations of crash and rescue personnel. Flight lead/mission commander then rebriefed flight responsibilities and flight was conducted in accordance with the brief. The same applied to the actual lift day.

D. **Landing Zone (LZ) selection and control:** The WHLO is ultimately responsible for the LZ selection. The White House Advance Staff selects the event location and may recommend LZ locations to the WHLO. The WHLO then goes to the event location, reviews any recommended sites and if it looks acceptable, will conduct a thorough zone evaluation using a measuring wheel to ensure the zone meets at least minimum standards based on SOP and WHLO handbook criteria. He specifically looks for obstacles to flight, approach and take-off corridors, and any ground hazards. If the zone meets all the requirements, he then makes a diagram of the LZ with all non-interfering obstacles depicted and aircraft locations in the LZ. The diagram also depicts crash and rescue locations. **If the zone does not meet the above criteria, he either coordinates with the White House Advance Staff to either have obstacles removed or goes out and finds another LZ that meets all criteria.**

Since the 1990 VH-3D mishap near Chicago, the WHLOs are thoroughly attuned to their responsibility not to accept any compromises and the White House Advance Team supports the WHLO recommendations. In their training program, they view the video from the 1990 mishap as validation of their responsibilities. In the actual conduct of the flight, the WHLO acts as the LZ control officer. He provides landing site marking, specifically for *Marine One* and gives positive LZ direction, both verbally over two-way radio communication and physical control, to all landing helicopters. This is done for all LZs other than the routine ones (i.e., South lawn, reflecting pool, etc.). **At the Lift Site, the WHLO coordinates with the other advance support personnel, crash and rescue, and police for security of the LZ to ensure there will be no vehicular or personnel traffic in the zone.** He also briefs crash and rescue personnel on specific aircraft rescue procedures and accesses.

E. **Cockpit Resource Management (CRM).** The squadron has an active CRM or *aircrew coordination training program* (ACT) as it is called in the Marine Corps. The squadron has school-trained officer and enlisted facilitators to conduct the training. The training is conducted at a minimum during their two scheduled safety standdowns (January and July) and during the annual instrument check. It was evident during the actual flight. As the flight complexity increased, so did the crew coordination. There was an impressive flow of communication between

## STATEMENT OF COLONEL ROGER H. DOUGHERTY, U.S. MARINE CORPS

the pilot, co-pilot, and crewmember throughout the flight to include comments like "*I'm changing maps, head's down.*"

**F. Crew "marriage."** All command pilots are well experienced with an average of 3763 flight hours and a copilot average of 2389 flight hours. Marine One command pilot average is 3850 flight hours. There are 6 Marine One pilots with the CO being the primary. There are an additional three command pilots, and 27 other White House Helicopter Aircraft Commanders (HACs). Crew Chiefs are sharp and most are second tour fleet crewchiefs.

**G. Morale.** Morale was high even though OPTEMPO was high. The troops appeared to enjoy what they were doing. They recognized that the current level of OPTEMPO was demanding, knew what was driving it, and knew that this is why they came to HMX.

**H. Human Factor monitoring.** The squadron has an active Human Factors Council that meets monthly. Membership is in accordance with SOP. Chain of command is aware of the stressors. Maintenance mid-level supervision appeared to be very crew concerned. They watched crew day involvement, and showed a personal interest in their assigned personnel. In an organizational brief at the lift site, the CO addressed keeping him informed of any personnel issues.

**I. Mishap reviews.** Both Judge Advocate General investigations and safety Mishap Investigation Reports (MIRs) for the 1990 (VH-3D) and 1993 (VH-60N) mishaps were thoroughly reviewed. All recommended actions from them have been completed.

Since the 1990 mishap, all passengers are briefed by the crewchief on Presidential (and all other) lifts and are provided a safety pamphlet that addresses safety and egress procedures and locations.

Following the 1993 mishap, maintenance procedures were further clarified, and several actions were accomplished by the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command which serve to further enhance the safety of flight of VH-60N aircraft.

**As for the September, 1996, mishap, it is still under investigation.** However, discussions with the Commanding Officer, lead me to conclude that it is probable that a loss of situational awareness caused the aircrew to taxi too close to the light pole, allowing the rotor blades to strike it. The subsequent loss of rotor blades induced extreme vibrations and structural damage that resulted in the aircraft rolling over and burning. The crew was under the direction of a local civilian fixed-base operator taxi director. Subsequent to this mishap, the Commanding Officer issued additional taxiing policy requiring all crews operating at civilian fields to have their crewchiefs assist local civilian taxi directors. Other actions may be implemented following the conclusion of ongoing investigations. The squadron taxiing procedures are clear in several SOPs.

3. I was impressed with the professional attitude of all personnel. The senior enlisted leadership is superb. They hold to the prescribed standards, they are with the maintainers and security folks, and they lead from the front. They are personable, therefore, keeping the lines of communication

# STATEMENT OF COLONEL ROGER H. DOUGHERTY, U.S. MARINE CORPS


open. The officer corps is all-volunteer, all come recommended by their previous commander, and each undergoes thorough screening both as an officer and as an aviator prior to assignment.

4. The only discrepancy noted was the lack of an annual external NATOPS evaluation. Since the squadron flies and maintains the CH-46E and CH-53D/E, in fleet configuration, they should be evaluated by the model manager or designated unit evaluator to ensure standardization and compliance with appropriate instructions.

Since the VH-3D and VH-60N are *not* fleet configured, and the applicable NATOPS manuals and procedures are different from those in use in the fleet configured models of each of these aircraft, HMX-1 is essentially fulfilling the role as the model manager for both aircraft. Since only currently designated Command Pilots can give White House Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC) syllabus qualification flights, and only the CO, HMX-1 can certify the Command Pilot certification and check rides, no valid requirement appears for an annual external unit evaluation for the operation of these two aircraft—providing the Squadron implements the required H-46/53 evaluation in accordance with OPNAVINST 3710, and clarifies the status of such a requirement relative to the VH aircraft.

The above information is true to the best of my knowledge and belief, and was obtained through my personal review and observations, based upon my background in rotary wing operations, maintenance, safety, and command, as enhanced by virtue of my present duties with the Naval Safety Center.

Subscribed by me this, the 3<sup>rd</sup> day of October, 1996.

  
R. H. Dougherty  
Colonel  
U.S. Marine Corps



**INTERVIEW WITH MGYSGT T. L. DOWNEY**  
**"GREEN SIDE" MAINTENANCE**  
**17 SEPT, 1996**

**1. IS AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT TO HMX-1 ADEQUATE?**

Yes. Aeromedical support for HMX-1 is better than the average FMF squadron. Flight surgeons and corpsmen are an integral part of the team.

**2. ARE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL A REGULAR PRESENCE IN SQUADRON SPACES?**

Yes. They are around squadron spaces on an almost a daily basis, working with the other squadron members on medical and safety issues and generally keeping a watch for unsafe conditions.

**3. DO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL REGULARLY PARTICIPATE IN SAFETY ACTIVITIES? STAND-DOWNS? -TRAINING?**

They take a very proactive role in safety, prevention and training activities.

**4. IS MEDICAL READILY ACCESSIBLE FOR CONSULTATION REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS WITH INDIVIDUALS?**

Yes. A phone call or direct conversation is sufficient to begin the process of getting someone seen immediately for any medical concern.

**5. WHAT MECHANISMS DO YOU USE TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE AT RISK FOR SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSES?**

Squadron members are highly motivated and have a real sense of teamwork. Individual problems are quickly identified and acted upon immediately. SNCO meetings, both formal and informal provide a forum to discuss individual's difficulties or potential problems at work.

**6. WHAT ARE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU ENCOUNTER WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITH SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSORS OR PROBLEMS?**

New members who are unable to meet security clearance requirements are of little use in assignments in the squadron. There are very few jobs in the squadron which do not require clearance. Additionally, they count against the HMX T/O, cannot be replaced until their scheduled rotation date and there results an additional work load requirement for those who are cleared.

**7. ARE LOCAL/MCB SUPPORT ACTIVITIES SUFFICIENT? E.G. FINANCIAL, FAMILY SERVICES, STRESS MANAGEMENT CLASSES, ALCOHOL, FAMILY PLANNING, ETC..**

Yes.

**8. IS LOSS OF TIME FROM WORK FOR MEDICAL VISITS ACCEPTABLE? DOES MEDICAL TRY TO MINIMIZE THOSE LOSSES?**

Yes, it's very easy to get someone seen at medical in a short time.

9. HOW WELL DOES MEDICAL COMMUNICATE BACK TO THE SQUADRON ON THE STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS?

Very good two way communications exist. Medical will call back to inform the work area about the status of individuals who are sent over if there is to be a delay or is some larger problem.

10. HOW WELL ARE FAMILY MEDICAL PROBLEMS ADDRESSED? ARE THEY TIMELY?

Very well locally, with delays in obtaining appointments at referral centers.


11. HOW WELL DOES MCB BRANCH CLINIC SUPPORT THE SQUADRON?

HMX-1 Medical handles most problems, but occasionally referral to mainside medical is required, and there are no difficulties except the inconvenience and loss of time from work.

12. HOW WELL ARE MEDICAL REFERRALS TO OTHER MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES HANDLED?

Referral to other military medical treatment facilities results in considerable time lost because of travel distances, appointment schedules and waiting times.

I have reviewed the foregoing Two pages on this the 10<sup>th</sup> day of Oct, 1996 and it accurately summarizes the information provided by me.

  
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**Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Secretariat, Military Assistant to the Executive Airlift Support, Telephone Interview, 17 Sep 96**

**MEMO FOR RECORD**

On 17 September 1996, I conducted a telephonic interview with Lt Col Jack B. Egginton who is assigned to the OSD Executive Secretariat as Military Assistant to the Executive Secretary of DoD. The interview was part of the Assessment of Executive Airlift Support directed by the SECDEF. Purpose of the interview was to find out the process used to approve requests for DV passenger travel aboard DoD aircraft. Lt Col Egginton indicated most missions he handled fell into one of two categories: 1) Missions paid for by the Agency involved, and 2) Missions having a direct military impact which are paid for by DoD. Lt Col Egginton's basic criteria is cost effectiveness, which generally involves comparing use of a DoD aircraft to utilizing commercial air transportation. Realistically however, most missions have been "scrubbed" to the point where commercial aircraft is not an acceptable option. For this reason, Lt Col Egginton recommends approval of the lion's share of the requests he receives. He refers requests that are questionable to Transportation Policy and/or the General Counsel for advice and resolution.

//SIGNED//

PATRICK F. NOLTE, Colonel, USAF  
Executive Travel Review Board

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group  
The interviewee's statements were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
Executive Support Air Fleet Review, provides instructions for handling.

## SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Major R.W. Ellinger, 6302, Executive Flight Detachment Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer (AAMO) (E)

Master Gunnery Sergeant J.A. Northcott Jr, 6119, Executive Flight Detachment Maintenance Chief (N)

Conducted by Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, on 17 September 1996.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- (E) The campaign most intense flight operations squadron faces
- (E) Experienced growth in mission since introduction of the VH-60N.
- (E) Need two additional VH-60N's to be meet campaign and added mission requirements. - Both VH aircraft operate on reduced Maximum Operating Times (MOT's) and finite life limits. For the VH-3D it is generally 50% with greater usage (up to approximately 75%) for the VH-60N.
- (E) Both aircraft operate under the Phase maintenance schedule.
- (E) Special Progressive Aircraft Repair (SPAR) is the scheduled depot level maintenance. This occurs at 24 months or 1000 flight hours, which ever occurs first, for the VH-3D and 48 months or 2400 hours for the VH-60N.
- (N)The VH-60N has a mid tour refurbishment (MTR) refurbishes the interior and exterior paint as well as correcting known airframe discrepancies. The mid life refurbishment occurs at 24 months or 1000 hours.
- (E) The squadron has a policy of 5 open discrepancies against a VH aircraft.
- (E) The squadron normally maintains no open discrepancies against the aircraft.
- There is no Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix for the aircraft, it either works or it is fixed. Maintain 100% availability of all systems on the aircraft and 100% availability of all aircraft.
- (N) The configuration of the VH aircraft is closely controlled, there are no non standard installations in the VH aircraft.
- (E) Utilize existing directives and policy for determining applicability and compliance with applicable technical directives. Work closely with NAVAIR (specifically the APML) to know what will affect the aircraft.
- (E) The current drop in mod plan for GPS is being worked with NAVAIR to attempt to align with SPAR. Not aligning with SPAR will add approximately an additional month of out of service time for the aircraft. The current systems provide almost the same accuracy as the GPS.

### Internal/External Mission Support Aircraft:

- (E) Local mission support assets are sufficient when the aircraft are available.
- (N) The ongoing restrictions applied to CH-46E rotor heads and the recent restrictions on CH-53E swashplates have had some impact.
- (E) USMC Fleet provided aircraft for the most part have been satisfactory in meeting support mission requirements.
- (N) Few problems, they are the exception rather than the rule. Fleet commanders are provided the requirements and then required to comply.

- (N) Air Force support has a good track record of being on time. HMX has recently added a C-5 day into their planning due to the reduced reliability of the aircraft.
- (N) The Air Force used to have Phoenix Banner designated crews but has gotten away from that designation. Air Force crews that now support the mission frequently are not used to HMX operating procedures, existing waivers nor highly proficient in loading equipment or aircraft.
- (E) Coordination for internal support aircraft is handled through the Operations Department, external support is handled through the White House Liaison Office, in both cases the coordination was considered to be very effective.
- (N) HMX-1 has recently gotten certification for the C-17 although they have not used the aircraft operationally.

#### External Agency Support:

- (E) The nature of the mission, small community and proximity to NAVAIR work effectively to create an effective working relationship between all members of the Integrated Logistics Support Management Team.
- (E) Semi annual Maintenance Publications Reviews, Integrated Logistics Support Management Team meetings and Maintenance reviews are conducted to ensure the adequacy of the logistic support.
- (N) The squadron has designated program coordinators to the single entry point for external agencies into squadron. Highly effective in properly channeling info.

#### Logistics Elements:

##### Manpower:

- (N) The Table of Organization (T/O) needs to be scrubbed, it has not been changed to reflect the transition from VH-1N to VH-60N aircraft.
- (N) The numbers of personnel is considered sufficient, MOS alignment considered to be the problem.
- (N) The squadron is manned at 100% of T/O. Personnel under orders to the squadron are considered by HQMC to be on board.
- (N) The "Greenside" or Stake maintenance department is the intake side of the squadron. Personnel in "Stake" Maintenance don't require a Top Secret "Yankee White" clearance. Stake maintenance is the pool of the Cage.
- (N) The T/O of the "Greenside" is less than the "Whiteside". This leads to accelerated movement within Stake maintenance.
- (N) This problem is exacerbated by those personnel who have not been properly screened by the detaching command and arrive and are "unclearable".
- (N) A rough guess was that approximately 15-20% of those Marines ordered in are not capable of obtaining a "Yankee White" clearance
- (N) The period to transfer out "unclearable" personnel fill billets needed as a base to support the "Whiteside".
- (E/N) The increased usage of personnel direct of out FREST training adversely impacts the ability to meet mission requirements. First term Marines do not have the background necessary for effective use in squadron. Currently about 25% inbound personnel are right out of FREST training.
- (E/N) They must first be trained and qualified on their primary aircraft. This training

process takes approximately two years.

- (N) Once they are trained and have been cleared they are moved to the "Whiteside". These personnel must then be trained on the VH-3D and the VH-60N, mission unique aircraft not used in the FMF.
- (E/N) FREST personnel never get fully qualified in their primary aircraft and they don't get an understanding of Fleet Maintenance.
- (E/N) By the time they complete their "cage" tour they will be a sergeant. On returning to the Fleet they will be expected to possess technical knowledge and qualification they will not have. A first term may spend whole first enlistment at HMX, up to 6 years.
- (N) Personnel moving to the "Cage" must have a minimum of 2 years left on a 4 year tour.
- (N) HQMC consideration should be given to extending tour lengths for enlisted, and working harder at returning former HMX Marines.
- (N) Work at fair sharing shortages between Green and White maintenance departments.
- (E) Do not dual qualify enlist aircrew.
- (E/N) Crew initially determined by T/O line number and MOS. 617X's fly. Do "home grow" crew chiefs. Essential to having sufficient crew to meet all mission requirements.
- All crew go through Sikorsky schools first. Fly establish syllabi for specific aircraft to be qualified in. Get 90 days to fly 50 hours Crew Member under Training (CMT) then check ride. Easier with Fleet qualified crew chiefs, more difficult with FREST qualified first term crew chiefs.
- (E/N) Standardize training across department by establishment of formal schools, and the use of MATMEP generated by squadron.
- (N) Mitigate personnel issues by a minimum of 1 trip per month to HQMC to deal with monitors. Sit down with Greenside on continuing basis to resolve shortfalls and work out fills for billet shortages.
- (N) Need to study the feasibility of contractor maintenance for some tasks in the maintenance department. Civilians could provide continuity and stability.

#### Supply:

- (E) Use a closed loop Contractor managed supply system. Range and Depth is 100%.
- (N) Contractors system does outstanding job of tracking usage, validated on annual basis.
- (E) Track every item, from major dynamics to consumables, use bar coding like Wal Mart.
- (E) Data helpful in Maintenance Plan reviews to make sure we are doing the right maintenance and understand what the problems are.
- (E) Looking to add functionality through a government generated tracking program, Configuration Status Accounting System (CSAS). Will move towards total asset visibility, and allow to track from cradle to grave.
- (E) Supply System effectiveness is 98%. Remaining issues are here within 24 hours.
- (E) VH aircraft on trip are supported by Supply packups. Packups built based upon number of aircraft and mission. Standardized and prebuilt.
- (E/N) Packups constantly reviewed based upon annual usage and technical representatives input.
- (E) Age of aircraft is showing to some degree, packups modified to compensate for

higher failure items.

- (E/N) Contractor negotiates transportation methodology, works closely with Ops to see if local or USAF transportation available. Otherwise use commercial delivery service dependent on part to be moved, time dependent upon criticality of the part. Very effective system.

#### Technical Data:

- (E) Technical manuals are almost a closed loop system. HMX is only user.
- (E) Semi annual In Process Review (IPR) of publications. Involves NAVAIR, NATSF, Sikorsky and HMX. Review pubs and have Sikorsky tech pubs writer on site to update publication.
- (E) IPR's review all previous Technical Publication Deficiency Reports (TPDR) for incorporation.
- (E) Sikorsky holds a full set of aperture cards of technical drawings for both aircraft. They maintain up to date. Very useful when changes are made and not incorporated into manuals yet.
- (E/N) Maintain a packup of manuals for each possible deployable detachment. They are maintained by the Central Technical Publications Library and are properly updated.
- (E/N) Great effort expended to maintain accurate Central and Dispersed Technical Pubs. All librarians are required to have the school.

#### Facilities:

- (N) Facilities are not good.
- (E/N) Moving aircraft is continuing requirements since "white top" aircraft are hangared when not flying or outside for maintenance purposes.
- (E/N) On spots in hangar main rotor blades overlap. To tow, must rotate heads, lift and lower main rotor blades respectively. Although good troops situation is an accident waiting to happen.
- (N) Had to build catwalks to facilitate lifting and repositioning rotor blades. Positioning aircraft inside the hangar is a "puzzle".
- (N) Hangar decks are uneven, settling and buildup around hangar doors makes towing that much more complicated.
- (N) Ramp space not compliant with P-80 criteria. Have to taxi aircraft straight in then manually turn if continuing mission.
- (N) Maintenance spaces are cramped, Flight Line is in a trailer outside the hangar.
- (N) Having been trying to get the hangar deck painted for the last two years to help reflect light and assist with maintenance.
- (N) Must be careful with cleaners and solvents, drains flow directly into river.
- (N) Anacostia facility is great. Maintenance Chief's dream.
- (N) Emergency support is problematic. Phones 3 days, couldn't use modem, NALCOMIS support through modem back to squadron. Becomes significant issue.
- (N) Thermostat on hangar deck removed 9 months ago, still not fixed. Garage Door used for parts has been broken for 2 months. Plumbing is considered routine, won't fix head unless all commodes/urinals are down.
- (N) Subcontractors employed to fix discrepancies appear to be part of the problem.

### Training:

- (E/N) Mission training using Sikorsky on hand schools and saturation. VH-3 and VH-60 aircraft are mission unique. 2 full time instructors on hand to teach VH-3 and VH-60 courses.
- (E/N) Other mission unique training gained during saturation at Anacostia, or specific syllabi.
- (N) Training is keyed to role, mission and experience. The Sikorsky schools augmented by inservice training meet established syllabi to qualify personnel in mission, aircraft and position.
- (N) Training has been aided on the H-3 side by the use of part task trainers. The H-60 side could benefit from their use as well. NAVAIR looking for excess trainers that could be made available.
- (N) Need to ensure that each new system has the appropriate training package procured. Need to make sure training is available as we add systems.
- (N) Training is standardized using MATMEP.

### Support Equipment:

- (E) The existing support equipment meets mission with exception of H-60 huffer. GTC-85 is old and difficult to maintain. NAVAIR and squadron working on solving this problem.
- (E) Coordination with Operations and WHLO ensure requisite support equipment is available or known requirement for transport. Common SE useable on both series aircraft is known to WHLO.
- (E) Sufficient peculiar support equipment (PSE) is available to meet the maximum number of detachments.
- (E) Some one time buy items are getting old and new to be reviewed, i.e., H-60 C-5 Hydraulic carts. They are getting older, harder to keep up and no support. This will be an ILSMT issue.
- (E) Squadron inputs for improvement of SE is solicited through ILSMT's. Huffer is a good example.

### 3. Safety/General Operations:

- (E) Maintenance Control controls maintenance on road. Maintenance Controller maybe the trip leader as he maybe qualified and certified.
- (N) Syllabus for Trip Leader. SOP he follows to ensure mission reliability and safety.
- (E) Designated Cage AMO for each trip.
- (E) Aircraft go/no go decisions based upon QA/Maintenance Control analysis. Down aircraft is down. Will use Sikorsky Tech rep assigned for information. If really gray area call squadron and get more assistance. Has not been a significant issue. Manuals are fairly good.
- (E) Aircraft on the road are controlled by SOP, MI's and recently the CO issued a policy letter on taxiing. SOP's/MI's are key, do business the same on the road as we do at home.
- (E/N) QA is overstaffed to make sure doing best job we can. Maintenance Control is also overstaffed for same reason. Control and ensure quality. Both are "sacred". Work together well.
- (E) QA and Safety work together well.



**Executive Aircraft Maintenance Department**  
**("Whiteside" or "Cage")**

**Interview with:**      Maj Ellinger                      Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer  
                                 MGySgt Northcott              Maintenance Chief

**1. Are Table of Organization (T/O) and manning adequate for current tasking?**

A. T/O comments. Since this T/O is patterned after a standard USMC aircraft maintenance department, the full range of tasks required to properly support the primary squadron missions of Executive helicopter transport and contingency support are not reflected in the T/O.

**1) Deployment/Detachment Concept.**

a. A permanent "detachment" exists at the Alert Facility at Anacostia, Naval District Washington. This facility is a restricted access compound manned solely by HMX-1. Support for this contingency mission requires the full-time presence of not only aircraft, aircrew and maintenance personnel, but also personnel to manage plant maintenance. The Executive Maintenance Department provides manning for all enlisted billets (minus Security) on a rotating basis. Maintenance Chief stated that this results in the equivalent manpower draw of two detachments to fully support the Alert Facility. No fleet counterpart exists on which to pattern the manpower requirements for such a detachment.

b. Unlike fleet counterparts, this unit deploys aircraft in detachments of from one (i.e. Emergency Relocation Standby) to three or more (i.e. full White House transport mission) aircraft to support White House Military Office tasking. Current deployment tempo may require as many as three or four detachments to be deployed simultaneously. These dets are often "leap-frogged" from one site to another in order to cover Executive travel schedules with the assets available. Under current tasking, aircraft on-hand has often been a limiting factor for White House trip support with all "VH" aircraft deployed on trips or at Anacostia.

c. Detachment support drives personnel requirements beyond T/O to meet minimum supervisory needs in areas such as Maintenance Control and Quality Assurance. These areas are "overstaffed" at the expense of work center manning to meet mission requirements. Other areas such as the Tool Control Center also require overstaffing from work center manning to provide detachment support.

**2) Peculiar Equipment.**

a. Department supports the VH-3D and VH-60N aircraft which have no USMC counterpart in the fleet from which to draw experienced personnel. In the case of the VH-3D, the aircraft has an "old technology" air conditioning system which requires extra training and support equipment to comply with Environmental Protection Agency standards for servicing and handling.

b. Maintenance personnel are required to train in bulk fuel handling and fuel truck licensing due to security requirements and lack of such specialties in the current T/O. Unlike fleet squadrons, HMX-1 has no supporting Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) from which to draw such support.

c. The squadron maintains and operates the obsolete GTC-85 Ground Power Unit ("Huffer") for auxiliary starting of the VH-60N. This ground support equipment is required to meet VH-60 air transportability requirements and is the only model available which can be transported in Marine helicopters.

3) Integrated Logistics Support Management Team (ILSMT). Since HMX-1 is the only unit which operates the VH-3D and VH-60N aircraft, all responsibility for fleet management and interface with NAVAIRSYSCOM for ILSMT matters falls to representatives from this maintenance department. This causes an additional draw on manpower usually shared by all fleet operators in other aircraft communities.

B. Manning comments. By Marine Corps policy, HMX-1 is an Excepted Command which will receive manning to 100% of T/O. However, due to security requirements, the Executive Maintenance Department's sole source for manning of aviation maintenance MOSs is the "cleared" personnel population within its USMC counterpart "Greenside" (or "stake") Maintenance Department at HMX-1. The impact of this requirement is explained below in questions 2 and 5.

**2. Describe personnel flow between "Greenside" and "Whiteside" maintenance departments. Does the T/O support this process?**

All personnel for the Whiteside maintenance department are drawn from the Greenside, but only after they have been cleared. If there are clearance problems, then the Greenside must either employ the "unclearables" or hold them until they can be transferred. This causes "bottlenecks" where the clearable population available for the Whiteside becomes decreasingly smaller until personnel are transferred and new candidates arrive on the Greenside. In cases where there are shortages of a particular MOS, the two maintenance departments equally split the available population and, logically, the resultant "holes" in manning. If there is an unequal number of billets that will go unfilled, the larger Whiteside T/O will absorb the difference.

The Greenside T/O is smaller than its Whiteside counterpart. If the Greenside was forced to fill all billets on the Whiteside, the Greenside maintenance effort would be crippled and could not function safely, thus the squadron policy on equal distribution of available personnel.

Near the end of a Marine's tour with HMX-1, the Whiteside will move him back to the Greenside for "refresher" experience on fleet aircraft in preparation for his return to the fleet.

**3. What percentage of enlisted personnel come directly from primary MOS schools? Percentage of aircrew? What is the squadron's ability to use them in the "Whiteside" mission?**

The Whiteside does not keep an actual count of first tour personnel, but many Marines in the department fall into this category. Since the Whiteside maintains aircraft that do not exist anywhere else in the Marine Corps, first tour personnel hamper the department's ability to man billets requiring years of experience. Examples are Quality Assurance and Maintenance Control where only the most experienced personnel are assigned and then only after they have completed extensive training in the VH type aircraft. Rarely will a first tour Marine gain enough skill and experience to serve in these billets. As a result, assignment of first tour Marines to the Whiteside limits the experience base on which the department depends for manning of these critical billets.

There is also an unplanned side effect on the fleet. Many of these Marines will arrive as a lance corporal (E-3) or corporal (E-4) and depart for a fleet tour as staff sergeants (E-6) with little experience on fleet aircraft. Unless they are exceptional performers, these Marines will struggle in subsequent fleet tours which can effect their promotions and also leave a poor impression of HMX-1 in the fleet.

**4. Do you have personnel assigned for reasons other than primary duty with HMX-1 (for instance, "humanitarian" transfers)?**

There are no personnel assigned in any category which would allow them to be less than 100% effective in this department. Deployment tempo, experience and security clearances rule out such limitations on Marines assigned. Personnel with any deployment restrictions or clearance difficulties will remain in or be transferred back to the Greenside maintenance department.

**5. Are screening and assignment procedures effective and do they meet your needs? What part does the clearance process play in the maintenance department's ability to do the mission?**

A. Screening of personnel for assignment to HMX-1 occurs either through visit teams from HMX-1 or through applications from the fleet. The process is largely effective but depends heavily on the individual applicant's efforts and those of his parent unit. If the application does not contain accurate or detailed information, delays and errors in the assignment process can occur. A key document is the Administrative Action (AA) Form through which a Marine declares his desire for assignment to HMX-1. Fleet squadrons which are typically short of experience are not eager to lose highly qualified personnel to HMX-1. This is sometimes reflected in the administrative delays encountered in processing AA Forms or, in some cases, unfavorable endorsements on the form by the Marine's chain of command.

B. To facilitate the assignment process, maintenance representatives meet with the Headquarters Marine Corps assignment monitors about once a month to scrub the personnel assignments for the squadron. This places a demand on the available time of senior enlisted maintenance personnel in both departments, but is felt necessary to keep qualified Marines flowing into the squadron. HMX-1 is designated as an "Excepted Command" which means the unit rates manning to 100% of its T/O (fleet units typically rate no more than 90% of T/O). Although an Excepted Command, clearance requirements and gaps caused by assignment delays force "whiteside" and "greenside" maintenance departments to fair-share shortages in personnel (see question 2). End result is breaks in continuity and gaps in billets in spite of policies designed to keep manning at near 100%.

C. There are a number of efforts that could be taken that would enhance the assignment process.

1) In addition to the Presidential Support secondary MOS, a secondary Presidential Crewchief MOS should also be created. There is no T/O restriction on the rank for this assignment and tracking previously qualified crewchiefs would allow the squadron and monitors to locate such personnel for a second tour. This would help avoid the training overhead necessary to qualify Marines for this billet. The current Presidential Support MOS is not specific enough to identify these aircrewmen.

2) Unlike Security and Communications, maintenance personnel assignments are controlled by many different monitors. As a result, no one person at Headquarters has visibility over these MOS assignments to HMX-1. Both the Marine Security Guard (MSG) and the Drill Instructor (DI) programs manage this problem through special monitor billets at Headquarters. Each of these programs has an enlisted monitor who interfaces with the enlisted assignments matrix to ensure that personnel are assigned in the proper numbers with the appropriate skills. Creation of an HMX-1 monitor would solve many of the squadron's manning problems.

3) Due to the length of tours at HMX-1 and the requirement for Marines to accrue a minimum amount of Accumulated Deployment Time (ADT) in the fleet, many HMX-1 Marines do not get the opportunity to serve in career-enhancing "B billets" such as Recruiting. Designation of a Presidential Support tour as "B billet" status for promotion boards would enhance the assignment efforts for HMX-1 and ensure qualified Marines are promoted and retained in the Marine Corps.

4) Current tour length does not allow HMX-1 or the Marine Corps to get an adequate return on the training invested in Whiteside personnel. An increase in tour length to five or six years from the current 3 years (with probable extension to four years) would promote continuity, decrease the cost of clearances and training, and allow more than the current one or two years of service on the Whiteside (Interviewees provided a nominal timeline to show the amount of training time required to produce a fully qualified Marine for Presidential Support).

The impact of the clearance process is described in question 2 above.

**6. How do you train for peculiar equipment required for this mission such as the VH aircraft?**

Primary training is accomplished through contractor support with Sikorsky on-site. Syllabi assume previously experienced maintenance personnel will be taught. This can pose problems for first-term personnel arriving from the "greenside" maintenance department whose only experience has been one or two years on either the CH-46 or CH-53 aircraft. Additionally, VH-3D and VH-60N Marine Aviation Training Management and Employment Programs have been established to mirror fleet standards for training.

**7. Describe your aircrew training program.**

Training is accomplished in identical fashion to the fleet via the appropriate aircraft Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures program. In addition, aircrew training for mission peculiar requirements occurs in Anacostia "saturation" and the Marine One training processes. Tactical training as conducted in the fleet is limited and not required for the mission. Crewchiefs are assigned to a specific aircraft and go where it goes. To create adequate numbers of trained crewchiefs, the department trains many enlisted aircrewmen from non-aircrew MOSs as secondary MOS crewchiefs as stipulated in current USMC policy guidelines.

**8. Have you evaluated increased contractor support?**

No recent evaluations of contractor support have specifically been made for the Executive Maintenance Department.

**9. If you could get increased contractor support of any kind, where would you apply it?**

Potential exists for contractor support in areas such as;

- Secretarial duties
- Aircraft painting; on VH aircraft this job requires skill and experience which few Marines achieve before assignment to the squadron. A civilian under contract assigned to this job for long term could achieve and maintain such expertise.
- Toolroom; this assignment does not require a specific MOS and could be taught to a contractor thus freeing a Marine who arrives already trained for a specific MOS.

- Maintenance Administration; although this is a Marine MOS, the VH aircraft are in a closed-loop maintenance system and upkeep of the associated records could benefit from someone assigned to this duty for more than one or two years (continuity).

**10. What maintenance trainers do you have access to for new personnel to accomplish VH training?**

A number of dedicated training devices are available such as VH-3D Rotor/Flight Controls Components, Automatic Flight Control System, Engine, Drive System, and Hydraulic System trainers. All were obtained by NAVAIR from existing SH-3 trainers and were modified by HMX-1 personnel to VH-3 standards. No new trainers specifically for the VH-3D have been procured.

**11. What retention/re-enlistment incentives are offered to HMX-1 Marines?**

None, other than those offered to any other Marine in the fleet. In fact, for Marines serving their first-tour with HMX-1, re-enlistment often appears as a threat of further family separation due to the likely possibility of reassignment to deploying fleet units. This, coupled with a first-termers lack of MOS and fleet experience, often acts as a disincentive for re-enlistment.

**12. In your opinion, would offering HMX-1 as a re-enlistment incentive for qualified fleet Marines help you do your mission?**

In preparation for squadron screening trips to fleet units, HMX-1 representatives attempt to contact unit career planners to coordinate such efforts. At present success depends on the efforts of individuals unfamiliar with the unit's mission, on "advertising" such opportunities to individual Marines, and on fleet perceptions of HMX-1. Service with the squadron is not universally considered a career enhancing assignment.

## SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Major T.W. Fitzgerald, 7566, Executive Flight Detachment Quality Assurance Officer (F)  
Major J.A. Bowden, 7566, Executive Flight Detachment Flight Line Officer (B)  
Captain R.G. Sypolt, 6004, Executive Flight Detachment Maintenance Material Control Officer (S)  
Master Sergeant D.M. Cowan, 6119, Executive Flight Detachment Quality Assurance Chief (C)  
Master Sergeant J.H. Haugh, 6119, Exec Flight Det Maintenance Material Control Chief (H)  
Gunnery Sergeant R.S. White, 6113, Executive Flight Detachment Flight Line Chief (W)

Conducted by Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, on 19 September 1996.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- (F) The campaign most intense flight operations squadron faces
- (F) Need two additional VH-60N's to be meet campaign and added mission requirements.
- (S) Concur, need two more H-60's
- (W) Lost 1 VH-60 in mishap, utilization is up to 44 hrs per month. Add 1 additional 60 utilization will drop to 35 hours per month.
- (F) Aircraft properly equipped for mission.
- (S) Use reduced life of components, cosmetic upkeep, detailed postflight inspections, phases and mid-phases sustain material condition of aircraft. Preventive maintenance key to maintaining material condition.
- (B) Postflight inspection is 2-3 hours elapsed maintenance time by 8 people. Wipe down aircraft completely. Independent of flight time flown.
- (W) Postflight procedures work to inhibit corrosion. Preventive maintenance key to keeping aircraft up. (All concured in last statement)
- (F) All maintenance is in accordance with the policies of OPNAVINST 4790.2F.
- (C) Additionally, use program reviews, SPAR reviews, Pack up reviews and ILSMT's to ensure right maintenance done. More people reviewing, good system of checks and balances on maintenance.
- (S) Validity of stores is 99.6%.
- (H) Annual review of stores makes sure right parts on hand.
- (S) In house schools ensure quality of maintenance.
- (F) Brought 2 instructors in house, they provide in-service training as well as formal schooling.
- (F) Prefer to use HMX assets to chase rather than USAF C-130's. Easier to coordinate, more flexible with changing mission profiles.
- (S) Configuration is closely monitored and maintained. No non standard installations.
- (H) TDC is received by QA, compliance or non applicability is determined, route sheet attached in accordance with MI then issued to Maintenance Control. MAF issued for compliance or incorporation. Certified copies of TDC issued to appropriate shop(s).
- (F) Squadron gets heads up from NAVAIR of upcoming TDC's, especially where immediate compliance required.
- (F) The squadron has a policy of 5 open discrepancies against a VH aircraft. Don't operate the aircraft with open discrepancies.
- (F) Liaison between Trip Leader, WHLO, Greenside Trip Leader and Operations ensures proper support requirements.

- (H) Sikorsky Stores maintains and supports packups, keyed to aircraft mix.
- (S) Need to look at increasing use of Mid Term refurbishments vice SPARs during peak periods. Never get an aircraft back on time, makes it difficult to plan on best way to meet commitments.

#### Internal/External Mission Support Aircraft:

- (F) Good rapport with Air Force Crews. Demise of "Banner qualified" crews has caused some problems. Have to make sure to review mission requirements and crew day with C-130 crews. Most critical for them.
- (C) Attend annual "Banner" conference. Review how White House support is executed, who is responsible for what under part of SOP.
- (J) USMC Fleet provided aircraft for the most part have been satisfactory in meeting support mission requirements.
- (N) Few problems, they are the exception rather than the rule. Fleet commanders are provided the requirements and then required to comply.
- (N) Air Force support has a good track record of being on time. HMX has recently added a C-5 day into their planning due to the reduced reliability of the aircraft.
- (N) The Air Force used to have Phoenix Banner designated crews but has gotten away from that designation. Air Force crews that now support the mission frequently are not used to HMX operating procedures, existing waivers nor highly proficient in loading equipment or aircraft.
- (E) Coordination for internal support aircraft is handled through the Operations Department, external support is handled through the White House Liaison Office, in both cases the coordination was considered to be very effective.
- (N) HMX-1 has recently gotten certification for the C-17 although they have not used the aircraft operationally.

#### External Agency Support:

- (S) Deal with NAVAIR closely, especially APML, through ILSMT's, IPR's and other reviews. Use all the assets in house, QA, CDI's, Tech reps to initiate action chits to make system better.
- (H) Anyone can initiate an action chit, QA takes the lead in drafting and submitting to ILSMT.

#### Logistics Elements:

##### Manpower:

- (S) The Table of Organization (T/O) could be improved on.
- (F) Have the right number of people, just the wrong MOS's. Need a T/O scrub against the mission, it might require more people.
- (S) The troops right out of FREST experience culture shock.
- (W) Have recently had a large increase in the number of "school house" troops that have joined.
- (H) The T/O of the "Greenside" is less than the "Whiteside. The small pipe has to fill the big pipe.

- (B) After reporting from FREST takes a troop about 2 years to learn his primary aircraft and move towards becoming a CDI. Then must move to Whiteside to have 2 years, starts all over again. After tour at HMX becomes senior NCO, not properly prepared to execute his responsibilities in a Fleet squadron.
- (W) Most agree that new troops need at least one pump to understand Fleet maintenance and their aircraft.
- (B) Greenside maintenance is not set up to be a training squadron, they have heavy tasking to support the mission.
- (E/N) They must first be trained and qualified on their primary aircraft. This training process takes approximately two years.
- (W) Clearances seem easier for school house troops, younger less activity to look at. See more being used to fill Whiteside holes.
- (S) Clearances are a factor for the older troops.
- (F) Have minimum requirements for pilots, need the same thing for troops.
- (W) If you have a 617X MOS you are going to fly. Have developed VH syllabi, some haven't made it so send them back. 50 hour Crew Member Training syllabus, 90 days to qualify. Can grow our own crew chiefs from other MOS's but use same requirements for qualification.
- (B) Syllabus is standardized. Crew Chief and Plane Captain boards evaluate knowledge and maturity. Not a paper process.
- (F) Personnel churn has negative impact. Have to watch depth and continuity in shops to make sure sufficient knowledge and expertise
- (W) Churn especially bad when dealing with school house troops, just get up to speed and they are gone.
- (S) Churn effected by campaign schedules, campaigns most difficult time, everyone will face one. Usually large exodus after campaign.
- (W) CDI's take a while to grow, by the time you get them qualified it seems they are ready to rotate. Can't rush CDI process and get experience and knowledge required.
- (S) In lieu of T/O changes ought to consider contract maintainers (GS or Contractors).

#### Technical Data:

- (F) Sikorsky maintains a full set of aperature cards that are available at any time required.
- (B) TPL is strong, dispersed libraries are monitored and are strong.
- (W) Considering the volume of changes the dispersed libraries do well.
- (C) We develop our own tech manuals, QA ensures proper publications pack up for each det.
- (F) QA check program for all disperesed tech libraries, ensure changes are incorporated.
- (F) Do most of the changes internally, develops process agreement. Outside check and balances validate system.
- (B) Need to see if people understand two separate maintenance departments. Didn't get a suite of ATIS gear for the greenside.

#### Facilities:

- (W) Because of facilities use 7 people to tow an aircraft. Have to turn head, lift and lower blades to get aircraft outside.
- (C) Had to build a deck over some to the offices to walk blades and turn heads.
- (B) Tie up a great deal of time towing.



- (W) Usually move every aircraft a couple of times a day.
- (C) Only one spot in hangar to jack and cycle landing gear.
- (W) Complacency becomes an issue. 4-5 months then another ding and everyone pays attention again. Facilities cause problems.
- (B) Flight Line lives in a trailer, insufficient space for people, no good area for maintenance. Have to "hot desk", not enough office space to allow a desk for people who need them.
- (W) Muster 74 troops, no way to get them all inside.
- (S) Ramp is an issue, not compliant with P-80 criteria.
- (F) Taxi in nose first, shut down then tow aircraft to point in launch direction.
- (H) Only one hot seat spot on the line.
- (H) Have to negotiate 3 fences to get to wash rack, good chance to ding tip cap. Only one rack has a drain with scupper, so limited to washing one aircraft at a time.
- (F) Non compliance with P-80 only get worse with addition of greenside H-53E's.
- (W) See more civilians working on the facility but nothing seems to change.
- (F) Anacostia is outstanding facility.
- (W) Doors are a problem.
- (F) There is a contract to fix the doors.
- (B) Roof still leaks.
- (H) Leaks are painted on the deck so don't park aircraft under them if possible.
- (S) The roof has been tarred twice in my tour, still leaks.
- (W) Head near flight in constant need of repair. Redid the roof, had tar dripping down the walls into the head, passed for maintenance, never resolved.

#### Training:

- (F) There is a syllabus for each position in mission training, use saturation to make sure everyone learns their job.
- (C) The in house factory schools and vendor schools make sure everyone learns the aircraft and systems. Get actual hands on before in the mission.
- (B) Developing T and R syllabus for crew positions for the H-3 and H-60.
- (W) Can use trainers and instructors to assist in in-service training.
- (B) Technical training on Tuesday is taken seriously.
- (C) Use the formalized schools and their syllabi to standardize maintenance training.
- (B) MATMEP and other formalized syllabi ensure standardization.
- (C) Computer literacy is poor, need to get more school quotas. Essential, especially as no more paper documentation of maintenance. Difficult to get MCCDC quotas. This was a recommendation from the AirLant AMMT inspection.

#### Support Equipment:

- (F) The existing support equipment meets mission with exception of H-60 huffer. GTC-85 is old and difficult to maintain. NAVAIR and squadron working on solving this problem.
- (S) Use trip after action reports to identify problems and recommendations.
- (H) Battery cart is an example, identified problem, solution and then had the item procured. Old battery cart didn't fit on aircraft, have sufficient amperage to complete multiple starts and was sometimes forgotten. New fits on aircraft and meets all other requirements.

- Squadron works well with vendors. Squadron personnel working with Pax River test folks on upgrade to Com/Nav system software. Ensure involvement in all applicable processes, more like arm than fingers in the pie.

#### External Support - Other Agencies:

- Squadron participates in ILSMT's. Work closely with NAVAIR on issues for ILSMT's, a pre ILSMT meeting on 24 September to review issues.
- Program coordinators for VH aircraft provide a single point of contact for information flow.

#### Logistics Elements:

##### Manpower:

- 24 month requirement to work in the cage. Even with this need to look at bringing back experienced personnel to provide stronger knowledge base.
- Since only operators of aircraft school essential. School dates are hard requirements. No formal school no qualifications, no CDI, no CDQAR or QA.
- If you have a aircrew MOS you fly. Home grow crewmembers as well. 50 hours Crew Member under Training (CMT) then NATOPS eval, plane captains and crew chief boards. This is not a paper process.
- Standardize training through formalized schools, use of local tech reps and MATMEP. Local tech reps are well utilized, attend Maintenance meetings and know where problems are.
- Real fear is that after campaign there will be a big flush of people. Recruiting trips help, but need to come up with way of better stabilizing experience. Short period to get people up to speed on unique aircraft.

##### Technical Data:

- More involvement in the development of manuals than in fleet.
- Semi annual In Process Review (IPR) of publications. Involves NAVAIR, NATSF, Sikorsky and HMX. Review pubs and have Sikorsky tech pubs writer on site to update publication.
- Redline pubs are available with 30 days. Formal copies are available within 90 days usually.
- Hold complete file of aperture cards, have access to any drawing if required to sort out gray area of a discrepancy.
- Aperture cards also used in IPRs to ensure accuracy of the publications.
- Use digital video camera on discrepancies. Data sent to the factory where engineers overlay on drawing. Reduces turn around time for answers.


##### Facilities:

- Great training facilities.
- From QA perspective, aircraft movement is dangerous, a "kabuki dance" to get aircraft out. Ding blades since required to lift up and pull down blades and rotate head to get aircraft out. Lots of aircraft movement required.


3. Safety/General Operations:


- (F) Maintenance Control controls maintenance on road. Trip Leader is qualified certified to serve as the Maintenance Controller. May have a separate Maintenance Controller along, depends on the trip.
- (F) QAR makes the determination whether or not it is downing discrepancy. If gray area use all the resources, tech rep, call back to base and use expertise and technical data available.
- (B) Tech reps help a great deal on the road.
- (F) Aircraft handling procedures while on the road are spelled out in the Trip Leaders SOP and the CO's new policy on taxiing at civilian airports.
- (F) QA solicits hazard identification from everyone. Once hazard is identified QA will initiate paperwork or work with Safety office as required. Good relationship with ASO since QAO is a former safety officer. Understand what he is trying to do.
- (C) QA attends quarterly Safety Council meeting.
- (B) Issues identified, regardless of source roll into appropriate forum, whether AOM, Maintenance meetings, etc. The word will get passed.

I have, on this the 30<sup>TH</sup> day of SEPTEMBER, 1996, reviewed the above summary of the interview consisting of 5 pages.

  
Major T. W. Fitzgerald

  
Major J. A. Bowden

  
Captain R. G. Sypolt

  
Master Sergeant J. H. Haugh

  
Master Sergeant D. M. Cowan

  
Gunnery Sergeant R. S. White

## **89 LG Maintenance Squadron Commanders**

**Interview Summary, 17 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

**Maj Ronald E. Fontenot, 89 Aircraft Generation Squadron (AGS)**

**Maj George F. Rhame, 89 Maintenance Squadron (MXS)**

**Maj Robert S. Sherouse, 89 Logistics Support Squadron (LSS)**

### **BACKGROUND**

There are six squadrons within the 89th Logistics Group, but only the Aircraft Generation, Maintenance, and the Logistics Support Squadrons directly support the aircraft maintenance mission. The commanders along with their maintenance supervisor and/or maintenance superintendent were interviewed together to obtain their assessment of maintenance operations within the 89th Airlift Wing.

### **RESOURCES/FUNDING**

There are no funding shortfalls that negatively affect the squadron's ability to safely perform its mission. However, the MXS and the LSS indicated a shortage of funds for basic squadron infrastructure and improvement. These items included requirements for computers, office equipment, local area network equipment, and some backshop equipment. The AGS indicated they had no shortage of funds, even though they directly provide funding for the Presidential Pilot's maintenance unit.

### **SUPPLY/PARTS**

No significant problems with obtaining necessary parts for assigned aircraft. Four of six assigned types of aircraft are supported by the Contractor Operated and Maintained Base Supply (COMBS). Helicopters and C-135s are supported by the Air Force base supply system. Supervisors monitor the usual metrics, such as MICAP rates. The MICAP rate is the percentage of time an aircraft is not mission capable because parts are not available. For FY96, MICAP rates are well below the maximum.

### **MANNING**

Authorized and assigned manning is sufficient for the tasked workload. The squadrons do work extended shifts and/or go on 12 hour shifts during peak workload periods, like most other units, but this is not a frequent requirement. The AGS maintains 24 hours a day, 7 days a week flightline coverage. The MXS schedules standby personnel if the shop is not manned 24 hours per day.

The squadrons are selectively manned and commander's review each candidate before the individual is hired. Commanders and supervisors review each candidates performance reports, prior experience, and, if possible, conduct telephone interviews with previous supervisors. Including retirement and PCS actions, the turnover rate is about five percent per year of assigned personnel. This results in a solid base of experienced technicians with a high degree of

continuity. The only shop that seems to have a problem with experienced individuals is the cryptographic (secure communication) shop. Supervisors pay particular attention to this shop to ensure experienced and qualified technicians are available.

Morale within the squadrons is good. People understand the high priority of the mission and get to see immediate results of their efforts. The experience of being involved in a mission with high DV visibility is very rewarding. Some negative factors are: high cost of living, long commutes, and substandard schools.

### **LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION**

Since the units are rank heavy, there is no shortage of qualified senior level personnel to provide adequate supervision at all times. Senior supervisors (minimum of SMSgt and one officer) are available at all times

### **FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT**

Facilities and equipment are adequate for the mission, but there is room for improvement. The MXS has an immediate need to replace/upgrade their paint facility. Numerous self-help facility improvement projects were evident throughout the maintenance complex.

### **TRAINING**

Training has become even more important with the loss of experienced technicians during the recent drawdowns. Each squadron recognizes the problem and is ensuring the proper emphasis is placed on training. Other than basic aircraft familiarization courses, units invest a lot of resources for OJT and the Maintenance Qualification Training Program (MQTP). MQTP classes are taught by a highly experienced maintenance technician and consists of a combination of classroom and hands-on training. Commanders support this requirement and have identified some of their best personnel as trainers.

Most of the individuals assigned to the 89th AW maintenance complex have previous experience on other aircraft. They are usually trained mechanics who need upgrade training on the specific aircraft assigned to the 89th AW.

### **AIRCRAFT GENERATION**

The maintenance complex has an outstanding record of achievement. The on-time departure reliability for FY95 was 99.7%. For FY96, the on-time departure reliability is currently 99.3%.

The maintenance complex maintains an outstanding relationship with the operations group. There are formal and informal weekly meetings to discuss upcoming taskings, coordinate requirements, and openly discuss ways to improve the aircraft generation process.

Due to the uniqueness of each individual aircraft, short notice taskings are not unusual. Safety is emphasized even more during these periods. Pressure is high to get the job done, but there is also a great deal of unity in effort for a common purpose.

The squadrons maintains a comprehensive Process Improvement Program (PIP). The unit uses the program to assess the quality of maintenance being performed. The PIP is process oriented and requires numerous assessments of on-going tasks and completed tasks.

### **SAFETY**

Safety is emphasized by all squadron commanders. It is a topic during commander's calls and is constantly briefed throughout the flights and shops. Commanders expect and enforce technical data requirements to ensure quality maintenance and a safe workplace.

### **OUTSIDE AGENCIES**

The squadrons coordinate well with outside agencies and do not indicate any significant problems with outside agencies.

//SIGNED//

RONALD E. FONTENOT, Maj, USAF  
Commander, 89th Aircraft Generation Squadron

//SIGNED//

GEORGE F. RHAME, Maj, USAF  
Commander, 89th Maintenance Squadron

//SIGNED//

ROBERT S. SHEROUSE, Maj, USAF  
Commander, 89th Logistics Support Squadron

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
The interviewee's statements were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

## SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Colonel R.A. Forrester, 9907, Program Manager, (PMA-261)

Conducted by Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, on 27 September 1996.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- The VH-3D has a life of 14,000 hours based on a Service Life Assessment conducted in FY-93. Takes aircraft out to year 2014 for service.
- The VH-60N has a life of 7,500 hours based on original design. A paper analysis could easily move the life to 10,000 hours.
- No currently scheduled replacement for either the VH-3D or VH-60N.
- The VH-3D is currently undergoing prototype testing for Communications, Navigation and Survivability Upgrade (CNSU) and Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) at Patuxent River.
- The VH-60N is currently undergoing prototype testing for CNSU and Mid Life Upgrade (MUG) at Patuxent River.
- The PMA is currently in negotiations with Sikorsky on the procurement for CNSU/SLEP and CNSU/MUG kits
- A schedule for incorporation of the kits has been developed.
- Global Positioning System (GPS) is a modification mandated for incorporation into all aircraft by the end of FY-98.
- Current tolerances for on board navigation system is within 1% of route without external update, with update tolerance is about 60 meters.
- GPS was included in the CNSU package for both aircraft, modifications would have been complete by FY-2001
- Drop in modifications for GPS will cost an additional \$1.1M over CNSU.
- Cockpit Voice and Flight Incident Recorders (CSFIR) have also been mandated for incorporation in all aircraft by the end of FY-98.
- Drop in modification schedules have been developed for both GPS and CSFIR, when done together they take each aircraft out of service for an additional month, done independently they will take each aircraft out for 6 weeks (3 weeks each)
- Life limited components and components requiring overhaul are ½ life primarily on VH-3D and appropriate life (normally doesn't exceed 75%) for VH-60N. Life for H-60 based on study and safety/reliability of design.
- All parts reworked on VH aircraft are returned to "blueprint" tolerances vice repair tolerances. Increases reliability of the components.
- 50% of Fleet life represents 7 sigma reliability, 1 in a million. With additional maintenance procedures provides reliability required for mission.

### Logistics Elements:

#### Computer Resources

- Software Support Activity(SSA) was NAWC Warminster, now at Patuxent River with BRAC move.
- BRAC move caused loss of 60% of knowledge on program, engineering staff was senior and did not leave area. Great availability of jobs in the civilian sector.

- Big problem was in documentation of effort. New engineers must learn system and understand design at same time.
- BRAC move prevented process improvement and improved documentation procedures.
- Current funding in Tactical Software Support (TSS) under Air System Support is \$1.5M of a \$2.5M requirement.
- Current funding will only allow correction of Category 1 Software Trouble Reports (STR's). Category 2 and 3 STR's will not be corrected
- Previously been able to use APN-5 resources to partially fund TSS. Software under CNSU has stabilized and that funding will not be available to assist in support TSS.



**375 MS/QAR (Quality Assurance Representative)  
Interview Summary, 21 Sept 96, Scott AFB, IL  
Maj Frisbee, SMSgt Cook, SSgt Kern, SSgt Buntjer, Mr. Gerleman,  
CMSgt Graham, MSgt McLaughlin**

**BACKGROUND**

Maj Frisbee 375 Logistics Support Squadron (LSS) Commander, SMS Cook 375 LSS Superintendent, SSgt Kern and SSgt Buntjer 375 LSS C-21 Quality Assurance Representatives (QAR), Mr. Gerleman C-21 Site Manager for Raytheon at Scott AFB, CMS Graham HQ AMC/LGFB Support Aircraft Superintendent, and MSgt McLaughlin HQ AMC/LGFB Support Aircraft Manager. Interview was conducted in the QAR office area. C-21 maintenance is aligned under the 375 LSS for management and personnel oversight with the actual maintenance being performed by contractor personnel with the QAR performing quality assurance oversight. QAR personnel perform actual aircraft maintenance action oversight insuring the contractor, Raytheon, performs according to contract requirements. HQ AMC/LGFB is the headquarters management oversight team who provides guidance, policy, assistance, and direction to aircraft maintenance requirements on DV support aircraft.

**RESOURCES & FUNDING**

Resources and funding are adequate. There are no areas impacting safety.

**SUPPLY/PARTS**

There are no parts shortages that effect safety. The contractor is very responsive when an aircraft is down for parts, most of the time receiving next day delivery.

**PERSONNEL**

Two individuals are authorized and assigned in the QAR office which is adequate to insure safe reliable aircraft. One augmentee is provided when an individual is on leave or TDY and the squadron is working on qualifying another individual so that two augmentees will be available.

**FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT**

There are no known facility or equipment shortfalls that impact safe operations.

**TRAINING**

All QAR personnel receive initial QAR training through Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and aircraft familiarization training is through the contractor. AETCs portion is 5-days of concentrated study on how to administer, validate, and report contract requirements. The contractor portion is also 5-days long and concentrates on aircraft specific C-21 aircraft system knowledge. The 375th LSS QAR personnel said the training was very good and covered all required items.

### **AIRCRAFT GENERATION**

Operations tempo is high. When the C-21 is heavily tasked the contractor provides extended support. For instance the contractor sent personnel TDY, at his expense, to support large gatherings of C-21 aircraft such as when a General Officer conference was being conducted. This makes for a smoother and safer operation as more contractor personnel are available during peak work loads.

### **SAFETY**

Safety is first and foremost in everyone's minds in all activities. Annually, at every program management review (PMR), the weapon system safety group also meets to discuss any safety concerns. The System Program Director (SPD) also receives all commercial safety info from the FAA and aircraft builders and forwards info to MAJCOM. The MAJCOM then forwards the safety info out to the units. Safety cross-tells, such as the service difficulty reports (SDRs) are reviewed by HQ AMC for applicability with AMC aircraft. If a safety item, from any source, is applicable AMC, the SPD, and the owning organization discuss options and develop a plan of attack. The 375th wing safety oversees the C-21 ramp like they do with any other wing aircraft. QAR personnel are active and involved in the wing ground safety program through the LSS safety NCO. The LSS safety NCO passes out information and performs on sight inspections.

### **BOTTOM LINE**

The 375th has highly trained and qualified QAR personnel providing quality aircraft evaluations.

//SIGNED//

M. FRISBEE, Major, USAF  
Commander, Logistics Support Sq

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statement were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

## SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL FRED GEIER, U.S. MARINE CORPS

On Monday, 23 September 1996, I interviewed Colonel Fred Geier, CO, HMX-1, and then also the Detachment Commander for the New York City/Boston Presidential lift detachment of HMX-1, at our hotel in Edison, New Jersey. We were deployed to support Presidential helicopter lifts in the New York area, and since the lift rehearsal had been conducted on the previous day, 23 September was an opportune time to speak at length with Colonel Geier without interrupting his normal performance of duties. Colonel Geier was, during this interview, and during all other occasions upon which we had contact, *extremely* positive and upbeat about HMX-1's capabilities, its performance of a very demanding mission, and, especially the quality of his pilots, aircrews, and maintenance personnel who work in a seamless unit to ensure accomplishment of the wide range of missions in literally hundreds of deployed sites worldwide.

I asked Colonel Geier if he had any **comments about the number, quality, stability, or personal reliability of his Marines and Sailors**. He emphasized that **HMX-1 is a unique command** in the Marine Corps, owing to its very tightly controlled and specific mission parameters. Because of this, the Squadron is **normally manned at just under 100% of its listed Table of Organization for both officers and enlisted personnel**. Such manning is evident nowhere else in Marine Corps aviation. He felt he could not reasonably complain about the number of personnel, even though the squadron's workload had continued to grow over the last few years. He was, however, concerned about the numbers of first tour personnel being assigned to the Squadron. [I note parenthetically that the latest HMX-1 T/O revision was approved in July, 1993, and is referenced and included elsewhere in this report].

When asked if there were other areas he, as Commanding Officer, felt might be valuable for the Review Team to consider, Colonel Geier spoke about the following issues. They are not listed in any order of importance designated by him, but are more readily characterized as issues of concern to him as a commander of the organization, and about which he held strong enough an opinion to speak when given the opportunity. They follow here:

- **The White House Liaison Officers (WHLOs) frequently act on behalf of the Commanding Officer, coordinating on a daily basis with senior White House officials, and other Executive agency officials such as the Secret Service.** They routinely conduct advance mission planning as totally independent agents of the command long prior to the time of the mission, and **must also coordinate mission execution in conjunction with other Services' officers, Federal, state, and local officials.** They routinely deal with complex planning tasks, involving compartmentalized, highly classified information which bridges between DoD, and other branches of the Executive arm of the government. **Such functions are almost unique for mid-grade military officers, combining many of the most difficult of "joint" DoD taskings with elements of interaction with the State Department** and on many occasions their staffs worldwide.

## SUMMARY OF STATEMENT OF COLONEL FRED GEIER, U.S. MARINE CORPS

The same considerations apply to the HMX-1 Plans section, which daily interfaces with the Joint Contingency Plans Office in the White House, staffed by Navy and Air Force personnel. Thus, their *jointness* is inherent in their very existence for the purpose of the classified planning mission. Colonel Geier also believes these personnel should receive joint duty credit.

They have a high personnel tempo, being deployed as much as 75% of the time during an election year. They are responsible for all lift trip and emergency relocation site planning, frequently involving large detachments of helicopters and personnel, often at unfamiliar locations both inside the United States and in foreign countries. During a typical two year tour as a WHLO, an Officer may be called upon to plan and execute nearly a hundred missions. Clearly, this is a most highly sensitive and visible mission. Yet, despite this, WHLOs are given no joint duty credit. Having been assigned duty in the J-7 Directorate of the Joint Staff for two years, as well as having previously served as a WHLO, *Colonel Geier felt strongly that the WHLOs' duties gave more than comparable exposure and should rate joint duty credit.*

*Recommendation: DC/S(M&RA) evaluate WHLO duties under appropriate regulations to determine the appropriateness of awarding joint duty accreditation for Officers performing the WHLO function within 365 days (as a minimum) from assignment to those duties.*

o The White House Military Office (WHMO) has been utilizing an HMX-1 WHLO in a temporary duty status as head of Airlift Operations in the Old Executive Officer Building. This is the first time an HMX-1 officer has been assigned to work in Airlift Operations. Colonel Geier noted that the dual addition of both Marine Corps and helicopter expertise was unprecedented, and had thus far provided valuable planning expertise for the Director, WHMO, and had paid big benefits to HMX-1 and the Department of Defense as a whole. He recommended that the Marine Corps make this a permanent billet, by initiating the appropriate staffing process to bring the billet within the WHMO T/O. Such action would not only ensure permanence of the position, but would also serve the dual purpose of freeing up the current placement of that billet against the normally assigned T/O billet for a WHLO within HMX-1. The experimental fill of the position was never intended to be permanent when accomplished by a compensatory reduction of HMX-1 WHLO assets, but was instead designed to determine both the utility and advisability of having an HMX-1-experienced rotary wing Marine aviator in the Airlift Operations structure.

[Note: Mr. Alan P. Sullivan, Director, WHMO had earlier made almost the exact same comments and recommendations about the utility of the Marine Corps presence in Airlift Operations at the WHMO, and his desire that it become a permanently staffed position during his orientation briefing to VADM Engen, MGen Hogle, and myself in the course of this review.]

*Recommendation: The Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command/Total Force Structure Review Group should thoroughly review the recommended addition of a permanent Marine Corps rotary wing aviator billet in the WHMO Airlift Operations Office, with a view towards shifting that billet into the*

## SUMMARY OF STATEMENT OF COLONEL FRED GEIER, U.S. MARINE CORPS

*WHMO structure and freeing up the WHLO slot now captured by it.*

◦ Although HMX-1 has historically been assigned experienced Marine rotary wing aviators, the average experience level of pilots has recently been declining. As a direct result of the overall lack of an experienced fleet base upon which to draw, the minimum requirements for assignment to HMX-1 have previously changed from 2000 flight hours, first to an 1800 hour level, and currently a 1500 flight hour level. The 1500 flight hour requirement is rarely waived and then only for pilots who have demonstrated exceptional abilities who nearly have 1500 hours. Despite this highlighted matter noted by him, Colonel Geier noted that he was not concerned for the safety of flight or for mission performance due to this decline of overall experience. All squadron pilots are initially required to complete a rigorous syllabus to qualify in the additional type aircraft ratings (VH-3D and VH-60N) used in the White House missions. If successful, further into their tours with HMX-1 each must undergo a separate, intensive program in order to qualify to fly as a White House co-pilot, and/or ultimately a White House helicopter aircraft commander (HAC)--and in some cases as a Command Pilot.

Colonel Geier stated that, in his opinion, the level of training was much better now than it was in the past. He said he currently had within HMX-1 *fifty* of the top majors in Marine Corps rotary wing aviation, along with *thirty-three* of the top Captains as well--along with a significantly large number of pilots who have been designated as *Weapons and Tactics Instructors* (WTI) after completion of a rigorous training syllabus at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 (MAWTS.-1).

[*Note: A typical operational squadron has one or two WTIs; a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)] composite squadron normally has approximately four. HMX-1 has thirty--largely because it has relatively experienced applicants from the operating forces whose overall qualifications, including WTI schooling, do not reflect the "fleet average". HMX-1 aviators are necessarily selected from the best captains and majors in the operating forces; these "best" pilots have a disproportionate amount of tactical and other qualifications.*]

◦ Colonel Geier was next asked about flight simulator training for the Executive mission. He indicated that pilots annually went to the SH-3 simulator located at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida, but noted that although the VH-3D and VH-60N cockpits were similar to each other, they were not similar to the Navy's SH-3 and H-60 simulators--therefore, only gross similarity in cockpit procedures exists. This could result in negative training but those assets present the only comparable simulation available. In response a question, Colonel Geier indicated that he did not see any requirement for a motion base simulator for his mission; he indicated the critical need was for emergency procedures. He indicated his belief that even visual simulation of the external environment may not be needed. He thought an Aircrew or Cockpit Procedures Trainer with a fixed base and no visual simulation would be of material assistance to the Squadron's mission. He felt that VH pilots should have monthly simulation training in a device that replicates the VH-3D and VH-60N cockpits.

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**[Note: A fixed base simulator has a much lower acquisition and operating cost and is much more reliable than one with motion. A fixed base device would avoid the higher costs of a larger and more complex facility to house it. A fixed base simulator should not expose pilots to simulator motion sickness.]**

***Recommendation: That DC/S for Aviation prepare appropriate documentation to recommend expeditious procurement of a fixed-base procedures trainer configured to replicate the VH-3D and VH-60N cockpits, for ultimate location aboard Marine Corps Air Facility or Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.***

◦ Colonel Geier also commented on the fact that **decreasing average pilot experience levels, even with corresponding decreases in the minimum required to apply for duty at HMX-1, had drastically affected the pool of annual applicants.** He noted that even very recently there had been more than 100 voluntary applicants annually who met the requirements for HMX-1 duty. Applications have currently declined to numbers in the high 30s. **Last year, because some applicants did not meet other screening criteria (e.g. personal debt made them poor candidates for the necessary White House "Yankee White" security clearances), HMX-1 used virtually 100% of applicants who met screening criteria in order to access the required numbers of pilots for its mission. Even so, only 95% of the vacancies for pilots were filled this year.**

Another factor that may be affecting the number of applicants is **the relatively high personnel tempo of Marines in the operating forces.** Aircrews in HMX-1 typically deploy 40% or more of the year, either on Presidential lift or emergency relocation support mission away from the metropolitan Washington area or on three day, unaccompanied deployments to the Anacostia Facility for the local emergency relocation mission. **These Anacostia deployments take place in total isolation aboard the secure compound at the facility, and the assigned aircrew may not depart the compound for any reason until properly relieved.**

**HMX-1 applicants must volunteer for this duty in between tours in operating forces; tours that also take them away from their dependents for up to 50% (or more) of the time. However, in the operating forces, Marines are credited with Accumulated Deployed Time, which ensures that they are not deployed excessively within a tour of duty or involuntarily returned to a deployable tour too soon. HMX-1 duty, however, is a tour where Marines are not credited Accumulated Deployed Time.** This is not only a fairness issue but also may affect retention of Marines due to morale and welfare implications. It clearly has significant potential to decrease the quantity of future applicants to the point that HMX-1 may have to lower standards or face billet vacancies.

**These factors combine to make clear that precious little maneuver room exists for either HMX-1 or HQMC manpower personnel in trying to find qualified Marines who can be cleared and trained as White House aircraft commanders or co-pilots.**

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[*Note:* In July 1991, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps non-concurred with an HMX-1 Study Group Report recommendation to modify Marine Corps Order 1300.8 and permit HMX-1 personnel credit for Accumulated Deployed Time. This issue was understandably a significant manpower management challenge for HQMC.]

***Recommendation: That DC/S(M&RA) once again review, with a view towards modification to reflect Accumulated Deployed Time credit for members of HMX-1, the provisions of Marine Corps Order 1300.8\_\_.***

◦ **Regarding enlisted personnel, Colonel Geier voiced concern about the increased percentage of first tour Marines reporting directly to HMX-1 from entry level schooling.** Currently, HMX-1 has about 26% of the enlisted ranks as first tour Marines. This has several impacts. First, it is widely and understandably assumed that personnel must have high personnel reliability and experience levels in order to be assigned to HMX-1 duty. **Yet, first tour Marines have no demonstrated operational reliability and have had no time to mature and become experienced in their occupational skills.** As a result of a successful four year first tour in HMX-1, a Marine could be a corporal or sergeant, qualified as a crew chief, yet still have zero appreciation of leadership or duties involved in typical units that deploy to sea and conduct sustained operations in an austere, tactical environment. As a result, **a first tour non-commissioned officer reporting to the operating forces from HMX-1 may have significant gaps in experience that are a "surprise" to his/her new unit leadership** because this otherwise superb Marine does not meet the "*fleet standard*" for tactical know how.

***Recommendation: That DC/S(M&RA) review current policy and assignment procedures assigning first tour enlisted Marines to HMX-1. If such assignments are considered necessary, it is further recommended that they be minimized to the greatest extent practicable for the reasons stated above.***

◦ **Another area of concern discussed by Colonel Geier was that of personnel reliability.** With the exception of 12 billets which do not require security clearances, all personnel assigned to HMX-1 must be screened as a first step in the process that would result in a White House "*Yankee White*" security clearance. Colonel Geier indicated that **the time it takes to get a "Yankee White" clearance has improved and is currently about six months.** Although two years ago there were problems regarding the screening of Marines before they received permanent change of station orders to HMX-1, frequent visits of HMX-1 *assist* teams to the operational forces and a review of screening procedures by all concerned have resulted in significant improvements.

Two aspects, however, should be noted. First, **the increased percentage of first tour Marines raises the prospect that relatively immature Marines may be more likely to fail getting a clearance or have a reliability problem after getting cleared.** Any Marine, first or subsequent tour, who is to fill a billet requiring a clearance *should* be able to be cleared, although some may be in a "*pending*" status during the processing. Second, **Marines have been assigned HMX-1 duty who are non-deployable.** Examples of Marines in this category may be parents with exceptional dependents requiring special care under the *Exceptional Family Member* Program

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(covered separately elsewhere in this report). **These are good Marines but, because they cannot do the normal duties expected of HMX-1 Marines, others must deploy in their stead.**

Although much emphasis appears to be on the *Whiteside*, Colonel Geier notes that **the impact of non-deployable personnel takes a similarly heavy toll on *Greenside* maintenance**, as these aircraft routinely deploy as part of any executive lift package in response to normal WHMO taskings--along with their associated maintenance support teams. Thus, the problem spans all aspects of HMX-1 operations.

This shifts the burden of deployment to other Marines, and is contrary to the best interests of the Marine and the Corps. Such workplace stresses create the potential for professional and family problems. **Assignment of non-deployable Marines may be a result of HMX-1 being a unit that does not accrue Accumulated Deployed Time**, making it appear to be a good command to assign non-deployable personnel. **Unfortunately, most of the billets in HMX-1 are filled with personnel who deploy about as often as their operating force counterparts in the fleet.**

***Recommendations: As earlier stated, DC/S(M&RA) should review first tour assignment policies as it concerns HMX-1, and should also review the matter of the assignment of non-deployable Marines to HMX-1 in light of the actual significant deployment of Squadron personnel, and the burdens associated both upon the deploying and non-deployable personnel when all cannot equally share the load.***

o On the matter of *span of control*, Colonel Geier was asked to comment on his perspective on the variance between the span of control he exercises as CO, HMX-1, and the Presidential Helicopter Pilot, and that of Colonel Barr, as the Presidential Pilot of *Air Force One*.

At the outset, one must immediately recognize that there can be no "*apples-to-apples*" comparison. Colonel Barr works directly for the WHMO, is reported upon directly by the President, and is responsible for only a small number of Presidential aircraft and associated personnel. He plans and executes only those missions directed for his aircraft. The 89th Airlift Wing, Air Mobility Command, or another Air Force component is responsible for all other taskings by the WHMO.

On the other hand, Colonel Geier is currently responsible for 34 aircraft and approximately 750 personnel, including the 19 "*Whiteside*" helicopters used for direct support of White House Military Office taskings and the 15 "*Greenside*" helicopters. His squadron has two missions *in addition* to those that support the White House: those supporting Headquarters Marine Corps "*Greenside*" taskings, and those that support the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force; and the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, "*Greenside*".



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Colonel Geier also voiced his concern over the prospect of any assumption of control over the MCAF at Quantico, as had been proposed in two earlier Blue Ribbon Panels on HMX-1 and its operations. This would form a *fourth* command line on HMX-1's already busy command structure from the CO, HMX-1 to Commander, Marine Air Bases East. Such an addition to an already wide-ranging span of control is not viewed as productive by Colonel Geier, and would be untenable.

Colonel Geier may, in addition to a mission he is personally executing at any given time, have two or more detachments deployed in support of White House lift or emergency relocation missions. Also, WHLOs are deployed on any of several levels of advance teams, and daily training and maintenance operations at the Marine Corps Air Facility Quantico must occur coincidentally with alert and training operations at the Anacostia Naval Facility, test and evaluation operations supporting COMOPTEVFOR, and missions supporting the CG MCCDC.

Regardless of his current tasking, Colonel Geier is often personally contacted by the WHMO on a wide range of issues. As a commander, he is naturally contacted regarding the status of all White House missions, unusual circumstances regarding other operations, and significant issues regarding members of his command (e.g. the death or injury--even outside the line of duty, of an assigned Marine, civilian, or dependent).

HMX-1 missions in support of the White House have grown significantly over the years; more than 11,400 flight hours will have been flown during calendar year 1996. *While the number of aircraft and personnel may be increased to offset any increased mission taskings, there is still only one commander.* Stresses on the commander have not been a factor in his functioning to date. Measures that could reduce the obviously large span of control presented by HMX-1's missions and the large organization that must be led to accomplish them should be considered.

Colonel Geier recommended that consideration be given to reorganizing HMX-1 and creating *Officers-in-Charge of detachments* for the Security Department (the Military Police), the MV-22 Test and Evaluation section, and the Supply and Fiscal sections.

With the exception of the Military Police, these elements of the squadron are not directly involved in "Whiteside" aircraft operations and maintenance and do not deploy to accomplish their missions. While the Military Police provide "Whiteside" security in the Metropolitan Washington area and on deployments, they do not perform aircrew or maintenance functions. The major who is currently the security officer should be given the same authority over his Marines that Military Police company commanders normally exercise in the operating forces.

Regarding the MV-22 OT&E element, the current plan will relocate it to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by early 1997 for a period in excess of six months; therefore, the present HMX-1 organization does not facilitate command of those personnel.

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The same logic holds true for the Supply and Fiscal sections of the Squadron. Neither deploys and neither has a direct interaction with executive support aircraft which would somehow be diminished if they were under a separate *officer-in-charge* oriented towards their mission performance and specific welfare.

If the *Officers-in-Charge* of such detachments were given administrative authority commensurate with their positions such as Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice authority, the Commanding Officer would then become only directly responsible for the Officers-in-Charge and thus only indirectly over the more than 200 personnel currently in these elements. Such a result would be consistent with an organization parallel to that of a Marine Aircraft Group (also commanded by a Colonel), wherein the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) contains the fiscal and supply sections, and the Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) would contain the security elements.

***Recommendation: That the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Developments Command/Total Force Structure Review Team review the HMX-1 T/O and consider establishment of officers-in-charge for the Security, MV-22 Operational Test and Evaluation, and Supply/Fiscal Departments, according each Article 15 authority. The current HMX-1 Administration Department would continue in direct support of all elements of the Squadron in its present configuration.***

o A discussion on the number of squadron aircraft followed. Colonel Geier noted that the introduction of the VH-60Ns had combined with increasing desires of recent Administrations for more lifts and emergency relocation missions. **HMX-1 averaged over 10,000 total flight hours for the last few years. Fiscal Year 1996 will set a record of more than 11,400 flight hours.** While there are absolute limits to the amount a President can travel, **VH-3D and VH-60N average monthly flight times run approximately 40 hours.** That is much higher than the CNO utilization or Navy fleet aircraft average.

**While HMX-1 specialized manning, maintenance and supply continues to ensure that VH operations are safe and reliable, these aircraft are expending their useful service lives at a much faster rate than originally planned. Additionally, the VH-60N which was destroyed in the 1993 mishap has not been replaced. Also, while the "Greenside" aircraft normally only provide general support for Presidential lift missions (e.g. they carry the media personnel), the CH-46E which was destroyed in the 1996 mishap has also not been replaced.**

While MV-22s are planned for eventual delivery to HMX-1, the larger tilt rotors are unlikely to completely replace VH helicopters, particularly for operations from small landing zones or within the Metropolitan Washington area. At any rate, current operational taskings indicate that two more VH bonded aircraft are warranted.

***Recommendations: That DC/S Aviation review procurement of helicopters for POM-00, in order to replace the two aircraft lost to mishaps in 1993 and 1996. Consideration should be given to procurement of two VH-configured aircraft. Additionally, DC/S Aviation should review the projected service lives remaining on***

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*HMX-1 aircraft to determine the appropriate timing of replacements for existing VH-3D and VH-60N assets. Consideration is recommended of the position that, for "Whitetop" missions, a "neckdown" to a single type/model/series for helicopters and V-22 tiltrotors for medium range missions occur. This recommendation is made in conjunction with the current planning for use of V-22 assets for future "Greentop" missions.*

◦ Colonel Geier next discussed aircraft equipment. He said that existing communications and navigation equipment was satisfactory but expressed concern about the incorporation of a "drop in" modification with Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation equipment. He said that *over \$1 million would be wasted* in order to comply with recent SECDEF direction to incorporate GPS in all aircraft by Fiscal Year 1998. Naval Air Systems Command had previously planned to incorporate GPS along with scheduled depot maintenance at Sikorsky Aircraft as part of an *integrated* package. **In addition to the extra \$1 million this "drop in" modification will cost, it will also take these aircraft out of service for an additional and previously unnecessary month.** Yet, without GPS, the VH aircraft already have navigation accuracy to locate themselves within one rotor diameter. Current system accuracy meets the White House mission requirements.

*Recommendation: That the Secretary of Defense review the mandatory scheduling of GPS incorporation as it pertains to the rotary wing VH-configured aircraft with the WHMO, with a view towards grant of a waiver to current policy which would mandate incorporation of GPS during FY-98. This would permit the previously planned upgrade package—with an "integrated" GPS system to be installed with a significant cost savings without sacrifice to mission performance or safety.*

◦ Colonel Geier noted that the CH-53E was the lead development platform for an *Integrated Health and Maintenance (IHMS) Diagnostic System*, a type of **flight data recorder**. The system is intended for incorporation in VH type aircraft after successful development and testing. Current plans also call for a Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) to be installed during the *VH-60N Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)* upgrade. Such installation is not planned in the VH-3D retrofit program.

*Recommendation: That DC/S Aviation continue to monitor development of IHMS, as well as future potential TCAS applications in helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft.*

◦ Colonel Geier was asked to comment on the aging of his aircraft. He indicated that **the bonded process for Sikorsky's VH-3D and VH-60N aircraft, coupled with replacing components on more frequent intervals than required on normal fleet aircraft, gave him confidence that aging was not a significant concern.** Based upon expiration of their service lives, which is calculated on a planned number of operational months and depot level maintenance cycles, these aircraft will either have extensive mid-life upgrades with service life extension programs...or be retired.

## SUMMARY OF STATEMENT OF COLONEL FRED GEIER, U.S. MARINE CORPS

***Recommendation: None. Adequate depot level maintenance and service life planning is being accomplished. Though the technical definition of aging aircraft applies to the VH-3D (i.e. the H-3 assembly line is closed), these measures ably provide for safe mission performance for the near term future (until the expiration of the extended service life). The H-60 line remains open at Sikorsky, and thus the aircraft is not considered "aging" at this time. The issue of funding for replacement aircraft is addressed separately.***

o Colonel Geier next commented on the **condition of his physical plant--both hangers and administrative workspaces, aboard MCAF Quantico. He was concerned that HMX-1's hangers and ramp areas were old and required replacement. The hangers were constructed in 1947 and are deteriorating. Despite periodic repair attempts, roofs were leaking in the hanger bay workspaces. Flight line and taxiway areas were deteriorating, although the runway has just received a complete resurfacing.**

**Currently, the ramp area and taxiway have limited space and do not meet clearances specified in pertinent governing instructions, specifically Naval Facilities Command Order P-80. With the acceptance of five new CH-53E aircraft, this problem will only be exacerbated. The request for additional ramp area has been appropriately submitted for approval, but remains unfunded.**

Flight line hanger space is cramped for the number of VH helicopters requiring shelter. The only hanger capable of sheltering the V-22 tiltrotors planned for HMX-1 is located across the street from the flight line. The same holds true for Squadron administrative spaces--which are housed in the same aging hanger buildings. These spaces are totally inadequate for use with the sophisticated electronic equipment which forms the backbone of today's administration, and provide an inadequate support base for this large unit. **Unfortunately, military construction funding for new hangers and associated facilities has not been budgeted.**


***Recommendation: Commander, Marine Corps Bases Eastern Area should address the construction of new hangers, associated facilities, and administrative spaces in POM-00. DC/S(I&L) and DC/S Aviation should mutually support this initiative for prioritization by DC/S for Programs and Resources.***

o **Communications lines used for telephones and computer networks are limited with only three numbers available for the maintenance departments. The Marine Corps Base Quantico is upgrading base telecommunications with fiberoptic lines. Commander, Marine Corps Air Bases Eastern Area, is responsible for the MCAF Quantico, and has provided the Base funds to extend the fiberoptic lines to the MCAF area.**

**SUMMARY OF STATEMENT OF COLONEL FRED GEIER, U.S. MARINE CORPS**

***Recommendation: That COMCABEAST and CG, MCB Quantico continue in their joint initiatives to modernize MCAF Quantico's telecommunications facilities and capabilities.***

***I have reviewed this summary of interview consisting of a total of eleven (11) pages including this page, on this, the 2 day of October, 1996, and certify that it is a fair and accurate summary of the interview conducted by Brigadier General Magnus on Monday, 23 September, 1996, at Edison, New Jersey.***



Frederick Geier  
Colonel  
U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding Officer, HMX-1

## **201 AS Operations Staff**

### **Interview Summary, 18 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

**Lt Col John E. Gleason, Lt Col Michael P. Hannin, Maj Darlene K. Dejesus, and CMSgt Bruce L. Culver**

#### **BACKGROUND**

The 201st Airlift Squadron (201 AS) of the DC Air National Guard (ANG) flies four C-21 and three C-22 aircraft in support of Operational Support Airlift (OSA) and HQ USAF/CVAM directed airlift missions. It is a small but cohesive unit composed of only 30 pilots and 178 total personnel. The individuals interviewed provide key operational direction to the unit.

#### **SAFETY**

The Safety program is similar to other ANG and Active duty units. The unit has older equipment, but the high flying time experience of the crews compensates for the age of equipment. The aircraft lack technology upgrades such as TCAS, SELCAL and GPS that are commonly found on commercial air fleets. The crews believe such equipment upgrades would increase reliability and enhance the margin of safety. The Ops staff stated that their aircraft and equipment is in excellent state of repair. They cited the excellent relationship they enjoy with maintenance as the reason.

#### **TASKINGS**

Taskings for 201 AS aircraft come from AMC/TACC for their C-22 airlift missions. The C-21 aircraft receive their taskings through the National Guard Bureau; as of 1 Oct 96 all scheduling will come from JOSAC. When the 201 AS is tasked by CVAM, the tasking is passed through the TACC. Short notice taskings (less than 2-3 week lead time) puts pressure on the ANG crews due to the numerous changes and cancellations. The major complicating factor is the requirement for numerous diplomatic clearances and message traffic preceding international missions.

#### **SUPPORT**

The 201 AS is beginning to work with the 89th Operations Support Squadron (89 OSS) mission support section to provide crews some additional help during pre-mission and en route planning. The 201 AS Operations personnel stated this new initiative shows promise, but they have only flown one or two missions to date using 89 OSS mission support unit, and have uncovered some bugs that need to be further worked out. The unit only flies four to five overseas missions a year but the tasking for such missions is increasing. The TACC does not give a lot of help when a mission comes down (mission planning, diplomatic clearances, etc.). As a result, the squadron has been trying to hire a navigator to help in mission planning, but does not have the money or slots available.

#### **MANNING**

Traditionally, unit hires came from the active-duty Air Force and were mid-level captains with relatively high time and experience (2000-2500 hours). Now however, that pool is unavailable

due to current flying bonus policies and airline hiring. The 201st competes with airlines for pilots exiting the active component. Pilots who elect to stay on active duty and receive the bonus are not available until they are much more senior--usually majors. ANG units rarely hire majors because it limits upward movement. Newly hired majors would fill authorized positions that current ANG members desire to be promoted into. Currently, more recruits for unit hire are coming from other guard units or from the reserves. Typically these individuals have fewer hours (500-1500 hrs), were part-timers at the previous unit, and are now looking for full-time flying duties with the DCANG. There is some attrition due to furloughed airline personnel returning to the major air carriers. Therefore, new hires are asked to put in 3 years of full-time duty before going to airlines and changing to flying only part-time. Part-time members must be available to fly five days per month. Most airline hires stay affiliated with the 201st because they like the flying and the safety net provided when airlines furlough.

### **POLICY AND GUIDANCE**

The 201 AS Operations Officer (DO) stated unit crews are qualified to fly any DV mission. On overseas missions the crews fly augmented with three pilots and two engineers. The 201 AS has no written policy on this issue, but the DO said that using the augmented crews was standard practice. The 201 AS provides supplemental airlift for the 89 AW when directed, however, the Ops Officer stated that there were no formal agreements between 210 AS and 89 AW.

### **PUBLICATIONS**

The unit believes that they are very proactive with submitting suggested changes for improvement for the C-21/C-22 checklist and flight manuals. They work closely with OC-ALC and cross reference changes with other agencies. However, the Operations Officer stated that the system is slow getting changes to procedures and the re-written flight manual back to the unit.

### **MODERNIZATION**

The operations staff personnel voiced concern with the lack of modernization plans for the C-22 aircraft. However, the National Guard Bureau Directorate of Plans and Oklahoma City-Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC) decided not to modernize due to planned C-22 retirement in FY00. Still, many DCANG crew members believe overall reliability and margin of safety would be enhanced by having new equipment such as TCAS, SELCAL and GPS that is commonly found on commercial air fleets. Even if the "safety mods" cannot be installed, there are two items on the aircraft that could be improved at limited cost. The C-22s are used extensively through Europe and the Automatic Direction Finding approach is often the only equipment available for their approach procedures. The ADF receiver they presently have is antiquated and is getting more difficult to repair. With little cost, the receiver could be upgraded with newer Air Force organic

equipment or commercial off the shelf hardware. They suffer the same problem with their present VHF radio, the unit missions frequently take them to civilian airfields whose primary communications are done on VHF. There are Air Force radios that the C-22 could use, available from Air Force organic supply, that would greatly improve the present radio's reliability and performance.

### **STANDARDIZATION/TRAINING**

The 201 AS administers crew check rides on the Air Force standard 17-month evaluation cycle. The flight examiners in the unit have been in position for a long period of time and are experts on the C-21 and C-22. The 201st is the only C-22 (Boeing-727) operator in the Air Force and the unit uses a pyramid evaluation policy. Lt Col Gleason is also a civilian airline pilot and in his opinion, the evaluations given by the Air Force are on an even par with the FAA. The "difficulty" of the checkride is a subjective call, but he feels the bottomline is--safety is the pillar of either checkride. Initial training for the C-21 is accomplished by SIMUFLITE for simulator training and the 450 AS at Keesler AFB for initial flight training. The C-22 training is accomplished in house. As half of the unit's pilots are qualified in two aircraft, and many unit part-timers fly commercial aircraft different from 201st's, strict adherence to standard procedure and checklist discipline is stressed. Any areas of concern are identified early and worked immediately before they become a problem. According to the Ops Officer, the small size of the pilot contingent (30) makes this easy. Crew Resource Management (CRM) training is taught quarterly and the unit often brings in civilians experts for added insight. Further, a simulator is given annually at the Pan AM facility, affording good cross talk. The 201 AS uses the 89 AW's standardized airfield data base for information on the airfields transited.

### **OPERATIONS TEMPO**

The squadron operations staff stated that tempo is not a problem. The unit often experiences tasking surges during election campaigns, but no long-term increases in tempo, tasking and operations. The typical flyer gets 10-11 days of flying per month. Part-time guard fliers are asked to schedule 5 days of availability sometime during each month. There is no requirement for those days to be consecutive. The consensus is the schedulers accommodate such requests and preferences well.

//SIGNED//

JOHN E. GLEASON, Lt Col, DCANG  
Operations Officer

//SIGNED//

MICHAEL P. HANNIN, Lt Col, DCANG  
Chief of Standardization/Evaluation

//SIGNED//

DARLENE K. DEJESUS, Maj, DCANG  
Chief of Aircrew Scheduling

//SIGNED//

BRUCE L. CULVER, CMSgt, DCANG  
Senior Flight Engineer

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.



General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

## **201 AS/CC, Telephone Interview, 7 Oct 96**

### **MEMO FOR RECORD**

As part of the information gathering process for the Executive Travel Review Board, I conducted a telephone interview with Col Gleason requesting the approximate number of flying hours for C-22 pilots. Col Gleason estimated the C-22 pilot average total flying hours was between 5,000 and 6,000 hours total flying time.

//SIGNED//

JOSEPH P. MARKSTEINER, Lt Col, USAF  
Executive Travel Review Board

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
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## SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Major S.O. Gold, 6002, Executive Flight Assistant Program Manager for Logistics (APML) (G)  
Master Gunnery Sergeant B.J. Sigman, 6119, Deputy Executive Flight Assistant Program  
Manager for Logistics (DAPML) (S)

Conducted by Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, on 18 September 1996.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- (G) Insufficient aircraft, two undergoing prototype testing (1 each VH-3D and VH-60N). Originally planned to have testing done by end of August to ensure assets available to support election. Now probably won't finish until November.
- (G) Experienced growth in mission since introduction of the VH-60N.
- (G) Need two additional VH-60N's to be meet campaign and added mission requirements. H-46's recently used to support Anacostia (ERS mission) and have deferred SPAR on two aircraft to keep assets available for campaign.
- (G) NAVAIR did a study on replacing crash damaged aircraft and possible addition due to mission creep. Study done in the 1993-94 time frame. Involved both the Program Office and Sikorsky personnel.
- (G) Both VH aircraft operate on reduced Maximum Operating Times (MOT's) and finite life limits. For the VH-3D it is generally 50% with greater usage (up to approximately 75%) for the VH-60N.
- (G/S) Both aircraft operate under the Phase maintenance schedule. A four phase cycle exists for the VH-60N with an interval of 150 hours. The VH-3D is on a two phase cycle with an interval of 125 hours. Both have mid phase preventive maintenance inspections.
- (G) Special Progressive Aircraft Repair (SPAR) is the scheduled depot level maintenance. This occurs at 24 months or 1000 flight hours, which ever occurs first, for the VH-3D and 48 months or 2400 hours for the VH-60N. There are no deferrals from SPAR, longest seen is 2.5 months.
- (G) SPAR is an upgraded Standard Depot Level Maintenance, aircraft returns with no high time components and properly configured. Newly overhauled and specifically designated engines are installed in VH-3D.
- (G) VH-60N airframe and engines are "on condition", aircraft is inspected and discrepancies corrected during SPAR, engines maybe reinstalled with APML approval. Decision made on whether engines will make another SPAR cycle based on log book review. Between Sikorsky, DPRO and squadron log book reviews effective.
- (G/S)The VH-60N has a mid tour refurbishment (MTR) refurbishes the interior and exterior paint as well as correcting known airframe discrepancies. The mid life refurbishment occurs at 24 months or 1000 hours. The VH-3D has a major inspection conducted at the squadron at 500 hours.
- (G) The Mid Life Upgrade for the VH-60N will make it look more like a H-60L.
- (G) The squadron normally maintains no open discrepancies against the aircraft, any aircraft can fly as Marine One. There is no such thing as a partial mission (PMC) aircraft.
- (G) There is no Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix for the aircraft, it either works or it is fixed. Maintain optimum mission capability.

- (S) The configuration of the VH aircraft is closely controlled, there are no non standard installations in the VH aircraft. Sikorsky uses IMS system to track the configuration of each VH aircraft assigned to HMX-1.
- (G) Utilize existing directives and policy for determining applicability and compliance with applicable technical directives.
- (G) The current drop in mod plan for GPS is being worked to attempt to align with SPAR. Not aligning with SPAR will add approximately an additional month of out of service time for the aircraft. The current systems provide almost the same accuracy as the GPS.
- (G) Currently doing Maintenance Plan for the VH-3D SLEP, being done in Mil Std 1388-2B. Changed items will generate new maintenance plans, also doing for T-58 engine.
- (G) ILSMT's also function as Maintenance Plan reviews to ensure right maintenance being done at the right time. Preventive maintenance is key to ensuring reliability and readiness of aircraft.

Logistics:

Manpower:

- (G) The squadron is manned at 100% of T/O.
- (S) The increased usage of personnel direct of out FREST training adversely impacts the squadron. These new Marines do not have the background necessary technical background
- (S) It takes about two years to train them in their primary aircraft if they get that
- (S) Once they are trained and have been cleared they are moved to the "Whiteside". These personnel must then be trained on the VH-3D and the VH-60N, mission unique aircraft not used in the FMF.
- (S) FREST personnel never get fully qualified in their primary aircraft and they don't get an understanding of Fleet Maintenance.
- (S) By the time they complete their "cage" tour they will be a sergeant. On returning to the Fleet they will be expected to possess technical knowledge and qualification they will not have..
- (G) Green and White maintenance work to fair sharing shortages.

Supply:

- (G) Supply is Contractor Logistics Services (CLS) for airframes, engines and APU's are organic. Some avionics are I level, most contracted back to prime.
- (G) Going to primes for avionics components has reduced turn around time (TAT) by 50% in most cases. AHRS went from 6 month to 1 year turn around time to 90-120 days. Reduces requirements for items that have to be kept in system pipeline and makes for better support.
- (G) Numerous Basic Ordering Agreements (BOA's) required to make system work.
- (G/S) Part of CLS contract includes forecast of requirements, buy to the forecast. Forecast is validated by Squadron and APML's shop.
- (G) CLS contract contains urgent transportation shipment.

- (G/S) Contractors system does outstanding job of tracking usage, validated on annual basis. Required by contract to keep program informed regarding impending shortages resulting from unanticipated usage, TDC's, non-performance of subcontractors, etc.
- (G) Reports and inventory levels are visible to the program office (APML), logistics element managers (LM's) on the program, the squadron and Sikorsky.
- (G) Track every item, from major dynamics to consumables, use bar coding. Looking at new system called Configuration Status Accounting System (CSAS) with additional smart technology for marking.
- (G) Within 1 year hope to have 2 to 3 aircraft in CSAS as well as all spares, will be able to track cradle to grave, give total asset visibility.
- (G) Supply System effectiveness is 98%. Remaining issues are here within 24 hours.
- (G) Population of parts includes repairables, consumables, QCU's (built up engine and transmissions) and phase kits.
- (G) VH aircraft on trip are supported by Supply packups. Packups built based upon number of aircraft and mission. Standardized and prebuilt.
- (G/S) Packups constantly reviewed based upon annual usage and technical representatives input.

#### Technical Data:

- (G) Technical manuals are almost a closed loop system. HMX is only user.
- (G) Semi annual In Process Review (IPR) of publications. Involves NAVAIR, NATSF, Sikorsky and HMX. Review pubs and have Sikorsky tech pubs writer on site to update publication.
- (G) Squadron gets "redline" publication within 30 days after completion of IPR. Difference between "redline" and DoD printed pubs is "redline" pubs only printed on 1 side and don't have NATSF bar code and are marked "Advance Copy".
- (S) Approved DoD printed publications are in place 90-180 days after IPR depending on publication. Rapid Action Changes (RAC's) and Immediate Rapid Action Changes (IRAC's) are always available.
- (G) Sikorsky holds a full set of apperture cards of technical drawings for both aircraft. They maintain up to date. Very useful when changes are made and not incorporated into manuals yet.
- (G/S) Maintain a packup of manuals for each possible deployable detachment. They are maintained by the Central Technical Publications Library and are properly updated.

#### Facilities:

- (G) Moving aircraft is an emergency. Any complacency causes an accident.
- (G) Issue about who ought to control facilities and who is willing to properly support, whether base or ComCabsEast. No one has put much money into the facilities.
- (S) There were some V-22 site survey issues that haven't been resolved. Don't know of much going on since initial procurement contract.

#### Training:

- (G) Training embedded in the SPAR contract, provided for 2 full time instructors on hand to teach VH-3 and VH-60 courses. Instructors provide training on a scheduled or as required basis.

- (G) Training aids have been provided either by assemblies no longer suitable for use or actual training devices.
- (G) Spin off from previous mishap was requirement for training. Got excess training equipment for H-3's from shutdown of training sites.
- (G) NAVAIR looking for excess trainers that could be made available. In queue for H-60 trainers when the H-60 consolidation question is answered. Working closely with N889 to make happen.
- (S) Need to ensure that each new system has the appropriate training package procured. Need to make sure training is available as we add systems.
- (S) Training is standardized using MATMEP.

Support Equipment:

- (G) Working to solve ATE bench problem. Issue is engineers from Warminster that developed system didn't make BRAC move to Pax River. System suffered from poor documentation of design. New engineers going through learning curve to come up to speed.
- (G) Looking at Electronic Subsystems Test Set (ESATS), a piece of ATE based off of Huntron Tracker as a replacement. Sikorsky to present concept later this year.
- (G) Squadron voice requirements, program office works provide solution.

# **1 AS/CC and DO Interview Summary, 20 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

## **Lt Col Peter W. Gray, Lt Col Michael J. Garber, III**

### **BACKGROUND**

Lt Col Gray has commanded the 1st Airlift Squadron (1 AS) since May 1995. Lt Col Garber has been the Operations Officer since June 1996. The 1 AS provides the backbone of the 89 AW DV support airlift mission flying long-range special airlift support in the C-137. Passengers supported include the Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and other Cabinet and Congressional leaders.

### **SAFETY**

The squadron commander and ops officer stated that there is probably more emphasis on safety at Andrews AFB than most wings due to the 89 AW mission of Presidential airlift support. Safety officers are highly involved in squadron upgrade review boards and training decisions. The commander also integrates safety issues into his commander's calls and other briefings given to the aircrews. Safety is the number one emphasis in the unit's mission statement and this sets the tone for the entire squadron. Lt Col Gray said his number one safety concern is the aging, ill-equipped C-135 aircraft. The C-135 lacks the latest in avionics technology, the oxygen systems are old and out dated, and the aircraft has very low reliability rates.

### **TASKINGS**

At home station, Current Operations confirms the mission taskings received from CVAM, then passes the information to the squadron. After the mission is executed and the crew is away from home, the aircraft commander works with the customer's representative, then makes contact with current ops for coordination with CVAM.

### **CRM**

The 1 AS runs an in-house Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) training program and Lt Col Gray stated that he believed the unit leads the command in this area. The squadron training flight centrally manages the on-going CRM program effort. Another program the squadron stresses is the requirement for a complete mission debriefing. The crews talk about what went right, wrong and what could be done better after each mission. Problems are noted and then changed to continuously improve the mission. CRM simulator training is profile-oriented and matched to mission flow. Training is set to a bi-annual frequency to keep systems and CRM currencies aligned.

### **RESOURCES**

In terms of aircraft, the unit is most concerned with maintainability. The 1 AS has the planes to perform the mission, but the required maintenance for aging aircraft keeps the jets down more and more often. For example, last year the squadron was down to one C-137 for over six months due to corrosion. In terms of manning, the current crew ratio is 1.5 for six assigned aircraft. The unit also maintains an alert commitment which requires an augmented crew. With a 1.5 crew ratio, the unit is not manned for that commitment, so it must be taken out of hide. Both the commander and ops officer would like to see a crew ratio of 2.0 like the other airlift aircraft. The greatest shortfalls occur in the severely undermanned flight steward positions, and the unit also

has 15 unfunded positions due to the fact that it is not manned for the augmented crew requirement.

### **HIRING POLICY**

The squadron attempts to only hire the best of the best. All candidates have excellent flying credentials, overseas experience, motivation to get the mission done, demonstrated leadership and potential for promotion. Desired credentials are 2,500 hours and at least 300 hours as an Instructor Pilot. Many of the pilots selected are former school house instructors, chiefs of standardization/evaluation, or chiefs of training. As a result, 89 AW people are some of the most experienced in the command. However, recent changes in Air Force retention policy and airline hiring increases have decreased the total number of highly experienced candidates. Although the smaller pool of experience has required the 89 AW to look at some pilots with 2,000 hours of experience, it does not mean the wing will hire anyone who just doesn't fit professional standards. The bottom line is that every newly chosen crew member meets the highest standards of experience and potential.

### **RETENTION**

Air Force Personnel Center works closely with the squadron to keep people in the unit for the full four years. Currently, an assignment to the 89 AW is a controlled four-year tour with a three-to-five year assignment window. As a result, the unit is able to keep the right people.

### **CREW EMPOWERMENT**

Crews in the 1 AS probably have better communications within the chain of command than most squadrons. They are empowered with a great deal of both responsibility and authority to accomplish the mission. If there is a change of plan while the mission is underway, the crew works all arrangements with the customer's contact, then calls the current operations for mission coordination and support. CVAM must approve all mission changes.

### **COMPARISON OF STANDARDS**

When asked to compare 1 AS crews to FAA standards, Lt Col Gray stated that in his opinion, every crew member in the squadron meets or exceeds FAA standards. The flight check each aircraft commander is administered is virtually identical to an FAA Pilot in Command check. Further, most cockpit training and all evaluation is conducted in the aircraft unlike the commercial airlines, who conduct the majority of their training and evaluation in the simulator. The 1 AS also has a detailed aircraft systems training program. The flight engineers teach ground training classes to unit pilots and flight engineers that focus on aircraft systems and performance. Instructor pilots and engineers conduct emergency procedures and hands-on aircraft systems instruction in a contractor's flight simulator in Florida. This ensures the highest possible level of mission readiness and coordination.

### **EVALUATIONS**

The squadron uses the same criteria as AMC Stan/Eval does, only they require more for the annual flight check. Evaluations are given on twelve month cycles versus seventeen month cycles. This insures pilots, engineers, and navigators receive an inflight evaluation every 12 months like their counterparts in the FAA. The 89 AW flight examiners grade more stringently than other AMC units--downgrades in any critical area are not allowed. If a crew member is



downgraded in a critical area, they are automatically Qualification Level 3 (unqualified) for the entire check ride.

### **SIMULATORS**

Frequency for simulator training events was broken from annual into semi-annual scheduling to increase proficiency. The squadron also developed an extensive Jeppesen instrument approach procedure training program that is being adapted for use throughout AMC.

### **STRESS**

Although there is some stress associated with flying dignitaries, emphasis is always placed first on the safe execution of the mission. Unit training focuses on meeting customer needs, but stresses not to compromise safety. As the crews communicate what is possible to the customer, outside pressure is rarely a problem. Further, the crews have total support from squadron and wing staff.

### **UPGRADE**

Typically it takes about one year to get a pilot enough operational experience and training to upgrade to aircraft commander. During that time, the pilot is in a "first pilot" status and is restricted to flying only with an instructor pilot. However, a point to consider is that unlike other squadrons, every pilot hired for Special Air Mission duty was an instructor in a previous aircraft--the 1 AS crew force experience level is much higher than other AMC squadrons.

### **EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO ENHANCE MISSION**

Due to problems such as structural corrosion, the 1 AS needs new aircraft to replace the aging C-137 fleet. The Air Force has contracted for four Boeing-757 aircraft. The first two will be delivered in Jan 1998. This is a significant step in the right direction. The reliability of 89 AW aircraft is significantly affected by aircraft age since the airplanes require more and more maintenance to get the job done. The maintainers are hard working, well trained, and highly experienced, but are forced to expend greater effort to keep the present Boeing-707 airframe ready for flight. Lt Col Gray and Lt Col Garber recommended establishing standard aircraft configurations to reduce the by-tail-number scheduling turbulence and inefficiencies.

//SIGNED//

PETER W. GRAY, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander, 1st Airlift Squadron

//SIGNED//

MICHAEL J. GARBER, III, Lt Col, USAF  
Operations Officer

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Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

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## **89 LG/CC Interview Summary, 17 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

### **Col Cone J. Hance**

There are six squadrons within the 89th Logistics Group, but only the Aircraft Generation, Maintenance, and the Logistics Support Squadrons directly support the aircraft maintenance mission.

#### **Resources/Funding**

Unlike most other units in the Air Mobility Command, the 89th Logistics Group is an O&M funded organization. Similar to most organizations, the unit identifies requirements and then satisfies mission requirements with the allocated funds. The unit does not have a significant funding problem, but is undergoing the same problems with funding cuts as seen throughout the Air Force. One item of concern is funding for the Presidential Pilot's Maintenance (PPM) Support. All PPM requirements are funneled through the 89th Logistics Group. The PPM receives the highest priority for any and all requirements.

#### **Manning**

There are no significant manning problems within the maintenance complex. Although there has not been a manpower requirements study conducted within the wing in the last ten years, the wing is adequately manned. Also, the current assigned manning is above 100 percent of authorized positions. Additionally, the wing has coordinated a selective manning memorandum of agreement with the Air Force Personnel Center. This agreement allows the wing to selectively accept or refuse any projected inbound individuals. No other wing in the Air Mobility Command has that option. Individuals who want to become a member of the wing must submit a special duty assignment application. Finally, the group's authorization includes a disproportionate share of higher ranking authorizations compared to other units. The manning situation is the best ever seen.

The most important criteria evaluated for prospective applicants is trainability. Since the wing is assigned aircraft not normally operated by most Air Force units, ability to quickly learn and adapt to the unique requirements of the aircraft is critical. Individuals are selected on the demonstrated ability to learn and their professionalism.

Due to the unique aircraft systems, there are some critical skills that need regular attention. These skills are propulsion, communication and navigation, crypto, and fabrication. Of these, crypto requires the most attention. This skill is not normally associated with an aircraft maintenance complex.

Most of the units work a traditional eight hour shift schedule with five days on and two days off per week. Some shops (particularly the backshops) are not manned 24 hours a day, but do have designated individuals on standby. The unit does not regularly work extended shifts or require

12 hour shifts to cover the workload. The morale within the maintenance complex is very high due to the high visibility of the missions and passengers.

Working relationships between the Operations and Logistics Groups are outstanding. The groups are closely intertwined in each others mission and concerns. Close coordination and communication are evident.

Replacement manning for the PPM normally comes directly from the 89th Logistics Group. This situation results in the immediate loss of some of the most highly talented individuals in the group. The Logistics Group commander has very little oversight of the operations within the PPM. There is an established dialogue between the PPM and the Logistics Group Commander. He has a high degree of confidence in the leadership and supervision within the PPM.

#### **Leadership/Supervision**

Due to the high number of senior enlisted personnel, there is no shortage of qualified supervision at any time. Senior supervisors are assigned to all workdays and all shifts. There is normally a CMSgt or a SMSgt on each shift. Lines of communication, responsibility, and accountability are clear.

#### **Facilities/Equipment**

There are resource shortfalls, but none that affect the safety of maintenance operations. The unit possesses adequate equipment and facilities, but upgrades would definitely enhance mission capability. One of the prime shortfalls is the lack of a suitable paint booth. The large number of cosmetic upkeep associated with the aging aircraft has burdened the paint requirements on the existing facilities.

#### **Training**

Since most newcomers have never worked on the aircraft assigned to the 89th AW, training is very critical. This requires an immediate evaluation of the individual's capability and training qualifications. Supervisors tailor individuals training needs against available training programs. Training requirements usually involves 5 and 7 level technicians who were previously qualified on other aircraft and getting them qualified and certified on the new aircraft.

According to AMCI 21-107, 89th AW maintainers are not required to possess an A&P license to work on the commercial derivative aircraft. Currently, the wing possesses an FAA license for the backshops. FAA is reluctant to renew the license pending explanation of administrative changes caused by the objective wing restructuring.

The wing utilizes the Process Improvement Program (PIP) identified in AMCI 21-101. The PIP is a comprehensive quality-based assessment program which routinely evaluates the ability of technicians to perform their assigned tasks. The program incorporates a system of assessments from within the flight, squadron, and group.

### **Aircraft Generation**

CVAM, current operations, and maintenance plans and scheduling routinely meet to discuss mission taskings and aircraft available for those taskings. Usually, there are more taskings than aircraft available for those taskings. Additionally, because the aircraft have significant configuration differences, scheduling is normally tail number specific. This means that only one aircraft can satisfy the tasking. This places a great deal of pressure to ensure that specific aircraft are ready to take the mission.

Aircraft which have grounding discrepancies are not released for flight. Non-grounding discrepancies are repaired as soon as aircraft are available. Maintenance tries to schedule downtime with CVAM to accomplish these repair actions.

### **Safety**

The Logistics Group has a comprehensive system of ensuring safety at every level. Safety is emphasized through roll calls, bulletin boards, briefings, and crosstells. Additionally, the PIP involves a detailed review of safety during every assessment. Discrepancies are reviewed to identify the true cause of the finding with special emphasis on the process which may have created the finding.

### **Outside Agencies**

Due to the special aircraft configurations and the age of the aircraft, the group maintains an on-going dialogue with HQ AMC and the Systems Programs Director (SPD) at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center. The wing receives excellent support from HQ AMC and the SPD.

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CONE J. HANCE, Col, USAF  
89th Logistics Group Commander

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**89 LG/CC Logistics Group Commander  
Interview Summary, 1 Oct 96, Andrews AFB, MD  
Col Cone Hance**

**BACKGROUND**

Col Hance is the 89 AW (Air Wing) Logistics Group Commander. The logistics group is responsible for the supply, transportation, and contracting for the 89 AW plus aircraft maintenance on and backshop maintenance in support of 89 AW aircraft. Col Hance was interviewed concerning the relationship between the 89 logistics group and the presidential pilots maintenance (PPM) section. Interview was conducted by Maj Gen Hogle with Lt Col Moschella in attendance.

1. What is the 89th Logistics Group's relationship with the Presidential Pilots Maintenance (PPM) section.?

Answer: There is confusion with command oversight of the PPM. The LG/CC has Command oversight responsibility over other 89 AW logistics actions but not PPM or the 1st Helicopter Squadron maintenance section (1st Hele is aligned under the Operations Group Commander). PPM (Maj Hodson) comes and talks frequently and attends LG/CC meetings, and Col Hance has complete trust in his technical ability and integrity. Col Hance did not have an input into the hiring of the PPM. PPM looks and operates as an aircraft maintenance unit under the Presidential Pilot (PP), although the PP is not a Commander.

2. What is Brig Gen Wax's (89 AW/CC) expectations of the LG/CC with respect to PPM and 1st Helicopter?

Answer: Col Hance believes Brig Gen Wax expects the LG/CC to step in and get involved especially if there is something going on the doesn't look right. Col Hance believes that he would be successful with getting involved in the 1st Helicopter Squadron but would probably not be successful with the PPM.

//SIGNED//

CONE HANCE, Colonel, USAF  
Commander, 89 Logistics Group

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## **89 AW Inflight Passenger Service Specialist IPSS Survey**

**M Sgt Healy, 1 AS**

**SSgt Willing, 99 AS**

### **MEMO FOR RECORD**

- 1 AS has an extensive IPSS training and evaluation program.
  - Initial IPSS training is 5 day ground school at TWA.
  - Focus of the training is egress and use of emergency equipment.
  - Students receive certificate of training completion upon successful of passing TWA's program.
    - 1 AS IPSS training flight is researching what the airlines do for follow on training after the TWA school.
- Following TWA training IPSS students begin a 10 day ground school at Andrews AFB.
  - Aircraft hands on-training emphasizes egress from the aircraft and location to include use of the emergency equipment.
  - Once recommended for evaluation, the IPSS is given a closed and open book test and bold face test.
    - Open and closed book tests require an 85% minimum score..
    - 100% required on the bold face test.
    - In addition to the written test, an oral examination is administered covering egress and emergency equipment location/usage.
    - Any testing or oral examination failure disqualifies the student from flying until successful completion of failed area.
- Flight examination emphasizes preflighting equipment, questions on egress, equipment usage, and traditional IPSS duties.
  - Any unsatisfactory downgrade in a safety area is an automatic Q-3.
    - Examples: leaving a bag in front of an overwing hatch or slide, unsatisfactory knowledge of emergency equipment location and usage.
- Following successful flight evaluation the IPSS is now qualified as a "Second IPSS."
  - Second IPSS's will fly with an instructor while gaining experience for 15-18 months.
  - Any observed substandard performance in safety results in a Q-3.
- Upgrade to First IPSS requires more training, testing, and inflight examination.
  - Emphasis on egress, emergency equipment location/operation, and traditional IPSS duties.
  - Once qualified the First IPSS can fly unsupervised.
  - Instructor/Evaluator training continues to emphasize egress and emergency equipment operation with heavy emphasis on directives/regulations.
- The entire crew force receives life support training on equipment usage and egress procedures in their respective aircraft yearly.

- IPSS evaluation cycle is 17 months with 15% of the force receiving no-notice evaluations during the 17 month window.
  - IPSS personnel receive "spot checks" when other IPSS's are receiving formal evaluations.
  - Any safety discrepancy by the IPSS receiving the spot check will result in Q-3.
- 99 AS IPSS training is very similar to that of 1 AS with exception of aircraft flown.
- 99 AS trains their personnel to Second IPSS qualifications on the C-9C.
  - 15-18 month process overall.
- Training on how to handle problem passengers is accomplished in-house by the 89 AW.
  - Emphasis is on following the chain of command on the aircraft.
  - If a problem arises with a passenger the IPSS goes to the mission contact. If unresolved the enlisted crew coordinator intervenes. If the problem is still not resolved the Aircraft Commander intervenes and the passenger may be left off at the next stop.
  - The IPSS instructors feel that this chain of command works well and very few problems occur.

**//SIGNED//**

**JOSEPH T. ROHRET, Major, USAF**  
**Executive Travel Review Board**

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## SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Mister D.G. Helie, Deputy Program Manager (PMA-261) (H)  
Major A Gierber, 7566, Program Manager Executive Flight Programs (PMA-261) (G)

Conducted by Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, on 18 September 1996.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- (H) No current effort to procure additional VH-60 assets. No mission requirement to justify a procurement.
- (G) SPAR schedule to provide maximum aircraft availability. With emergent requirements like election adjust SPAR schedule to meet requirements.
- (G) Control the configuration of the aircraft, working hard to control the configuration of the avionics. That is biggest challenge.
- (H) Changes follow existing directives and are routed through the Change Control Board for approval.
- (G) PMA working issue to integrate GPS into SPAR schedule. Current drop in mod program will add an additional non-availability for every aircraft if GPS and Flight Data Recorder mods done concurrently. Will increase to 6 weeks if the mods are done separately on drop in mod basis. Effort looking to extend incorporation schedule beyond FY-99.
- (G) OSIPs generated from mission requirements identified by White House Military Office (WHMO). Submitted during POM development. Squadron participates greatly in development of requirements.
- (G) Integrated Mechanical Diagnostics (IMD) for VH aircraft is currently an unfunded OSIP. With projected development of IMD in the H-53 Lead the Fleet Program anticipate incorporation in the VH series aircraft beginning in FY-03
- (G) Outstanding coordination with HMX. The Program Coordinators provide single entry point and effective coordination.
- (G) If mission requirement identified have been successful in filling those, work the nice to haves after all the requirements have been met.

### Logistics:

#### Facilities:

- (G) No analysis of upgrading facilities for HMX

#### Training:

- (G) The Program Office is not currently reviewing or coordinating any efforts to provide Computer Based Training products for the VH series aircraft. Crew Fam Station

#### Computer Resources:

- (H) Tactical Software Support (TSS) is provided through NAWC Warminster. They serve as the Software Support Agency (SSA) for VH embedded tactical software.




Software primarily employed in support of the communications and navigation systems upgrades.

- (H) Current budget marks in the Air Systems Support line will adversely affect TSS for the VH community.
- (H) The BRAC move of Warminster to Pax River has had negative impact to software support based on personnel not moving and personnel reductions.

I have, on this the 30th day of September, 1996, reviewed the above summary of the interview consisting of 2 pages.

  
Mister D. G. Helie

  
Major A Gierber

**Presidential Pilot Maintenance (PPM)  
Interview Summary, 23 Sept 96, Andrews AFB, MD  
Maj Rick Hodson**

**BACKGROUND**

Maj Rick Hodson is the chief of maintenance in the presidential pilots section. He is responsible to the Presidential Pilot (Col Barr) for all aircraft maintenance actions on the VC-25 aircraft and on the C-137 when the President is on-board. The 89 Logistics Group provides the Presidential Pilots Maintenance (PPM) section funding through the 89 AGS and draws from assigned 89 AGS manpower for replacement personnel.

**RESOURCES & FUNDING**

Resources and funding are adequate. There are no areas impacting safety. O&M funding requirements come from the 89 LG budget through the 89 AGS.

**SUPPLY/PARTS**

There are no parts shortages that effect safety; the contractor, Boeing Corp., is very responsive when an aircraft is down for parts. A vast number of parts are on hand and when one is not available most of the time it is received the next day as indicated by the outstanding <1% MICAP rate. The MICAP rate is the percentage of time an aircraft is not mission capable because parts are not available.

**PERSONNEL**

Manpower is adequate with 81 authorized and 76 assigned. Usually PPM is 100% manned but recently there have been a number of sudden vacancies for which replacements are currently being interviewed. The 89 AGS provides maintenance augmentee support during peak work load periods. All augmentees receive the same training as permanent PPM personnel. Personnel required to fill PPM vacancies are nominated from the 89 LG, and almost exclusively come out of the augmentee pool. Manpower, rank structure, and supervision are adequately distributed across duty shifts. Duty shifts are very flexible and are based on when the DV requires the aircraft. Because of available manpower and high rank structure of assigned personnel there is always at least a Senior Master Sergeant on duty. Assigned manpower has a vast amount of experience. There are two critical specialties, cryptographic (secure communications) and communication. Two cryptographic specialists and 4 communication specialists are assigned, which is adequate as long as everyone is available for duty. This is not always the case. Because of the very low numbers authorized, these two specialties must be carefully managed to insure adequate coverage of maintenance requirements. The 89 AW and PPO recently requested a manpower study be conducted; AMC has delegated this effort down to the wing manpower office. The study is an attempt to base line work standards for the VC-25 aircraft and document manpower requirements.

### **LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION**

Leadership and supervision within PPM are very good. There is a clear line of authority and responsibility through the production supervisors or flight chiefs to the Presidential Pilot's aircraft maintenance Chiefs through the Presidential Pilot's aircraft maintenance officer (PPM) to the Presidential Pilot (PP) himself. PPM writes their own OI's and either the PPM or PP sign as the approving authority. If PPM chooses to follow an OI written by the 89 LG, then PPM does not write one of their own. Leadership opportunities are provided within the organization by a decentralized approach to responsibility on the flightline. Additional leadership opportunities are available through the assignment of modernization program projects where the assigned individual works with the depot through all phases of the mod process.

### **FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT**

There are no known facility or equipment shortfalls that impact safe operations. There is a need for some extra room in the maintenance area as the system specialist and aircraft general flight chiefs and their assistants work out of the same office. Equipment is maintained by the Contractor Logistics Support contract and meets all requirements.

### **IMPOUNDMENT PROCESS**

The impoundment process is managed within the PP area. The 89th LG does not interface officially in the impoundment process nor in the release of an aircraft from impoundment. If an aircraft is impounded for a maintenance problem the PP maintenance officer (PPM) would impound the aircraft and the Presidential Pilot (PP) would release it from impoundment.

### **TRAINING**

Formal Type 1 aircraft training provided by Boeing was completed by most of the current personnel. Those who have not had this type 1 training have been assigned after completion of initial training. PPM aircraft specific follow-on training is provided by MQTP and OJT. PPM is working with Boeing to pick-up aircraft specific training on CD-ROM. Recurring training is accomplished through testing, module and practical hands-on events.

### **AIRCRAFT GENERATION**

There are no special aircraft preparation standards. All aircraft are prepared the same following aircraft maintenance technical manual requirements and standard maintenance practices. The goal of all PPM personnel is to have the aircraft fly with zero discrepancies. When the Code 1 tasking goes to the C-137, PPM personnel will assist 89th AGS personnel in preparing the aircraft. Time changes are accomplished at the nearest maintenance action prior to it becoming overdue on all 89th aircraft. Aircraft statistics for the VC-25 are briefed in the 89th LG monthly summary. PPM attends 89th LG staff meetings and provides VC-25 aircraft status information to the 89th LG, although not required by current 89th Wing organizational arrangements.

**SAFETY**

Safety is first and foremost in everyone's minds in all activities. The process improvement program is administered within the PPM office IAW AMC requirements, a PPM OI exists for this program. The 89th Wing ground safety office comes into the PP area and conducts wing safety inspections and interviews. Within the PP area, ground safety is administered through the Operational Support Squadron (OSS) ground safety officer. The PPM ground safety representative attends 89 AW safety meetings and disseminates information through rollcall briefings and the safety bulletin board in the break room.

**MODERNIZATION**

A five year modernization plan has been developed in conjunction with OC-ALC.

**BOTTOM LINE**

Safe reliable aircraft are provided everyday by PPM personnel.

//SIGNED//

RICK J. HODSON, Maj, USAF  
Presidential Maintenance Officer

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

## **305 OG/CC Interview Summary 24 Sep 96, McGuire AFB, NJ**

### **Col Charles R. Johnson, Jr.**

#### **BACKGROUND**

KC-10 and C-141 aircraft from their respective units are tasked with transport of vehicles and communication gear in support of presidential movements. McGuire AFB is the home unit of one of the two Joint Task Force Command and Control Module, a converted Airstream trailer designed to be used on C-141 and KC-10 aircraft. The module is divided into three twelve-foot sections containing a living area, communications equipment, and a staff briefing areas. Its specific purpose is to guarantee communication contact with our nation's leaders as they travel on AF aircraft.

The interview was conducted with the acting commander of the 305 OG and members of his staff, including squadron commanders, operations officers, current operations, command post, special airlift missions, safety, training, and standardization/evaluation. Col Johnson has been acting in the commander's capacity since Aug 96, and has been on station approximately 2 years.

#### **SAFETY**

The Chief of Safety is a recent graduate of the Chief of Safety Course conducted by the Air Force Safety Center at Kirtland AFB NM. The 305 OG/CC believes the wing safety program is aggressive and adheres to the basic guidelines set forth in the Chief of Safety Course.

#### **POLICY AND GUIDANCE**

The 305 OG has two crews assigned to a Banner Bravo alert (3 hour response) year round. Any qualified crewmember may pull Bravo alert; however, squadrons maintain a list of those crewmembers excluded from the mission for reasons that may include low experience, flying problems, etc. Col Johnson stated squadron commanders select the best personnel available and the OG approves the crew. On "bullet" missions, a field grade mission commander is assigned to act as a coordinator between the flight crew and the customer. Mission planners are also assigned to the KC-10 "bullet" mission to ensure proper handling of mission changes. Manning for DV missions is highly selective, usually with an IP in command. Crewmembers are "not only technically qualified but professionally qualified as well."

#### **OPS TEMPO**

With the level of operational tempo, it is not always feasible to have an IP on the Banner alert crew. Short notice itinerary changes are common. The typical lead time for a short notice mission is only about 24 hours. However, the customer usually knows about the general schedule of the mission about a week prior. Even the programmed missions have continual changes in the itinerary. A comfortable lead time for missions is about 7 days--anything less than 72 hours

“causes a lot of turbulence.” Solid command and control is exercised by TACC; crews have instructions to call home whenever they are pressured or uncomfortable with changes to the mission.

### **PERSONNEL**

Air Force Reserve participation is limited, changing schedules and short notice tasking make it difficult to execute missions during their availability. The pilot force is well manned, yet qualified flight engineer manning is only about 70 percent, boom operators are at about 80 percent, and C-141 loadmasters are about 77 percent. The overall experience of those positions has also dropped. When instructors are on Banner alert, they are unavailable for unit training.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Give advance notice on projected takeoff and scheduled return times and provide mission details later.
- With more lead time, schedule Air Force Reserve to support Phoenix Banner and DV missions.
- Fence Banner Bravo crew for DV airlift. TACC should not swap the Banner Bravo crew into a channel mission at the conclusion of their 48 hour Banner alert period. An experienced crew is lost for next 7-8 days.

//SIGNED//

CHARLES R. JOHNSON, Col, USAF  
Commander, 305 Operations Group

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**HQ ACC/ADO, Directorate of Operations Staff  
Interview Summary, 24 Sep 96, Langley AFB, VA  
Col David L. Johnson, HQ ACC/ADO**

**BACKGROUND**

Col Johnson is the Assistant Director of Operations and has been in this position since Feb 1996. The group interviewed at Air Combat Command (ACC) included Col Johnson and members of the Operations Directorate Staff to include experts in training, standardization/evaluation, and airlift operations. It also included functional area managers and safety representatives. HQ ACC is responsible for training, organizing and equipping units to support the needs of the operational Commanders in Chief (CINCs). In the context of our review, ACC is the force provider for C-21s, E4As and CINC aircraft in support of DV travel, and C-130s that fly the Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) associated with Presidential and Vice-Presidential travel (i.e. Phoenix Banner/Silver/Copper).

**PERSONNEL/MANNING**

There are no special requirements for C-130 crew members to be assigned to Air Combat Command (ACC). The Air Force Multi-Command Regulation governing SAAM missions, contain no specific requirements for minimum flying hour experience. Therefore, any qualified crew member is able to fly the SAAM mission, but MCR 55-89 states that "only highly qualified crew members should be assigned to support these (Phoenix Banner/Silver/Copper Missions." General Hawley, ACC Commander, directed this mission be designated a "Special Interest Item." This means commanders should treat these missions be designated a "Special Interest Item." This re-emphasized that commanders should treat these missions at a level above "normal" and training, crew considerations, mission accomplishment and other mission related areas will receive added emphasis. ACC E-4 crews, which fly the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), are already selectively manned. Pilots must have 2500 hours and engineers require 3000 hours. The CINC support aircraft, call sign CASEY 01, a converted KC-135, is also selectively manned.

**OPS TEMPO AND TASKING**

In the opinion of Col Johnson, Ops Tempo is not a driving factor for ACC in the airlift aircraft. The E-4 is rarely used by any DVs other than SECDEF. CVAM can task the CINC support aircraft but coordinates with ACC first. CVAM rarely tasks the CT-43 at Howard AB Panama. However, this aircraft flies CINC-support for USSOUTHCOM. Ops Tempo is very high for the C-130 fleet. Real world contingencies, as well as, missions like Air Drop, low-level qualification in support of Special Operations, and Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) training, siphon off critical instructors and highly qualified personnel. The pool of experienced C-130 crew members is limited and ACC has limited ability to respond to short-notice support missions. The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard have told ACC they can offer little help. The SAAM mission taskings are short notice (between 24-72 hours before launch) and

highly susceptible to itinerary changes. They are not well suited to part-time flyers who have other jobs.



C3

In most cases, once the mission is active, an agency outside of ACC has operational control of the aircraft. For C-130 PHOENIX BANNER/SILVER/COPPER missions, the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) SAAM Shop at Scott AFB, IL, assumes the responsibility for planning, flight following and mission execution. However, the commander of Air Combat Command is briefed every day on the status of DV1 and DV2 missions being flown by ACC crews and aircraft.

//SIGNED//

DAVID L. JOHNSON, Colonel, USAF  
Assistant Director of Operations

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
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**INTERVIEW WITH MGYSGT M. A. LAPP**  
**HMX-1 SECURITY SECTION**  
**17 SEPT, 1996**

1. IS AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT TO HMX-1 ADEQUATE?

Yes.

2. ARE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL A REGULAR PRESENCE IN SQUADRON SPACES?

They are very frequent visitors to the squadron spaces and take an active role in all activities.

3. DO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL REGULARLY PARTICIPATE IN SAFETY ACTIVITIES? STAND-DOWNS? -TRAINING?

They are regularly involved in teaching, monitoring, safety stand-downs and other activities. activities.

4. IS MEDICAL READILY ACCESSIBLE FOR CONSULTATION REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS WITH INDIVIDUALS?

The medical department is always readily available to see and evaluate individuals who may need evaluation and/or treatment.

5. WHAT MECHANISMS DO YOU USE TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE AT RISK FOR SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSES?

There is a strong sense of squadron loyalty and teamwork. The senior enlisted staff is very watchful of their people. Currently, there is a pilot project planned to make use of the services of a psychologist to assist in the screening and management of security force candidates in an attempt to minimize attrition.

6. WHAT ARE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU ENCOUNTER WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITH SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSORS OR PROBLEMS?

While new squadron members who are unable to meet security clearance requirements are a problem for the squadron, security force members who get into difficulty are much easier to transfer from the squadron.

7. ARE LOCAL/MCB SUPPORT ACTIVITIES SUFFICIENT? E.G. FINANCIAL, FAMILY SERVICES, STRESS MANAGEMENT CLASSES, ALCOHOL, FAMILY PLANNING, ETC..

Yes.

8. IS LOSS OF TIME FROM WORK FOR MEDICAL VISITS ACCEPTABLE? DOES MEDICAL TRY TO MINIMIZE THOSE LOSSES?

Yes.

9. HOW WELL DOES MEDICAL COMMUNICATE BACK TO THE SQUADRON ON THE STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS?

Very promptly when there are medical concerns with security personnel.

**10. HOW WELL ARE FAMILY MEDICAL PROBLEMS ADDRESSED? ARE THEY TIMELY?**

They are generally handled without undue delays.

**11. HOW WELL DOES MCB BRANCH CLINIC SUPPORT THE SQUADRON?**

HMX-1

HMX-1 Medical handles the majority of problems unless they are deployed. Mainside medical provides that which is required, but with loss of time and some delays in being seen.

**12. HOW WELL ARE MEDICAL REFERRALS TO OTHER MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES HANDLED?**

Referral to other military medical treatment facilities results in considerable time lost because of travel distances, appointment schedules and waiting times.

## **89 OG/CC Interview Summary, 23 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

### **Col Randall J. Larsen**

#### **BACKGROUND**

Col Randall Larsen is the 89th Airlift Wing's Operations Group Commander. He oversees the daily operations of the six squadron, 1,000 person group, tasked with transporting the President, Vice President, Cabinet Secretaries, members of Congress, foreign heads of state, senior-ranking Department of Defense, and Department of State officials. Col Larsen has been assigned to the 89 AW for four months. He has over 4000 hours of fixed and rotary wing time.

#### **SAFETY**

In the opinion of Col Larsen, the 89 AW has a marvelous safety record and maintains an outstanding program. They have completed over 48 years and flown over 956,000 hours without a mishap. Safety meetings are held monthly, crew members not in attendance read the minutes and initial them. Everyone is accounted for. One major safety concern for Col Larsen, a concern for any flying organization, is an outstanding safety record can be fertile ground for complacency. From his initial safety meeting as the commander, he has been reaffirming concepts and ideas that promote the fact that safety is the first component of mission accomplishment and more important than making block times. The unit motto says it all: "Safety, Comfort, and Reliability." The other items of mission accomplishment are indeed important, however they are not "the measure of a good pilot."

#### **PERSONNEL/MANNING**

Other than the C-21 and the H-1 squadrons, there are no crew members assigned directly from Undergraduate Flying Training. In all other aircraft, the 89 AW actively seeks the most qualified and experienced pilots due to their special mission of flying our country's most senior leaders. Squadron Commanders are given the prerogative to select their new hires. However, each candidate is reviewed at both the Ops Group and the Wing before assignment. From Col Larsen's viewpoint, recruiting is successful and promotion potential is good. While experienced piloting skills are demanded, they also look at other qualifications. To ensure Distinguished Visitor (DV) travel is handled safely and professionally, the overall record and officer potential of each crew member is equally important. There is no real problem matching crews to mission requirements and considering individual personalities is not as important because of the high quality of the crew members. Virtually all missions are manned with either an instructor pilot or two aircraft commanders.

#### **C<sup>3</sup>I**

The thrust of the command, control, and communication initiatives in the 89 AW is: How can we better support the pilots? The 89 AW is one of the only airlift wings in the AF that flight follows and keeps contact with every mission they fly. Other AMC wings have their missions centrally executed and flight followed by the Tanker Airlift Control Center located at Scott AFB,

IL. Because of this requirement to manage their own missions, the Ops Group has held meetings and conducted surveys to ascertain what kind of assistance would best assist the crews (Atch 1). Support for our nations leaders has to be flexible and responsive; itinerary changes are the rule rather than the exception and this led to one disturbing finding. The survey showed 46% of the aircraft commanders have had crew rest interrupted because of mission changes. While none have ever had to delay missions due to crew rest problems, they decided there had to be a better way to do business. They have set up a Mission Support Office (MSO) to deal with mission changes. The group now has a 24-hour point of contact that can work the items required for mission itinerary changes. This may not keep the AC from being awakened, but it will provide him a point of contact to deal with the mission changes. Instead of dealing with two hours of phone calls and flight planning, he can turn the effort over to the MSO and continue his rest. Col Larsen is a proponent of taking this process even further. He recommends setting up a dispatch office, similar to commercial airlines, that can accomplish mission planning and maintain worldwide communication with the crew. This would involve using the latest available technologies in the dispatch office and the aircraft to establish this link. The Aircraft Communications, Addressing, and Reporting System (ACARS) would provide the electronic link and its use is proven in the commercial world. Transmissions are made to the aircraft and, without any action by the crew, received in the cockpit. The flight crew can then view the information when they choose and not be interrupted during high workload periods.

#### **INTEL/THREAT ANALYSIS**

Col Larsen is extremely confident in the Wing's intelligence capabilities. He is much more concerned about the likelihood of some type of sabotage or terrorist action against a DV aircraft than an aircraft accident. Threat briefings are required for all 89 AW operational missions.

#### **TRAINING & STANDARDS**

Col Larsen has tremendous regard for his training and evaluation team. He believes he has an excellent, highly experienced flight examiner office. Further, to increase objectivity flight examiner positions are being added to the Major Air Command and 21st Air Force staffs. The C-21 squadron has also been directed to interface with sister squadrons. They take advantage of checklists and procedures developed by other commands and the civil arena. The Wing senior leadership decided flight evaluations would be given on a 12 month basis, vice the normal 17-month Air Force standard, because of the important passengers the wing supports. Col Larsen believes the Wing could benefit from FAA pilot in command flight evaluations. It would allow an "external" look and lend credibility to the program in the public's eye. It would also require more review of the civilian regulations that apply to flying and particularly to the wing's civilian derivative aircraft. He is confident that current training is excellent. There are strong training programs for the C-9, C-20, C-21. Simulator training for the C-9 is very good; however, C-20 simulator training could be "harder and longer." The C-137 simulator training is outstanding. The 89 AW rents a civilian 707 simulator from PanAm and their own instructors teach both the ground school and the simulators. Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) is a critical part of every crew members' training.

### **OPS TEMPO AND TASKING**

USAF Special Missions Office, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff (CVAM) is the main tasking agency and Col Larsen perceives no problem with it. CVAM and the Ops Group coordinate daily on aircraft availability. Col Larsen stated there is never any undue pressure applied to fly "bad" jets. One identified aircraft training op tempo problem is the limit of 55 landings per month. This restriction exists to align the aircraft with Program Depot Maintenance (PDM). The minimum number of landings to meet upgrade and mission requirements is 65 per month. Increased landing rates require shorter PDM cycles--from 36 to 30 months. To ensure reliability of the aircraft, additional depot maintenance will be required driving up the cost to operate the fleet.

### **PRESIDENTIAL PILOT'S OFFICE (PPO)**

Col Larsen proposes the PPO be a separate Operations Group, reporting directly to the 89th Airlift Wing Commander. Due to the unique mission taskings and requirements, the PPO often acts in a manner autonomous to the 89 AW. Operationally the PPO reports directly to the White House. One problem Col Larsen perceives is the wing has the responsibility for the PPO but does not have the authority over it. One example of this is reflected in the fact that even though the Operation Support Squadron Commander has 140 PPO personnel assigned to her squadron, she cannot visit her troops at work. She is not allowed unescorted entry into the PPO area. Another highlight of Col Larsen's perception is performance reports are given to her from the PPO and she is expected to sign them, without comment, and then they are sent to the White House Military Office. The unit's promotion recommendations do not go through the wing, they go straight to the White House Military Office (WHMO). Personnel awards and decorations are handled the same way. Two other examples Col Larsen shared, include, a 27 Aug 96, 89 AW/PP letter (Atch 2) stating "any information pertaining to Presidential missions will be excluded from any and all reporting to TACC via GDSS or any other means". GDSS, the Global Decision Support System, is Air Mobility Command's global command and control system; it provides mission oversight information to the AMC commander, his staff, and CINCTRANS. Second, the tasking of AF 1, which the Operations Group is responsible for, is not even reported to the Operations Group. The tasking goes from WHMO to PPO. On any given day Col Larsen may not know if AF 1 is even flying.

### **FUNDING**

Col Larsen's opinion is the wing's operating budget is rather tight considering the nature of the mission. Although the quality of aircraft maintenance is great, the nature of the mission, with its unusually large number of high-visibility VIPs, demand a reliability rate that can only be met with additional manpower and parts funding.

### **OSA/C-21**

The C-21 operation in the 89 AW is not any different from any other Air Force C-21 unit. However, they benefit from close proximity to the highly experience and selectively manned 89 AW executive fleet. They have flight examiners in the wing and attend the same safety meetings so they benefit from the experience of the executive airlift pilots. C-21s are a pilot

seasoning aircraft--the Air Force builds experience in its young pilots in this aircraft. These pilots later transition into airlift or refueling aircraft. However, they carry approximately 100 civilian DV2s per year. Col Larsen stated that unlike the wing's executive airlift fleet pilots, the C-21 squadron pilots are not as experienced. Some of the pilots come from other aircraft, but most come right out of flight school. Therefore, the squadron commander has a tough job and is forced to carefully pair his crews. The 89th Operations Group has been proactive in "folding" the unit into the wing and expecting the same standards. Col Larsen believes this is the best C-21 unit in the AF.

//SIGNED//

RANDALL J. LARSEN, Colonel, USAF  
Commander, 89th Operations Group

2 Atchs

1. Crew Survey
2. 27 Aug 96 PPO memo

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

## STATEMENT OF

Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, Maintenance and Logistics Representative, Commandant's Review Team.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- The campaign represents the most intense flight operations the squadron faces.
- There are insufficient VH aircraft to meet the operational tempo the squadron faces. Specifically, the upcoming CNSU/SLEP and CNSU/MUG modifications, requirements for training and increasing mission growth have increased demands on the aircraft.
- Utilization is up significantly on both aircraft, with decreased aircraft availability from these major modifications utilization will further increase. Escalating utilization will drive more aircraft into SPAR sooner thereby exacerbating the problem.
- HMX aircraft are maintained to a higher standard than Fleet aircraft. Hangaring of the aircraft and constant attention improves corrosion prevention.
- Aircraft systems are better than what the Fleet has.
- HMX aircraft are also better maintained through an active training program on both sides, and the constant vigilance of the Quality Assurance Department.
- Squadron possesses a good system of checks and balances, half lives for Time between Overhauls (TBO's) and finite lives and SPAR provide better care for the aircraft. The care shown these aircraft helps sustain reliability
- Special Progressive Aircraft Repair (SPAR) is the scheduled depot level maintenance. There is no Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) inspection, it is a hard requirement. It is only adjusted a few months when required to meet commitments.
- This concept of hard maintenance guarantees preventive maintenance prior to failure or correction of a benign failure.  
ensure material condition.
- School training has proven essential, HMX teaches everyone the right way to do maintenance and then monitor closely.
- Maturity of personnel recruited and working helps ensure compliance SOP's and proper maintenance techniques.
- Allow no more than 5 discrepancies on the VH aircraft, but strive for 0. Although no set number for the Greenside aircraft they also push for minimal discrepancies. The mission won't allow gripes to build up. The constant vigilance helps make sure aircraft are always ready for the mission.
- Configuration control across both maintenance departments is well handled.
- There exists a very cooperative relationship between the two maintenance departments they work together to make sure they accomplish the mission in the most equitable fashion.
- HMX is very regimented in its use of SOP's. I have reviewed applicable SOP's and Maintenance Instructions. During my observation of the New York trip it became obvious, they have not only written the SOP's, but they use them in day to day operations.

### Internal/External Mission Support Aircraft:

- The use of USMC or other service support aircraft is not considered a problem. The procedures effected by HMX ensure local assets are capable and ready for the mission.



- WHLO coordination for SE and facility support is tremendous, they understand what each maintenance department requires and ensures it is available.

#### External Support - Other Agencies:

- Squadron receives exception support from NAVAIR. This is only possible with the tremendous communications that have been developed. The squadron works well all elements of the Program TEAM. This is evidenced by the strong logistics support for both maintenance departments.
- Program coordinators for VH aircraft are a good idea as they provide a single point of contact for information flow to all external support agencies.

#### Logistics Elements:

##### Manpower:

- There needs to be a complete T/O review. The presence of 6114/6124/6174 MOS's should be addressed. The number of 6072's assigned needs to be brought in line with the tasks assigned. The review should also address the growth in the mission, maybe more det personnel are required.
- During observation of the New York mission I had the chance to deal with a crew member right out of school. Although eager and hard working he was not well grounded in maintenance of flight procedures. He has never qualified in his primary aircraft, he only spent 6 months on the greenside.
- Policies for selecting aircrew were good. I was especially interested in the fact that they "grew" their own crew chiefs. They have a good program for selection and comply with the requirements to formally designate personnel as aircrew and as a crew chief.

##### Technical Data:

- The process of semi annual review of technical publications is exceptional. The ability to have redline pubs within 30 days and hard copy within 90 is exceptional. This squadron's participation in developing the manuals ensures accuracy. Great program.
- The Sikorsky tech reps holding a complete file of aperture cards is also a boon to the maintenance department. The uniqueness of the aircraft and single user makes it possible, regardless makes it possible to solve gray issues rapidly and correctly.
- Aperture cards also used in IPRs to ensure accuracy of the publications.
- Use digital video camera on discrepancies. Data sent to the factory where engineers overlay on drawing. Reduces turn around time for answers. It is nice to see a squadron applying some of the state of the art. Only applicable to the VH, the concept should be expanded.

##### Facilities:

- Great training facilities for the VH programs.
- Anacostia represents the requirements for this mission.
  - Quantico's facility is unsatisfactory and unsafe. Towing is a hazardous operation. Observed towing on 20 September, blades have to be lifted, pulled down

and heads rotated to ensure clearance. THIS IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.

- I walked through both Whiteside and Greenside spaces. There is insufficient space to get all the personnel assigned to most shops in the shop, let alone space to facilitate and effect maintenance. If there was the space most shops have inadequate lighting to do the work. The use of the trailers for both flight lines is indicative of the lack of shop space. This working conditions are terrible, not conducive to good maintenance procedures.
- Hangar deck is a real problem. On the VH side the hangar deck has risen and sunk in a variety of areas. There is only one spot to jack and cycle aircraft, and towing out of the hangar, already complicated, is worsened by having to accommodate the unevenness of the deck.
- The drainage system needs to be corrected so industrial waste is not accidentally discharged into the Potomac River.
- The roofs should be fixed. The squadron shouldn't have to paint the location of leaks on the whiteside deck to preclude having to clean aircraft again, work in spaces where water builds up in flourscent lights, or cover their computer equipment when it rains.
- The heads are few and most had at least one discrepancy. One head in the silver hangar had a sink that had been inoperative in excess of 18 months.
- The ramp is not in compliance with P-80. The nature of HMX home field operations make the close tolerances a safety issue. Only through the tremendous effort and regimented use of SOPs is the squadron capable of mitigating this risk.
- The degradation of the ramp to the extent that it is creating a FOD hazard needs to be resolved. A portion is under contract, but the entire ramp should be corrected.

#### Training:

- HMX's policy on training is one of the strongest elements in its success. They train effectively on both sides and mandate participation. No training, no stamp or qual, etc. This model should be copied by Fleet squadrons.
- Use of tech reps and instructors for in-service training helps ensure the highest quality training.
- The use of MATMEP for all MOS's in both departments ensures the standardization of training. Not only high quality training, but everyone is getting the training appropriate for their MOS.

#### Support Equipment:

- SE is sufficient. They use the right tool for the job and do not allow work arounds.
- Developed new containers for use on 46/53 aircraft. New containers are better way of transporting trip packups and should be evaluated for use across the Fleet.
- The only real issue is the number of personnel required to support all the SE requirements. This needs to be addressed through the T/O review.

### 3. Safety/General Operations:

- Maintenance Control controls maintenance on road. Whether Maintenance Control is a designated Trip Leader or a Maintenance Controller, the squadron ensures that maintenance is properly executed in accordance with applicable directives.


- There didn't seem to be an issue with gray area discrepancies, if there was a discrepancy everyone turned to correct it before the next flight. The strong belief in preventive maintenance and immediate correction of discrepancies helps ensure the readiness of the aircraft to meet the mission. Again a policy that all squadrons should seek to emulate.

- I saw no discrepancies on the way aircraft were handled. Aircraft were towed and taxied in accordance with existing squadron policies. This represents observations on HMX's flight line, Anacostia and at Linden N.J.

QA is overstaffed in both departments, as is Maintenance Control, a policy which contributes to the execution of a sound maintenance program.

- I was impressed with the safety awareness of the Quality Assurance departments. More importantly was the overall awareness from the troops through the SNCO's. Within the maintenance departments, everyone believes that safety is everyone's business.

- HMX's maintenance departments do produce safe and reliable aircraft to support the Executive Transport mission.



Colonel R. N. Leavitt 29 Sept 1996

## STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT MAGNUS

During 22-24 September 1996, I observed an HMX-1 detachment during its deployment to the New York City area in support of a Presidential air lift mission. The detachment consisted of two VH-3D and three CH-46E aircraft as well as over fifty officers and enlisted personnel with one contractor technical representative each from Boeing Helicopters and Sikorsky Aircraft.

### 22 September: Transit to Linden, New Jersey

On the morning of Sunday, 22 September the Squadron's Operations Duty Officer briefed the weather and aircraft assignments. The Commanding Officer, this detachment's commander, briefed the details of the detachment's flight to the forward operating base at Linden Airport, NJ. The brief was in accordance with Naval Training and Operating Procedures (NATOPS) as well as HMX-1's policies and procedures. The mission included separate VH-3D and CH-46E formation flights planned under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), with a rehearsal of the lift mission shortly after arrival at Linden Airport.

Monday, 23 September, was scheduled as a maintenance/weather day and Tuesday, 24 September, was set for the actual Presidential lifts. After the overall mission brief, the VH-3D and CH-46E crews separately conducted their formation and individual aircraft briefs. All briefings were conducted on time in accordance with the published Flight Schedule. I observed the VH-3D formation brief and the lead VH-3D aircraft brief. I observed the flight itself as a passenger sitting facing forward in what is historically the President's seat (President Clinton uses the opposing rearward facing seat in order to see all passengers). I was provided a headset to monitor normal internal communications; I could not monitor external communications or the "private" internal net. The private net is available to avoid unnecessary distress and inquiries from passengers during emergencies; it was not used on this flight.

Maintenance and preflight inspections of aircraft were smoothly and properly conducted. There was no apparent schedule pressure on aircrews or ground support personnel. Accurate passenger manifests, which included HMX-1 and contractor support personnel as well as the CMC review team which accompanied me were provided to the Operations Duty Officer, and each crew had a copy of all aircraft manifests. Additionally, prior to departure, individual aircraft log books were exchanged to ensure that, in the event of a mishap, the mishap aircraft's log book would likely be secure.

The VH-3D departures were uneventful and, despite a frontal passage in the Philadelphia area, the flight was conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VFR), with all mission aircraft arriving at about 1300 local time. The CH-46Es, which were in any event planned to depart later than the VH-3Ds, were slightly delayed by a routine maintenance problem. Following that correction, the CH-46E formation reported an otherwise uneventful flight to Linden Airport, arriving shortly after the VH-3Ds.

## **22 September: Arrival at Linden Airport & Mission Rehearsal Preparation**

At Linden Airport, the detachment was met by its advance team of a White House Liaison Officer (WHLO) and his assistant. They had previously conducted advance surveys of the airport facility and actual lift locations. The WHLO had also coordinated with necessary federal and local aviation, communications, safety, and security personnel prior to the arrival of aircraft. Those actions were noted by me to be quite significant as the Presidential lift mission evolved, and ongoing changes in planned lift times and the addition of a new lift location were all seamlessly integrated into the planning cycle.

Additionally, the advance team was tasked to prepare for a follow-on lift mission in the Boston area which would require redeployment of the detachment. This team served as the HMX-1 point of contact for external agency mission support. The detachment commander (here the CO, HMX-1) was kept thoroughly apprised of all critical aspects of mission status, including any developing issues, and was in constant contact with HMX-1's main base at Marine Corps Air Station Quantico, Virginia through use of his cellular telephone and pager.

A detachment logistics officer was responsible for mission area support, such as rental vehicles and accommodations, to ensure mission essential functions could be carried out. The detachment maintenance chief was responsible for hanger and flight line arrangements, including aircraft fueling. The detachment as a whole had exceptional aircraft, ground, and personal communications, including organic assets such as cellular phones and specialized assets provided by the White House Communications Activity.

The clearly well-orchestrated division of detachment responsibilities allowed the detachment commander to clearly focus on mission execution. It concurrently permitted his subordinate leaders a range of authority and responsibilities to permit their easily accomplishing essential supporting tasks in accordance with established policies and procedures and the mission plan.

Shortly after arrival at Linden Airport, while the aircraft were being refueled, the detachment crews briefed for an exact Presidential lift mission rehearsal that afternoon. The detachment Operations Duty Officer (ODO) began the brief with aircraft assignments and weather. He was followed by the WHLOs, who provided very detailed packages including time lines, communications frequencies, and local phone numbers, as well as diagrams for operations at Newark International Airport, the Wall Street Heliport (where the President and his party would be dropped prior to his United Nations appearance), and a follow on landing zone in Freehold, New Jersey. Detailed route information and pertinent local air traffic control procedures, frequencies and call signs were also briefed clearly and provided all participating aircrews. Weather was carefully monitored as it was then changing due to frontal passage. Although rehearsal at Wall Street Heliport was desired before 1600 local time, this clearly did not pressure the crews.

## **22 September: Mission Rehearsal**

For the rehearsal, the aircraft departed at 1430 local time. I was again occupying the forward facing Presidential seat as an observer. The aircraft were turned up as briefed and were taxied out of their parking spots by HMX-1 line directors. They departed the Linden Airport duty runway in order under the aircraft callsigns *Nighthawks* 1 through 4. Operations occurred precisely as briefed at Newark Airport (landing at 1435 with subsequent ground taxi for positioning), the Wall Street Heliport (1500), and Freehold landing zone (1530), recovering at Linden Airport (1600).

At each location, aircrews thoroughly discussed potential approach and departure hazards, sequential positioning and departure for the actual mission passenger pick-ups and drops, and enroute formation realignments, as well as noting key enroute terrain to facilitate orientation if visual conditions should deteriorate during execution on mission day. At Newark, Wall Street, and Linden, local air traffic and tower controllers cleared operations beneath the New York Terminal Control Area and to/from the facilities. Flight above New York's East River was conducted on the River Common frequency used by low altitude traffic. At Newark, Wall Street, and Freehold, the WHLO and his Assistant acted as landing directors, using the briefed aircraft frequencies. Arrivals at Newark, Wall Street, and Freehold were precisely located to spots that would be marked for the actual lifts. Despite changing weather, with temporary rainshowers and reduced visibility, Visual Meteorological Conditions and VFR were maintained.

## **22 September: Aircraft Recovery and Debrief from Rehearsal**

Upon recovery at Linden Airport, the rehearsal was debriefed. Minor maintenance was required on one VH-3D and one CH-46E. Maintenance personnel promptly refuelled the aircraft and began supervised towing of the aircraft into the civilian hanger. Because Sunday's good weather had permitted the required rehearsal, Monday was not needed as a "*weather day*" and would be used to complete any maintenance actions with non-essential personnel allowed local liberty. The WHLO provided all personnel a copy of the HMX-1 "*Trip Rules*" for Linden, NJ, as well as a list of pertinent area phone numbers in case contact with responsible HMX-1 personnel became necessary for them. The detachment commander briefed all personnel on geographic limitations on liberty, ensuring that personnel were cautioned regarding use of cars and alcoholic beverages (those under 21 prohibited), and ensuring that the chain of command was aware of personnel whereabouts and any problems. Mission day briefing was conducted on Sunday afternoon with a final brief planned after aircraft were to have ground turn-ups at 0545, Tuesday, 24 September. With the exception of duty Military Police and maintenance personnel, other personnel departed about 1700 for accommodations at the Clarion Hotel, Edison, NJ. Both accommodations and ground transportation, including detailed directions and local maps, were already arranged by the advance team, so that all personnel could expeditiously depart with full knowledge of what was expected of them, and with available and comfortable accommodations already arranged.

## **23 September: Flight Standown; Events at Linden Airport**

Monday, 23 September, was an aircrew rest day. Minor maintenance actions were completed. The CMC review team met with Colonel Geier for breakfast and a discussion of policies,

procedures and recommendations he had for the team.. Area weather continued to fluctuate and was closely monitored by the detachment commander through continuing contact with the Presidential Forecaster at Andrews AFB, Maryland. The detachment commander was more fully advised concerning the follow-on deployment being planned to the Boston area for lifts later in the week. He began to consider alternatives of deploying aircraft to Boston on Wednesday or remaining at Linden until Thursday.

Later in the day, the WHLO assigned to plan the Boston area lifts noted that local accommodations were not readily available due to late tasking of this mission and the onset of the Fall foliage season with associated heavy tourist traffic. Aircraft basing in the Boston area was also problematic. Therefore, the decision was reached that the detachment would remain based in Linden until adequate basing and accommodations could be secured in Boston. The detachment commander, in his capacity as Commanding Officer, was notified by his Executive Officer at MCAF Quantico that a CH-53E had experienced foreign object destruction (FOD) to a main engine when rivets apparently sheared off and were ingested into the turbine blades. Other than the engine damage (not noted as unusual for CH-53E aircraft), no other damage to the aircraft and no personnel injuries had occurred. I note the Boston trip planning and the CH-53E FOD incident as typical examples of both a detachment commander's and the Commanding Officer's span of control challenges while striving to remain focused on his primary mission of executing the scheduled Presidential lift mission.

#### **24 September: Presidential Lift Mission Execution**

Tuesday, 24 September, started with my 0445 departure with the detachment commander from the lodging facilities several miles away for Linden Airport. We arrived at 0530, noting that the detachment maintenance chief had already repositioned all five helicopters from the hanger to the flight line. Maintenance personnel were completing preflight inspections and ground communications checks.

Aircraft were ground turned at 0545. A final confirmation mission brief was conducted at 0550. The WHLO provided new mission packages, including the detailed sequence of events coordinated with the White House Advance Team and other authorities and also containing diagrams of all lift locations.

At 0600, after the detachment commander's final weather call to the President's Military Aide to confirm acceptable weather for the helicopter lift from Newark, the WHLO departed for Newark International Airport, and his assistant departed for the Wall Street Heliport. The Nighthawk 1 and 2 crews changed into the Dress Blue "C" uniforms (which are normally worn) for the lift. As the crews started their checklists, the HMX-1 security (Military Police ) and I boarded as passengers for the flight to Newark.

At 0720, anticipating an 0800 Air Force One arrival there, two VH-3Ds (*Nighthawks* 1 and 2) and two CH-46Es (*Nighthawks* 3 and 4) departed for Newark International Airport. I again occupied the same seat aboard *Nighthawk* 1 as I had earlier used to observe the first leg of the mission.

At 0730, the aircraft landed on Newark's *Yankee* Taxiway and were positioned on the terminal ramp by the WHLO exactly as rehearsed and briefed. I disembarked to observe ground operations and remained at Newark. Upon notification that the President's departure from Washington was delayed, the aircraft were shut down instead of keeping the engines running as planned. HMX-1 Military Police took posts near the mission aircraft in accordance with mission planning and normal HMX-1 procedures. The WHLO maintained constant communications with the White House Advance Team. An American Airlines charter arrived in conjunction with the arrival of Air Force One with the White House press pool aboard. It was positioned by Newark Airport line personnel in the vicinity of its planned location.

HMX-1's Executive Officer called from HMX-1's spaces to advise that his lift of the President from the White House to Andrews AFB had been completed smoothly, with the sole exception being the President's late departure from the White House. The detachment commander told me that such notification is routine--whether the mission has been successfully completed or whether some complication arose which might require him to address issues to the White House Military Office (WHMO) or others. Colonel Geir gave an example of a routine complication as being the instance in which CH-53D rotor downwash blew some small trees down in California. He noted that he would not be notified of these matters when on leave, except in an emergency, as his Executive Officer would be instead notified as the Acting Commanding Officer.

Our first warning that Air Force One was approaching Newark was the takeoff of a police helicopter from the nearby terminal building. The Secret Service had apparently gotten the first call and launched their surveillance of the runway approach corridor. The WHLO confirmed Air Force One's imminent arrival and the aircrews manned their helicopters. They promptly began prestart and engine start procedures.

During this sequence, *Nighthawk* 1's auxiliary powerplant failed to start. The crew was so smooth in shifting to the previously briefed use of a battery start procedure that the additional personnel activity was not noticeable to observers until pointed out by the WHLO. *Nighthawk* 1's engine start was otherwise uneventful.

Air Force One arrived about 0825 and was quickly and safely taxied by Air Force personnel into position, stopping approximately 30 feet closer to *Nighthawk* 1 than planned. *Nighthawks* 3 and 4 repositioned to the rear of Air Force One in preparation for embarking the press pool for the trip to Wall Street. Local press had already repositioned to the left rear of Air Force One, along with the press pool which had debarked from the charter jet. The press on board Air Force One disembarked from its rear airstairs and also positioned to the left rear, in preparation for boarding *Nighthawks* 3 and 4.

After approximately five minutes, the President disembarked from the front using standard airport accommodation vehicle stairs. He proceeded promptly to *Nighthawk* 1, returned the salutes of the Crew Chief and Military Policeman who were at either side of the front airstairs, and boarded the aircraft. *Nighthawk* 1 became *Marine One*, as is the routine, when the President steps aboard. The President leaned into the cockpit and briefly talked with the pilots prior to taking his seat.



Meanwhile, the rest of the President's primary party boarded *Marine One's* rear airstairs, as is customary. *Marine One* completed its rotor engagement and pretaxi checklists. The other Presidential party passengers boarded *Nighthawk 2* and the media personnel quickly moved to *Nighthawks 3* and *4*. These aircraft then completed their checklists. *Nighthawk 5*, the flying backup aircraft, remained clear of the immediate area. The WHLO then directed *Marine One's* taxi from the *Air Force One* positioning toward the *Yankee* Taxiway. The aircraft departed Newark in numerical order in a loose trail formation. As they proceeded to fly out of visual range, I observed the CH-46Es pass the VH-3Ds in order to have the press safely at the Wall Street Heliport to document the President's arrival, as is customary.

I returned to Linden Airport by car, observing the recovery of all aircraft approximately 0900 local. The crews changed from Dress Blue "C" uniforms into flight suits. At 1030, the Military Police departed by car for the Wall Street Heliport. The *Nighthawk 1* and *2* crews alternated alert status for any unscheduled emergency mission in order to ensure they got lunch. At 1215, Colonel Geier contacted the President's Military Aide and confirmed acceptable weather for the helicopter lift from Wall Street. At 1300, *Nighthawks 1* through *4* departed for Wall Street as planned. I again occupied my observer's seat. On final approach, I noted a number of police and fire department personnel at the base of the Heliport terminal but safely clear of the landing spots. *Nighthawk 1* landed precisely on its marked spot at 1315. The aircraft shut down and crews went into the terminal to rest and monitor communications.

At about 1400, communications indicated that the President had departed the United Nations and his motorcade was enroute to Wall Street. The *Nighthawk* crews manned their aircraft as the Heliport Chief Operations Supervisor Mr Ignizio, local police and fire department personnel took positions. Military Police, Secret Service and Port Authority of New York police secured access to the terminal and ramp areas, controlling the movement of media personnel and observers. *Nighthawk 5*, the backup CH-46E, was orbiting in the lower New York Bay. A Coast Guard H-60 search and rescue helicopter was also in flight and Coast Guard, Port Authority of New York, and police boats were in the nearby waters in the event of a ditching.


At about 1415, the Presidential motorcade arrived with Secret Service vans preceding the limousines that drove onto the Heliport ramp. The President's limousine drove directly around to *Nighthawk 1's* front airstairs. After the President boarded, *Marine One* promptly engaged rotors and took off towards the south and its next destination, the Freehold landing zone. *Nighthawks 2* through *4* followed. I subsequently returned to Linden Airport by car with two Military Police personnel.

At 1600, I departed for Newark Airport with the White House Liaison Officer and Colonel Hall. At about 1700, I observed *Marine One* and *Nighthawk 2* approaching Newark, followed by *Nighthawks 3* and *4*. Local weather was still Visual Meteorological Conditions but had deteriorated with an overcast and light rainfall. *Marine One* arrived slightly early, which was noted as unusual by the WHLO (i.e. the President usually arrives later than planned), but was due to President departing Freehold earlier than planned. *Marine One* landed and taxied into position off the nose of *Air Force One* as directed by the WHLO. *Nighthawk 2* positioned behind

*Nighthawk 1*; both aircraft shutdown their rotors. *Nighthawks 3 and 4* taxied into position off the tail of *Air Force One* and shut down. The President disembarked *via* the front airstairs and proceeded to the nose wheel area of *Air Force One* to shake hands with airport personnel. Other passengers promptly boarded *Air Force One*. The President then boarded *Air Force One*. Then *Nighthawks 1 through 4* reengaged their rotors and repositioned well clear of *Air Force One* as planned. *Nighthawks 3 and 4* took off for Linden Airport, their part of the lift completed. *Air Force One* started engines and quickly taxied for takeoff. After *Air Force One's* takeoff, *Nighthawks 1 and 2* took off for Linden Airport.

I departed Newark International Airport at 1830 on a Continental Airlines flight to Washington National Airport. Like many other flights that day, the Continental flight experienced an unplanned delay when airport traffic was frozen for 30 minutes due to Presidential movement.

This statement, consisting of this page and the 6 pages preceding it, constitutes a recapitulation of my observations and recollections, and is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have signed it below this, the 1st day of October 1996.



Robert Magnus  
Brigadier General  
U.S. Marine Corps

## **Gates Learjet Representative, Telephone Interview, 3 Oct 96**

### **MEMO FOR RECORD**

As part of the information gathering process for the Executive Travel Review Board, I interviewed Mr. Hal Martin of Gates Learjet, Wichita KS phone, (316)946-2358. Mr. Martin provided estimates of Lear 35 (Lear business jet comparable to the USAF C-21) cumulative flying hours for the years 89-96, and the total number of Lear 35 accidents for the same period from the NTSB data base (1.38 million hours, 8 accidents).

**//SIGNED//**

**JOSEPH P. MARKSTEINER, Lt Col, USAF  
Executive Travel Review Board--Safety Member**

**This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
Executive Support Air Fleet Review, provides instructions for handling.**

**INTERVIEW WITH LCDR V. D. MORGAN  
HMX-1 SENIOR FLIGHT SURGEON  
13 SEPT 1996**

**1. IS THERE A SPECIFIC AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT POLICY FOR SQUADRON MEMBERS ENGAGED IN HMX-1 MISSIONS, INCLUDING WHITE HOUSE SUPPORT MISSIONS?**

The medical facility conducts its operations using established standard operating procedures for provision of health care in medical treatment facilities. There are no special procedures for clinical care except those generated by HMX-1 or Yankee White procedures generated by the White House, such as the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). Virtually all members of the squadron are treated as PRP members, and a front sheet in the individual medical record clearly identifies them, with special procedures required in handling their medical care needs, including reporting procedures.

**2. WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION AND LEVEL OF TRAINING OF YOUR HMX-1 FLIGHT LINE CLINIC STAFF?**

There are 2 fully qualified and credentialed flight surgeons on staff, one of whom is additionally certified in family practice. Each is required to maintain clinical currency in accordance with current BUMED Privileges and credentialing instructions. Each is also required to be fully NATOPS qualified in Physiology and water survival skills and maintain flight currency.

Four corpsmen are listed on the T/O, all of whom are 8406, Aviation Medical Technicians. The corpsman manning level was 2 for a period of 5 months, has increased to 3 recently, and will not reach the full complement until in November. Each is fully trained in their basic and specialty MOS. Quarterly internal training was considered insufficient and is being replaced with weekly corpsman training, with further cross training provided through exchange with mainside branch clinic. Additionally, it is required that each corpsman be ACLS and EMT trained.

**3. ARE THERE ANY SPECIFIC CONCERNS REGARDING YOUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE SQUADRON?**

The corpsmen are very active in squadron activities ranging from clinical duties, squadron duties to monitoring of physical fitness testing to rifle range activities. Shortages are acutely felt and decrease the ability to provide full support. It is expected that when the full complement of corpsmen is aboard in November, that support will be fully realized.

The flight line clinic operating budget is \$3000 annually for supplies and equipment. The clinical expertise necessary to provide care exists, but sometimes must be referred to the MCB clinical facility in order to remain within budget, resulting in loss of work time/inconvenience to squadron members.

**4. WHAT STEPS HAVE YOU TAKEN TO PROMOTE HMX-1 OCCUPATIONAL /PREVENTIVE MEDICINE GOALS?**

The clinical programs for timely immunizations, wellness initiatives, , alcohol and substance abuse and other programs are in place and well supported. Beyond that, HMX-1 medical staff presence

in the squadron spaces is virtually a daily occurrence, with close interactions with both officers and enlisted personnel in security, NATOPS, air and ground safety, maintenance and so on. The purpose is to provide two way communications with all departments not only in safety issues, but also to promote awareness among squadron members with regard to early recognition and intervention in potential problems. The Human Factors Council meets at least quarterly to evaluate squadron members performance and look for indicators of trouble. There is both an officer and enlisted Council.

#### 5. DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERNS REGARDING SAFETY IN THE OVERALL WHITE HOUSE SUPPORT MISSION?

Pilot total flight time has decreased. While the requirement has been reduced to 2000 total hours, waivers sometimes need to be granted down to 1800 hours, since some new pilots are arriving with as few as 1500 total flight hours, requiring considerable time to get them up to the minimum requirements.

It is difficult to keep experienced senior enlisted personnel in adequate numbers. A considerable amount of additional training is required to get these personnel up to HMX-1 requirements. Monitors often send out a number of experienced personnel without understanding the impact of leaving gaps in the numbers of experienced people.

New squadron members arrive before their security clearances are complete, often before they are even begun. It then takes many months to complete the clearance process, during which time they are not completely useable. Should clearance be denied as sometimes happens, there is no way to replace them with cleared or clearable people. This constitutes a strain on clearable individuals to take up the difference in work load. We are investigating the possibility of employment of psychological profiling and follow ups on a formal basis in addition to preliminary screening in an attempt to minimize these losses.

#### 6. HOW IS SQUADRON MEDICAL SUPPORT PROVIDED DURING CONUS PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT MISSIONS?

Flight surgeons do not routinely deploy during CONUS operations. This presents a problem if deployment is in a remote location where no military treatment facilities are nearby, requiring dependence on the local medical community and out of pocket costs to the individual. Additionally, occasional CONUS deployments would promote better acquaintance with members and enhance human factors effectiveness. Replacement of one 8406 corpsman with an Independent duty corpsman would not significantly interfere with aviation specific capabilities, and at the same time would enhance capability to provide enhanced support both at home field as well as remote location CONUS support.

#### 7. HOW IS SQUADRON MEDICAL SUPPORT PROVIDED DURING OCONUS PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT MISSIONS?

The flight surgeons routinely deploy during OCONUS operations. If both deploy, flight line clinic operations cease, requiring use of MCB clinic facilities with loss of work time/inconvenience to squadron personnel.

**8. HOW DO YOU DETERMINE THE PHYSICAL/MENTAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH OF SQUADRON MEMBERS WHICH WOULD ALLOW YOU TO MONITOR SQUADRON PERSONNEL.**

The senior SNCOs have been the key to early detection of arising problems with squadron personnel. They have become much more astute in early detection than previously, and are critical to that effort. Additionally, medical personnel get to know the squadron members much better when serving as integral to HMX-1.

**9. HOW DO YOU RISK PROFILE SQUADRON MAINTENANCE OR OTHER DEPARTMENTS FOR POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS/WORK WITH SAFETY?**

There are ongoing meetings and dialog between medical and air and ground safety, daily AOMs which address safety issues and so forth. The squadron safety program is excellent, but there are limitations imposed by inadequate facilities, hangars and shops. These shortfalls represent increased risks to both personnel and the aircraft assets.

**10. WHAT MEDICAL TRAINING IS PROVIDED FS/CORPSMEN TO HELP FACILITATE HMX MISSION.**

Corpsmen are both EMT and ACLS trained in addition to their MOS training. Recurrent training was originally quarterly, but was deemed inadequate, resulting in a new weekly training schedule.

**11. IS THERE ADEQUATE TIME FOR TRAINING.**

Training is difficult at this time because of the current shortfall of corpsmen and increased work load which results. This should be much easier to accomplish once the full complement of corpsmen is on board.

**12. WHAT PHYSIOLOGY/SAFETY TRAINING IS REQUIRED FOR PASSENGERS ABOARD HMX AIRCRAFT?**

All aircrew must meet the physiology and water survival qualifications as outlined in General NATOPS. Passengers are provided safety and egress briefs by the crew chief of the aircraft as per squadron requirements. White House scheduled passenger briefs are coordinated through the White House military office.

**13. WHAT IS THE QUALITY AND AVAILABILITY OF LOCAL MEDICAL SUPPORT SERVICES?**

We enjoy excellent support from financial, legal, family services and other programs. There is a very active "key volunteer program" headed by Mrs Geier, which enjoys strong support of the squadron wives in a network for assisting squadron families in times of trouble or stress.

**201 AS CC/Mission Commander**  
**Interview Summary, 19 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**  
**Col Brian McGarry, Lt Col Al Westrom**

**BACKGROUND**

Col McGarry is the 201st Airlift Squadron Commander (201 AS/CC) and is a traditional part-time guardsmen. Lt Col Westrom is the 201 AS Mission Commander who is full time in the unit. The 201 AS is unique for a National Guard unit in that they work directly for a commanding general appointed by the President and reporting to the Secretary of the Army. The unit operates four

C-21 aircraft whose mission is primarily DV support for the Air National Guard and on occasion supports Air Mobility Command (AMC) requested missions. The unit also owns three C-22B aircraft primarily used for support of large Air Force team travel such as the Air Force Inspector General, some senior executive civilian travel, and ANG Chief travel. The unit supports CVAM-directed missions on a periodic bases based upon the 89 AW need for additional support.

**TASKING**

The DV taskings for the 201st come through CVAM and usually occur due to the lack of availability of aircraft at the 89th. After the initial request there still isn't a hard tasking for the mission but an aircraft is placed on alert against the request while waiting for the mission tasking to be passed to TACC. All missions are ANG funded. The 89th mission support personnel provide limited support to the 201st with respect to mission changes and message traffic. The unit requires pilots to maintain a basic currency in order to take a mission overseas as the aircraft commander. The unit schedules three pilots on all overseas flights to split up the duties and season the younger flightcrews since they don't get the opportunity to support overseas missions on a regular basis. The 201st does not augment aircrews since there are no crewrest quarters on board the aircraft. The basic crew duty day is 16 hours which is waivable under special conditions. The typical mission tasking does not require a waiver to duty day limitations.

**SAFETY**

The most effective safety program in the unit is peer accountability. Everyone keeps everyone else safe and straight. These officers believe the fact that these people are full time and career guardsmen lends to a certain level of ownership for safe operation of the aircraft at all times. This term is not unique to the ANG, but is more commonly talked about and tracked in the guard units.

**OPS TEMPO**

The C-21 Lear missions have tapered way off since early last year. The busies season is summer and congressional breaks for obvious reasons. The Boeing C-22 crews (727-100) are the hardest worked, specifically the flight stewards. The unit is not authorized the necessary number of flight stewards to perform the basic mission and several of the positions are manned "out-of-

hide" in order to keep up the level of support we maintain. One way the unit is dealing with varying schedules and operations tempo is through the inception of long-term scheduling or bidding. There are certain constraints on how crewmembers block out the time, but this gives them control over their own schedule and has cut the number of complaints. This gave the crews some feeling of control and really had a positive effect on morale.

### **FLIGHT CURRENCIES**

Aircrew currency is always a challenge based upon the availability of aircraft, but no more so than any other unit. The C-21 is pretty much always on station and allows for easier access, where as the C-22Bs are used for DV travel and team travel on a more frequent basis. During heavy demand periods for support airlift the aircrews have to work a little harder to stay current, but the training always gets accomplished.

### **OPERATIONAL CONTROL**

Operational control is maintained by TACC, if they schedule the mission. If CVAM executes the mission, the crews are independent for the most part. There is a great deal of experience in the 201st and the crews are empowered to get the job done safely and efficiently. Basically the crews meet the needs of the customer.

### **MAJOR CONCERNS**

The number one concern in the unit is uncertainty with respect to the future of jobs and the aircraft we fly or will fly in the future. As the commander, Col McGarry does not have any real concerns with regard to the crews and aircraft.

//SIGNED//

BRIAN McGARRY, Col, USAF  
Commander, 201 AS

//SIGNED//

AL WESTROM, Lt Col, USAF  
Mission Commander, 201 AS

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
Executive Support Air Fleet Review, provides instructions for handling.



## **89 AW OG/CD**

### **Interview Summary, 18 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD Lt Col Robert M. McGreal**

#### **SAFETY**

The 89th Airlift Wing Operations Group (89 AW/OG) safety program is organized similar to those found in any other Air Force operations group. Each squadron has its own flying safety and ground safety officer/NCO. Lt Col McGreal stated that his #1 safety concern is the crew rest his crews receive on the road when numerous changes occur to the mission. A system was instituted beginning earlier this month that sets up a mission operations center in the 89 Operational Support Squadron (OSS). The mission operations center will be the focal point to assist the crews with mission changes while away from Andrews. When a crew receives a mission change from the party and it's approved by CVAM, the aircraft commander will call the mission support center with the changes and the mission support center will then begin implementing the changes, making necessary calls to get clearances etc., thus allowing the crews to get their needed rest. The updated information would be faxed back to the crews, allowing them to be ready to fly when they depart their hotel. With the upcoming change from the C-137 (with a navigator) to the two-person cockpit of the C-32A, the mission support center becomes an even more vital tool to aid crews in accomplishing mission changes 24 hours-a-day and allow them to receive necessary crew rest. Plans are being evaluated to put an extra crew member on the aircraft to assist the crew on the mission by taking all the mission changes for the aircraft commander while he/she is in crew rest.

#### **RESOURCES/FUNDING**

The 89th Operations Group (89 OG) receives good support from outside agencies, especially in TDY funding. The Operations Group also receives excellent support from the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC). The 89 OG is manned at 100 percent of authorized level, and AFPC supports the 89 OG in ensuring all personnel requested are assigned. The 99th Airlift Squadron (99 AS) has some concern in the number of personnel in the aircraft commander and instructor upgrade programs. This may be being alleviated by Saturday flying.

#### **ASSIGNMENT POLICY/SELECTION**

The 89 OG looks for an experienced instructor in a major weapons system when they are hiring personnel. There is a requirement for personnel to be instructor qualified to apply for duty at the 89th, however, there is no minimum number of instructor hours required. There have been a few pilots hired with less than 2,500 hours, however most have over the desired 2,500 hours and none have been hired with less than 2,000 hours for the C-137, C-20, and C-9C fleet. The 1st Helicopter (1 HS) and 457th Airlift Squadron (457 AS) hire co-pilots directly out of Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT). The OG/CD said the enlisted personnel are "two quantum leaps" ahead of contemporaries in the Air Force. Their professionalism, enthusiasm, and motivation is some of the best he's ever seen.

## **LEADERSHIP**

The OG/CD believes his crews are empowered, very competent, and appropriately autonomous. The crews routinely go to places outside the military support structure. They're required to do most of the mission support themselves. The OG/CD (former T-1 squadron commander) is very impressed with 89 AW instructor knowledge of regulations and directives. The morale of the group is high due to autonomy, empowerment, and the excitement of the overall mission. The OG/CD is very impressed with the enlisted crew force within the group. He feels they are "two quantum leaps above" the rest of the Air Force. They're professional, responsible, and proactive. He's also very impressed with the officer corps for those same reasons.

## **OUTSIDE AGENCY INTERACTION**

The 89 OG regularly interacts with CVAM. No outside agencies have ever required the 89 OG crews to go beyond stated direction or authorization to complete a mission. An example given was a C-9C crew who was facing strong winds and rain before a launch. The winds were near the crosswind limits for the C-9C. The OG/CD said that senior leadership never put pressure on the crew to go, or not go, it was the crew's call and the group and wing totally supported their decision. The OG/CD said he was fully supported in turn by the 89 AW Vice Wing Commander (CV) who was acting commander.

## **RETENTION/CONTINUITY/PROGRESSION**

Retention is not a problem so far at the 89th. All positions are manned, and the only area of concern is the upgrading of crew members at the 99 AS in the C-20s.

## **C3I**

Overall operational control is with the 89 AW/CC; however, daily command and control is handled by CVAM (who, when, where they go etc.), the 89th Operational Support Squadron (89 OSS) Current Operations branch, the squadron commanders, and the mission support center. Launching and recovering of the aircraft is the 89 OG's priority. "We try to get the mission moving when the party arrives." The 89 OG/CD's overall assessment is "it's a well oiled machine--we've got autonomous crews, mission operations to help with mission changes/planning, and on-time launch reliability of 99.3 percent.

## **RELIABILITY/AVAILABILITY**

Aircraft launch reliability is 99.3 percent and it's been above 99 percent for the last few years. Both the Logistics and Ops Group commanders meet daily to discuss maintenance and operations issues. There's super support from the logistics group.

## **MODERNIZATION**

The 89 AW hasn't been able to take advantage of the latest technology. Some aircraft don't have TCAS, GPS, or Windshear equipment. It doesn't impact mission accomplishment, but does increase crew workload. The 89 AW should have the latest technology to increase both the margin of safety and reliability. The C-32A/Small VC-X will be a great improvement--these are modern aircraft that reduce the pilot workload--a real mission enhancer. The aircraft will replace the C-137 fleet. In the opinion of the 89 OG/CD the optimum force structure mix of aircraft would be six 757s with the remaining being the G-IV aircraft.

### **SPECIAL CERTIFICATIONS**

First pilots never fly with other than an instructor pilot. It is not a requirement, but due to the nature of the mission, the 89 OG/CD feels it's necessary.

### **AIRCRAFT OPERATING POLICY**

Any waivers from practices set out in Air Force instructions would come through Stan/Eval to the OG/CC for approval or disapproval. The 89 OG/CD hasn't yet seen a request for a waiver since assuming his duties. Aircraft are not operated in a manner other than that recommended by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).

### **TASKINGS**

There are some short-notice launches, but not a lot. The C-20s are on a two-hour alert response, and the C-137s maintain a three-hour alert commitment. The C-20s seem to launch off alert more often than the C-137s; there was a C-137 launch several weeks back. The 89 OG doesn't get involved in the scheduling of the DV code 1 & 2 missions. Mission validation is above the 89 OG level. CVAM is the interface between the party and the 89th pilots.

### **OPS TEMPO**

Ops tempo is not that great at the present time, however that can change. Crew member TDYs are not that excessive. There's no Ops tempo effects on crews performance.

### **AIRCRAFT SELECTION**

CVAM is the agency that selects the aircraft for the mission based on passenger load and required configuration for the mission.

### **CREW REST**

Crews receive sufficient crew rest and adhere to crew rest guidance. When on the road however, there is sometimes a problem with interruptions due to mission changes. The new mission operations center should help in this area.

//SIGNED//

ROBERT M. MCGREAL, Lt Col, USAF  
Deputy Commander, 89th Operations Group

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**375 OG/CD, 375 OSS/CC, 458 AS/CC, and 458 AS/DO  
Interview Summary, 21 Sep 96, Scott AFB, IL  
Lt Col Daniel W. McKenzie, Lt Col (S) James A. Mont, Lt Col  
Glenn A. Mackey, and Maj William C. MacKinzie**

**BACKGROUND**

The officers interviewed supervise C-21 flight operations at Scott AFB IL. Lt Col McKenzie is the 375th Operations Group Deputy Commander (375 OG/CD). Lt Col (S) Mont commands the 375th Operations Support Squadron (375 OSS) which includes responsibility for scheduling. Lt Col Mackey and Maj MacKinzie are the 458th Airlift Squadron Commander (458 AS/CC) and 458th Operations Officer (458 AS/DO), respectively.

**MEDICAL SUPPORT**

Three flight surgeons from the Scott AFB Flight Surgeons' Office routinely fly with the C-21 pilots in the 458th Airlift Squadron (458 AS). The squadron receives the identical level of support as any other flying squadron. The relationship is characterized as "very strong."

**SAFETY**

All flight operations at Scott AFB rigorously stress safety. The 458 AS/CC and DO impress upon their pilots that although the nature of VIP airlift involves a customer-oriented approach, safety must receive special emphasis and never be compromised. There is a high emphasis on Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) in the squadron. The squadron developed their own CRM program and the topic is regularly discussed at unit "hanger flying" sessions hosted by the 458th Operations Officer. The number one safety concern voiced by all was the relative inexperience of the crews in the C-21. Approximately 75 percent of the crew members assigned to the 458 AS are on their first assignment after Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT). This high number of inexperienced pilots is not unusual in C-21 squadrons, because the charter of such units is to provide rapid seasoning for young aviators. However, the 458 AS possesses an impressive safety record--over 19 years and over 480,000 accident-free flying hours. A secondary safety concern mentioned was the quality and consistency of the C-21 flight manual. This issue was previously identified by the 1995 Operational Support Airlift (OSA) Across the Board Review. As a result, the flight manual is being re-written to make it more user friendly and to standardize it with other Air Force flight manuals.

**ASSIGNMENT SELECTION/MANNING**

There are no unique hiring qualifications for the C-21s. The newly assigned pilots from UPT represent a cross-section of talent and ability, but the unit has not received a poor pilot in over two years. There is opportunity for greater hiring selectivity of the other, more experienced, 25 percent of the crew members coming from prior assignments. The Air Force Personnel Center works with the squadron commander to review volunteers. Current manning is set to a crew

ratio of 1.13 per aircraft. Squadron leaders stated that the present ratio does not allow enough scheduling flexibility and believes it is low for their operating tempo. On 1 October 1996, the mission taskings will be reduced due to a cut in flying hours for the unit. The reduction in total taskings will aid manning availability for missions.

### **LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION**

There are only two authorized field grade positions in the squadron--the commander and operations officer. The other senior leadership positions in the 458 AS are an assistant ops officer (ADO) and two flight commanders. All are filled by captains who are usually instructors. Additionally, the ADO and flight commander positions are also usually prior qualified pilots (PQPs) rather than first-assignment pilots. Flight orders are signed by the commander and ops officer, and rarely by the ADO.

### **OUTSIDE AGENCIES**

The C-21 squadron has little contact with outside scheduling agencies above the TACC such as CVAM because 99 percent of their assigned missions are in support of other than DV-2 passengers. In the past year only two missions were committed to civilian DV-2 support. On those missions the unit transported two congressional representatives. The only contact above TACC comes during such congressional support missions when the unit receives instruction to contact CVAM.

### **RETENTION/PROGRESSION**

Retention is not a problem in this unit. Rather, these leaders see an assignment rotation policy problem. The three-year turnover under current assignment policy does not allow replenishment of experienced instructors. The recommended solution is to increase tour length by six months to three-and-a-half years. Progression is generally good--the C-21 is an excellent platform to season young pilots. A new arrival from UPT will take approximately two years to upgrade to aircraft commander, and 30 months to instructor. These times vary as threshold for upgrade are based on flying hour experience. Multi-Command Instruction (MCI) 10-202 is the governing directive and mandates that PQPs need at least 100 hours in the C-21 and 800 hours total time to upgrade to aircraft commander. Usually they have between 120 and 150 hours in the jet before beginning upgrade. First assignment pilots need a minimum of 500 total flying hours, with at least 200 hours in the C-21. Usually they have between 520 and 550 hours in the C-21 before beginning aircraft commander upgrade. Instructor upgrade requires at least 100 hours in the C-21 past aircraft commander certification. Instructor pilots (IPs) must take a written examination and observe several evaluations before upgrade to evaluator pilot (flight examiner). Only the most experienced IPs are selected for this duty. In the opinion of the squadron commander and operations officer, the introduction of the T-1 aircraft to UPT syllabus results in greatly increased familiarity and proficiency with "business jet" type aircraft like the C-21. The initial qualification and instructor upgrade schools are centrally managed by the 45th Airlift Squadron of Air Education and Training Command (Keesler AFB MS) and the Simuflite company (Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport). Aircraft commander upgrade training is conducted in-unit using a standard syllabus.

### **C3I**

Squadron leadership encourages the crews to call back at every mission stop--for advice, to receive mission changes, to advise the unit of any problems, and to keep the unit apprised of mission execution. The Ops Group follows up strongly for all mission considerations--crew duty limitations, crew rest, etc. The status of the mission is tracked, but crews are not pushed into an unsafe situation.

### **AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY/AVAILABILITY**

There are eight aircraft currently assigned to the 458 AS. An aircraft is tasked on occasion to support operations in Saudi Arabia, with a crew and two maintenance personnel going with the aircraft. Crews are on temporary duty in Saudi Arabia for a 60 day period. The 458 AS rates the quality of their contract logistics support (CLS or contract maintenance) by Raytheon Corporation as outstanding. The reliability of possessed aircraft is very good, along with an aircraft availability consistently above the 85 percent contract standard. Aircraft forms are prepared in the standard Air Force manner. Quality assurance representatives ensure all aspects of the CLS contract are followed and the maintenance forms are properly annotated.

### **MODERNIZATION**

The C-21 aircraft are being upgraded with the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) navigation system. The TCAS collision avoidance system is also programmed with installation starting in 1998. Many C-21 crews are familiar with TCAS from the T-1 trainer, and believe will further aid in spotting/avoiding traffic conflicts.

### **TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION**

Additional controls on quality are maintained by senior leadership through the use of Training Review Boards. These boards certify readiness for upgrade by reviewing the candidate's total performance in recurring training and upgrade programs. The only special qualification established by the unit is for "CINC crews." The unit has 3-4 instructors designated to fly with CINCTRANS or other senior flying DVs.

### **OPERATING POLICY**

There is no written policy that requires an instructor pilot to be on-board the aircraft with a DV-2. The officers interviewed stated every attempt is made to only fly senior DVs with the "CINC crew" certified instructors. However, ops tempo may prevent the use of one of these instructors. Earlier this year, the 458 AS was directed to launch the Bravo Alert crew (C-21s launched from Bravo Alert must be airborne within two hours of notification per MCI 11-221) to fly the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF). As a result, the pilot for CSAF on this mission was neither an instructor, nor one of the CINC-certified crews. In fact, it was only his second mission as an aircraft commander. The wing senior leadership had full confidence in the pilot's capability and endorsed the mission. However, normal practice in this unit is to make every attempt to put an instructor on board every DV-4 mission and above.

### **TASKING**

Only one percent of the taskings for the 458 AS involve civilian DV-2 airlift. All taskings come through the TACC, though the unit may get specific guidance to call CVAM on a specific mission. The squadron commander, ops officer and ADO double check to ensure mission details are correct--suitable airfield, servicing available, sufficient crew rest, crew duty day not exceeded, etc. If a mission can not be safely accomplished by the unit, TACC is immediately notified.

### **OPS TEMPO**

Ops Tempo is now characterized as high, but steady. The tempo has been four taskings per day--three missions plus one training line. When assigned an alert line, the tempo was two missions, the alert, and one training line. The squadron anticipates a decrease on 1 Oct 96 due to a programmed flying hour reduction. The drop in tempo should equate to two missions and one training line or a single line each for alert, mission, and training. The squadron attempts to work with the tasking agencies to "tailor" the tempo to preclude interfering with necessary qualification training.

### **CREW DUTY/REST**

The squadron commander and operations officer stated the unit never waives pre-mission crew rest and only waives post-mission crew rest when absolutely required to support the mission. Crew duty day is limited to 12 hours and is waivable to a maximum of 14 hours (with crew concurrence) by the OG/CC. Waiver authority beyond 14 hours rests with the HQ AMC/DO. There were two occasions this year when the 458 AS commander requested a waiver to post-mission crew rest but the 375th Ops Group commander turned the requests down.

//SIGNED//

DANIEL W. MCKENZIE, Lt Col, USAF  
Deputy Commander, 375 Operations Group

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**Headquarters, Marine Corps, Assignments Branch**

**Interview with:** Col Nasby HQMC, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Officer Assignments (MMOA)  
Col Whittle HQMC, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Enlisted  
LtCol Judge Assignments (MMEA)

**1. What assignment policies are in place to specifically support the mission requirements of HMX-1?**

HMX-1 is categorized as an Excepted Command which allows Headquarters to establish a staffing goal of nearly 100% of the squadron Table of Organization (T/O).

HMX-1 T/O calls for a large number of E-4 and below (about 60% of enlisted). If Headquarters manned the squadron to this requirement, the unit's experience base would be severely degraded. Current MMEA policy allows the assignment of higher numbers of more senior Marines.

Current policy also allows an exception for the assignment of all Marines, officer and enlisted, to four year tours at HMX-1 vice the standard three year fleet tour (CMC letter 1300/MMOS/Aug 05 1993). Additionally, during this election year, transfers out of the squadron have been delayed until after the inauguration so that the normal assignment process will increase manning to help offset current operational tempo.

The automated order writing system also specifically spells out on the transfer orders for individual Marines the administrative requirements for assignment to HMX-1. Details such as clearance requirements are clearly stated for the Marine and the parent unit.

Many more informal processes take place with HMX-1 to insure mission requirements are met. An example is the monthly meetings between the monitors and squadron representatives.

**2. How do these policies differ from those applied to other unique organizations such as "8th & I", Marine Security Guard (embassy duty) or any other Marine billet with potentially high "visibility" outside the USMC?**

Assignment monitors are given more latitude in meeting the unique requirements of HMX-1. By comparison, HMX-1 has advantages, such as the current screening process, that these other units do not enjoy. Another obvious example is the detailed handling of individual assignments to the squadron.

Although both the Drill Instructor and Recruiting programs have a specific monitor to handle those programs, the same capability informally exists for HMX-1 within the enlisted assignments branch at Headquarters. One section is specifically tasked with ensuring that units and not just individual billets are properly manned. A single point of contact similar to the D.I. and Recruiting programs can be formally established for HMX-1.

**3. In general, what follow-on assignments do HMX-1 personnel receive?**

Due to required tour length with the squadron, most departing personnel will be required to update their overseas/deployment tour dates through assignment to a deploying unit. A driving force in this assignment is the need to keep the individual HMX-1 Marine competitive for promotion with his fleet counterpart.



Some accommodations are made for assignment to non-deploying follow-on tours such as recruiting duty if that duty is a career-enhancing exception to fleet assignment. However, due to the demanding nature of recruiting, HMX-1 personnel are generally excluded from screening to avoid immediate re-assignment to recruiting duty.

Monitors also attempt to assign Marines to one year unaccompanied tours so that they are eligible for immediate re-assignment to HMX-1 if the squadron so desires.

**4. Are any Marines assigned to HMX-1 for exceptional reasons which might limit the individual's ability to fully function in the squadron's mission?**

Under rare circumstances, a Marine, or a member of a Marine's family, may require assignment in the D.C. area for access to special medical care or special programs available only in this region. If that Marine has an aviation MOS, HMX-1 may be the only unit in the area in which the Marine is qualified to serve. If the Marine meets all the other criteria for duty with HMX-1, then the monitor will consider assigning this individual to the unit. Currently such assignments account for less than 2% of the squadron's T/O.

**5. What are your policies on assignment of Marines directly from the Fleet Replacement Enlisted Skills Training (FREST) units or any primary MOS schools?**

Assignment of first-tour Marines is a function of the squadron T/O which currently calls for fairly large numbers of junior enlisted personnel. Since prior experience is recognized as essential to the squadron's mission, less first-term Marines are assigned than current staffing dictates.

**INTERVIEW WITH MGYSGT J.A. NORTHCOTT**  
**"WHITE SIDE" MAINTENANCE**  
**17 SEPT, 1996**

**1. IS AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT TO HMX-1 ADEQUATE?**

Yes, but dental capability is limited to exams and referrals. Treatment requires referral to mainside dental, which has a considerable adverse impact on personnel who have limited time available because of a rigorous deployment schedule.

When two or more detachments go Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS), both flight surgeons are required to accompany the squadron. When that happens, medical support at the air facility stops, requiring use of mainside medical and loss of some of the direct medical support and safety function. When detachments are sent within the Continental United States (CONUS), the flight surgeons are left behind to provide support to the remaining squadron members, but those on the deployment must rely either on nearby military treatment facilities or the local economy.

**2. ARE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL A REGULAR PRESENCE IN SQUADRON SPACES?**

Yes.

**3. DO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL REGULARLY PARTICIPATE IN SAFETY ACTIVITIES? STAND-DOWNS? -TRAINING?**

They take a very proactive role in safety and training activities.

**4. IS MEDICAL READILY ACCESSIBLE FOR CONSULTATION REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS WITH INDIVIDUALS?**

Yes.

**5. WHAT MECHANISMS DO YOU USE TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE AT RISK FOR SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSES?**

Because of the nature of the squadron and the closeness of the members, problems are identified quickly so that corrective actions can be instituted.

**6. WHAT ARE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU ENCOUNTER WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITH SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSORS OR PROBLEMS?**

One of the major concerns is that of personnel who do not meet security clearance requirements. Since the President has on several occasions boarded "green side" aircraft, we cannot afford any unclearables. A clear policy is required which permits assignment of only cleared personnel, or assignment which does not count against HMX-1 strength.

7. Personnel with Exceptional Family members are also a problem. Given the busy deployment schedules, these individuals cannot be deployed, shifting additional burden onto those who can deploy.

Single parents are also non-deployable, resulting in additional burdens on those who are deployable.

Assignment to HMX-1 in itself is a problem in that it is a "non-deploying" assignment, but the reality is that deployments are the rule. Once their tour is completed, orders to OCONUS assignments are the norm.

7. ARE LOCAL/MCB SUPPORT ACTIVITIES SUFFICIENT? E.G. FINANCIAL, FAMILY SERVICES, STRESS MANAGEMENT CLASSES, ALCOHOL, FAMILY PLANNING, ETC..  
Yes.

8. IS LOSS OF TIME FROM WORK FOR MEDICAL VISITS ACCEPTABLE? DOES MEDICAL TRY TO MINIMIZE THOSE LOSSES?  
Yes.


9. HOW WELL DOES MEDICAL COMMUNICATE BACK TO THE SQUADRON ON THE STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS?  
Very good two way communications exist.

10. HOW WELL ARE FAMILY MEDICAL PROBLEMS ADDRESSED? ARE THEY TIMELY?  
Very well locally, with delays in obtaining appointments at referral centers. Squadron members are particularly pleased that the HMX-1 medical department will also see dependents.

11. HOW WELL DOES MCB BRANCH CLINIC SUPPORT THE SQUADRON?  
Not often required because of organic asset capability, but when required is good. Some additional waiting times are a result.

12. HOW WELL ARE MEDICAL REFERRALS TO OTHER MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES HANDLED?  
Referral to other centers like Bethesda or Walter Reed are difficult because of the distances, waiting times for appointments and loss of time from duties.

I have reviewed the foregoing 2 pages on this the 10<sup>TH</sup> day of OCTOBER, 1996 and it accurately summarizes the information provided by me.

  
J.A. NORTHCOTT JR.

**23 Wing/LG and 2AS/MA  
Interview Summary, 24 Sep 96, Pope AFB, NC  
Col Kenneth D. Pesola  
1Lt Kelly R. Holbert**

**MEMO FOR RECORD**

**BACKGROUND**

The 23rd Logistics Group Commander, 23rd Maintenance Squadron Commander, and representatives from the 2nd Airlift Squadron maintenance supervision were interviewed. These units were selected because they maintain C-130 aircraft which are tasked to fly Phoenix Banner, Silver, and Copper missions. The interviews provided data on the availability of unit produced guidance for aircraft selection and preparation.

**OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS, CHECKLISTS, OR POLICY LETTERS**

Interviewed personnel did possess the regulation dealing with Phoenix Banner, Phoenix Silver, and Phoenix Copper missions.

The logistics group has very little involvement in the process of generating aircraft. Aircraft generation is the direct responsibility of flightline maintenance personnel. These personnel are organizationally aligned under the flying squadrons within the operations group.

Maintenance representatives from the 2nd Airlift Squadron did not have any specific guidance, but did have a VIP checklist used to ensure the aircraft was clean and cosmetically presentable. Unit supervisors are aware of the priority of these missions and ensure the best aircraft is selected for the mission. Additionally, the daily flying schedule identifies which aircraft are tasked with high priority missions. Supervisors review aircraft condition and forms documentation to ensure all necessary inspections and maintenance actions are current.

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DANNY STEELE, Lt Col, USAF

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
The interviewee's statements were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**HQ AMC Interview Summary, 21 Sep 96, Scott AFB, IL**  
**Col Pruismann, HQ AMC/LGA**  
**Col Shefflette, HQ AMC/LGQ**  
**Lt Col Kreycik, HQ AMC/LGF**

**BACKGROUND**

Lt Col Kreycik is the Air Refueling/Support Aircraft Maintenance Deputy Division Chief (LGF), Col Pruismann is the Airlift Aircraft Maintenance Division Chief (LGA), and Col Shefflette is the Maintenance Management and Training Division Chief (LGQ). The interview was conducted in the Maintenance Conference Room with Lt Col Kreycik, Col Pruismann, Col Shefflette, and a number of their personnel who work DV airlift and DV support airlift issues in attendance. This group was interviewed because of their day-to-day management actions performed in support of DV airlift and support aircraft. This is also the group of individuals who coordinate aircraft maintenance policy and procedures pertaining to DV aircraft and their support.

**RESOURCES & FUNDING**

Resources and funding are adequate. There are no areas impacting safety.

**SUPPLY/PARTS**

There are no parts shortages that effect safety. There is a parts shortage on the C-137 due to dwindling approved FAA sources of repair but these again do not effect safety. All parts still require FAA certification prior to installation.

**PERSONNEL**

The 89 AW has no problem recruiting highly qualified personnel, both officer and enlisted, to meet the mission. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) exists between Air Force Personnel Center and the 89th Wing, coordinated with HQ AMC/DP (Personnel Management), which states that the 89th Wing will be manned at 100%. Selected personnel are on a four-year controlled tour with a follow-on one year extension. Additionally, the wing's experience level is elevated by numerous personnel recycling through for second and third assignments

**LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION**

Multi-Command Regulation 55-89 is the command guidance for DV support missions code named Phoenix Banner/Silver/Copper. There is no command guidance specifically for aircraft maintenance in the selection or preparation of aircraft for DV travel or for the travel of their support elements.

**FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT**

There are no known facility or equipment shortfalls that impact safe operations.

## **TRAINING**

HQ AMC provides requested training support. There is currently a command wide training needs assessment underway for all major weapon systems. The 89th Wing is not currently scheduled to participate in the assessment but is being re-evaluated for inclusion.

## **AIRCRAFT GENERATION**

Operations tempo is high. When the C-21 is heavily tasked the contractor provides extended support. For instance the contractor sent personnel TDY, at his expense, to support large gatherings of C-21 aircraft such as when a General Officer conference was being conducted. This makes for a smoother and safer operation as more contractor personnel are available during peak work loads. Requirements remain heavy across the fleet as aircraft modernization needs, aging aircraft requirements and depot maintenance inputs put aircraft into maintenance reducing the number of aircraft available. For this reason, the tasking on the remaining available aircraft is heavier.

## **SAFETY**

Safety is first and foremost in everyone's minds in all activities. At every annual program management review (PMR), the weapon system safety group also meets to discuss any safety concerns. The System Program Director (SPD) also receives all commercial safety information from the FAA and aircraft manufacturers and forwards information to those major air commands where applicable. Safety cross-tells, such as the service difficulty reports (SDRs) are reviewed by HQ AMC for applicability and forwarded to units where applicable. If an item is applicable AMC, the SPD, and the owning organization discuss options and develop a plan of attack to implement recommended actions.

## **BOTTOM LINE**

The 89th has highly trained and qualified personnel maintaining safe reliable aircraft.

//SIGNED//

NANCY A. SHEFFLETTE, Col, USAF  
Chief, Maintenance Management and Trng Div

//SIGNED//

BRUCE F. KREYCIK, Lt Col, USAF  
Acting Chief, Air Ref & Spt Acft MX Div

//SIGNED//

FRANK E. PRUISMANN, Col, USAF  
Chief, Airlift Acft Maintenance Div

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
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**INTERVIEW WITH MGYSGT B. G. RENAUX**  
**"GREEN SIDE" MAINTENANCE**  
**17 SEPT, 1996**

**1. IS AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT TO HMX-1 ADEQUATE?**

Aeromedical support for HMX-1 is as good or better than other Marine Corps squadrons I have seen.

**2. ARE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL A REGULAR PRESENCE IN SQUADRON SPACES?**

Medical is an integral part of the squadron and are frequently visiting squadron spaces to monitor safety, and generally getting to know other squadron members.

**3. DO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL REGULARLY PARTICIPATE IN SAFETY ACTIVITIES? STAND-DOWNS? -TRAINING?**

They get actively involved in training, safety stand-downs, meetings, and whenever medical input is required.

**4. IS MEDICAL READILY ACCESSIBLE FOR CONSULTATION REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS WITH INDIVIDUALS?**

They are readily and quickly accessible either in person or by telephone when assistance is required.

**5. WHAT MECHANISMS DO YOU USE TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE AT RISK FOR SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSES?**

Squadron members are very alert to developing individual problems because of squadron closeness and teamwork. Problems are quickly identified and dealt with before they get beyond control.

**6. WHAT ARE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU ENCOUNTER WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITH SIGNIFICANT LIFE STRESSORS OR PROBLEMS?**

Security screening is a critical factor in selecting new squadron members. If unable to clear, they are of little use to the squadron. Losing commands will sometimes provide a cursory screen and write them off as acceptable, when they are clearly not.

**7. ARE LOCAL/MCB SUPPORT ACTIVITIES SUFFICIENT? E.G. FINANCIAL, FAMILY SERVICES, STRESS MANAGEMENT CLASSES, ALCOHOL, FAMILY PLANNING, ETC..**

Yes.

**8. IS LOSS OF TIME FROM WORK FOR MEDICAL VISITS ACCEPTABLE? DOES MEDICAL TRY TO MINIMIZE THOSE LOSSES?**

Yes.

**9. HOW WELL DOES MEDICAL COMMUNICATE BACK TO THE SQUADRON ON THE STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS?**

In the event that an individual has a medical problem causing much delay in return to his work station, communication of his status back to the work center is very good.

**10. HOW WELL ARE FAMILY MEDICAL PROBLEMS ADDRESSED? ARE THEY TIMELY?**

They are usually handled without problems.

**11. HOW WELL DOES MCB BRANCH CLINIC SUPPORT THE SQUADRON?**

HMX-1

HMX-1 Medical provides most support. There are some delays when members have to go to mainside medical, but service is generally good.

**12. HOW WELL ARE MEDICAL REFERRALS TO OTHER MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES HANDLED?**

Referral to other military medical treatment facilities results in considerable time lost because of travel distances, appointment schedules and waiting times.



## **89 AW Wing Safety Office**

**Interview Summary, 18 Sep 96, Andrews AFB**

**Lt Col Brian W. Sackett, Chief of Safety;**

**Capt William S. McCallie, Flight Safety Officer;**

**Capt Christopher Lambert, Flight Safety Officer; and**

**MSgt Timothy A. McCutcheon, Flight Mechanic/Safety NCO**

### **BACKGROUND**

Lt Col Sackett is the newly appointed Chief of Safety in the 89 Airlift Wing (89 AW). Lt Col Sackett's background is in helicopters, C-141's, and more recently as the Operations Officer of the 457th Airlift Squadron (457 AS), the C-21 unit in the 89 AW. The mission of the safety office is to provide mishap prevention measures through training, crossstell, data collection, and program oversight for safety programs in all operating units in the 89 AW. Each of the aircraft flown by the 89th is represented in the safety office by a school trained Flight Safety Officer or Flight Safety NCO current and qualified in the aircraft they represent. This interview was conducted with the Chief of Safety, two Flight Safety Officers and a Flight Mechanic.

### **SAFETY PROGRAM SUPPORT**

The wing commander lends total support to the safety program at Andrews. The wing commander has a quarterly breakfast meeting with the safety staff to discuss current issues/concerns with the 89th mission, and to listen to concerns the safety office has for continued safe operations. He periodically takes the opportunity to "talk up" safety during commander's calls, base paper, and the quarterly safety meetings attended by all wing fliers. The Vice Commander also has regular contact with the safety staff concerning various issues with regard to the 89th mission. The chief of safety is working with all commanders to develop open lines of communication for safety concerns and has the full support of the chain of command.

### **INFORMATION DISSEMINATION**

The wing safety office sponsors a quarterly safety meeting for all crewmembers to discuss critical safety topics with wing-wide application. The meetings are tailored to the specific mission and the various airframes flown in the wing. Meeting topics range from controlled flight into terrain, Crew Resource Management (CRM), Bird Aircraft Strike Hazards (BASH), and various topics for seasonal flying. This is consistent with every other wing in the command. The greatest challenge is to present a briefing applicable to a wide range of specialties--including inflight stewards, flight mechanics and the flight crews from five different airframes. The safety office also publishes a weekly article in the base newspaper detailing on and off-duty hazards wing personnel may encounter.

### **PRESIDENTIAL PILOTS OFFICE (PPO)**

The crewmembers in the Presidential Pilots Office attend quarterly safety meetings like everyone else. If they are not available during the meeting, a unit safety representative attends and briefs the information to the crews upon their return from a mission. The wing also has a safety officer who is a PPO augmentee--his current duties are chief of standardization and evaluation, but he still acts as the liaison to the PPO. The commercial manufacturer regularly provides critical safety information to the unit concerning the VC-25 (Boeing-747).

### **CAN-DO ATTITUDE**

The wing commander's message to the wing is very clear, "We don't press any limits for anyone, if we can make the President wait for safety we can make anyone wait." This was in reference to the time the president's aircraft was delayed for one-and-a-half hours due to weather minimums being out of limits. There is never a mission so important that safety is intentionally disregarded or compromised in any way.

### **MAJOR SAFETY CONCERNS**

The major focus for the chief of safety is to keep the crews from becoming complacent in their duties. The crewmembers at the 89th are among the most experienced in the Air Force and the wing has the best safety record of any unit in the Air Force. This is not seen as a problem, it's just a major focus for the safety office.

### **INFORMATION DISSEMINATION**

While in the past, exchange of information between C-21 units was extremely poor, the C-21 community now has developed crosstell program involving all C-21 units in the Air Force. Aircrews are very open to the crosstell program as a means of accident prevention. There are several instances where aircrews have come to the safety office to discuss a specific concern. There is an on-going effort to re-design the C-21 flight manual to more closely resemble the Air Force standard. Crews were concerned that the size of a standard tech order is too cumbersome to use in the cramped C-21 cockpit flight, and the basic layout does not represent the commonalties found in the Mil Spec tech orders. The 1995 Operational Support Airlift Across the Board Review identified these problems and provided the impetus for change. This issue was forwarded to HQ AMC and the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The completed mil spec Tech Order will go to print after final coordination between the contractor and the Air Force. Additionally, crosstell messages for each specific weapon system flown by the 89 AW are entered into the Flight Crew Information File (FCIF) for everyone to read. For issues requiring wing attention, the safety office issues a message to all commanders for widest possible dissemination.

### **SQUADRON PROGRAMS**

Each unit has a trained FSO responsible for the squadron safety program, and the wing provides basic oversight of the separate squadron programs. Each of the squadron FSO's conducts minor investigations and uses the wing to validate their mishap reports prior to releasing mishap reports to the other users of the aircraft. They also conduct individual safety meetings in the squadron during training days. Commanders are cognizant of the importance of their safety programs. The bottom line is that the 89th has a well run, proactive safety program involving every member of the Andrews team. The wing commander's safety policy is fairly simple and it sets the tone for all operations.

//SIGNED//

BRIAN W. SACKETT, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief of Safety

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statements were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**Interview with Major Seisel  
HMX-1 Head White House Liaison Officer (WHLO)  
19 September 1996**

**POLICY**

**IS HMX-1 ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED, ORGANIZED, AND MANNED FOR CURRENT OPTEMPO?**

- Yes, but assignment of first tour personnel creates difficulties for both the unit and the assigned Marine. Due to high optempo, less time is available to conduct the regularly scheduled training needed by first tour personnel. Meanwhile, until such training is accomplished and a modicum of experience gained, the first tour Marine has less utility to the unit than more experienced and senior Marines.

**IS SAFETY POLICY PREVALENT?**

- Yes. The CO empowers all crew to eliminate hazards. "Safety" and "security" are words that get things done on the road.

**DOES IT ALLOW MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- Yes.

**WHAT POLICIES DIRECT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS?**

- Safety/Standardization SOP; NATOPS Manuals; Operations Orders; NVD (Anacostia) SOP; White House SOP; WHLO Handbook; CO's Policy Letters.

**IS THERE ANY CONFLICTING GUIDANCE? WHAT?**

- No.

**DO YOU OPERATE ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT WITHIN PRESCRIBED FLIGHT REGIMES (AIRSPEED, RANGE, WEATHER CONDITIONS)?**

- Yes.

**ARE ANY WAIVERS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION?**

- Yes, passenger waivers for the CH-46 (20) and the CH-53 (34) are in effect for the White side mission.

**TASKING**

**HOW DO YOU RECEIVE TASKERS FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULES / MISSIONS?**

- Airlift Operations calls the WHLO who notifies HMX Operations. Hard copy tasking follows later. We currently have an HMX-1 Liaison Officer working in Airlift Operations. This is paying major dividends in regard to improved planning and coordination. ATCO and MCCDC also task missions. ATCO is notified by HMX of MCCDC tasking. Silence is consent. OT&E can also task internally via a written "frag" to squadron operations.

**WHO VALIDATES ABOVE TASKERS (AIRCRAFT MIX, CREW DUTY DAY, SUITABLE FIELDS/ LZS, SERVICING)?**

- The WHLO, Operations, and Maintenance officers collaborate on feasibility of taskings. If questionable, the Operations officer will then make a recommendation to the CO who will make the final decision.

**HOW DO YOU SAY NO? WHO SAYS NO?**

- The CO will make the decision on rejecting a mission after recommendations from his staff.

**HOW ARE CHANGES TO THE MISSION RELAYED BOTH BEFORE AND DURING EXECUTION?**

- Changes are relayed through the WHMO to HMX-1. On the road, the Military Aide will relay changes to the WHLO who then relays to HMX-1. Green side missions are verified through ATCO a week prior to the event

**WHAT TRAINING IS GIVEN TO THOSE WHO SCHEDULE AND EXECUTE THE MISSION? (WHLO/ FLIGHT O) ?**

- WHLOs get three ERS flights / trips, plus three actual lifts. The third ERS flight is a check flight. In addition, before the check flight, a WHLO needs an outside CONUS lift. Traditionally, only officers who are in their second year at HMX are considered for WHLO positions. This experience is critical to the WHLO billet.

**WHAT OUTSIDE AGENCIES DO YOU INTERFACE WITH?**

- We routinely interact with the WHMO, FAA, airport managers and ATC personnel, local police and fire departments, and airport support personnel.

**WHAT POLICIES HINDER YOUR OPERATIONS?**

- None.

**DO YOU FEEL PRESSURED TO GO BEYOND STATED POLICIES?**

- No.

**DO YOU EMPOWER YOUR CREWS?**

- Yes. The CO supports the required "on scene" decisions that WHLOs and aircrews must make in accomplishing the Presidential support mission.

**DO YOU HAVE ANY UNWRITTEN POLICIES / AGREEMENTS ?**

- Yes. Policies such as "no rehearsal, no lift" and the requirement for one year of experience at HMX-1 before consideration for a WHLO billet are both unwritten rules. There are others, I'm sure, but I can't recall them at the moment.

**DO YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED "GO / NO GO" CRITERIA?**

- Yes. Weather "go / no go criteria" dictates that a decision must be made two hours prior to launch time based on the existing weather.

**HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH "GRAY" AREAS NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED BY EXISTENT SOPS?**

- Experience and judgment are exercised to evaluate the situation and make the appropriate decision. If the circumstances exceed the Command Pilot's frame of reference, he has the option to consult with the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer in making a decision.

**WHAT AIDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR MISSION PLANNING, BOTH IN TRANSIT AND ON SITE?**

- In evaluating landing zones, facilities, etc., the WHLO carries a bag with tape and marking material for measuring and marking a landing zone. In addition, cell phones and computers with e-mail capability are part of the WHLO's "pack up". Lessons learned reports from previous lifts to the same area are consulted to identify potential problems.

**HOW DO YOU DO NEAR / MID / LONG TERM PLANNING?**

- Long and mid term planning are very difficult. WHMO operates primarily in the near term. WHLOs often use newspaper and television reports to determine where the President is scheduled to go and then work their WHMO contacts for confirmation.

**HOW STABLE ARE ABOVE PLANS AND DAILY FLIGHT SCHEDULE?**

- See last question. The flight schedule routinely fluctuates, but is manageable without compromising safety.

**HOW DO YOU DETERMINE MISSION CRITERIA?**

- Overall guidelines are provided in the WHLO Handbook. Basically, Airlift Operations determines the number of seats required and from that HMX-1, determines the aircraft mix.

**OPERATIONS TEMPO**

**DOES OPTEMPO AFFECT CREW PERFORMANCE?**

- No.

**WHAT IS YOUR PERCEPTION OF CURRENT OPTEMPO?**

- It is currently very high due to the reelection campaign, but certainly supportable.

**EFFECTS ON TRAINING?**

- I don't think there is any adverse effect on training or mission performance.

**DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL PROCEDURES WHICH REQUIRE WAIVERS TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION? IF SO, WHO APPROVES IN WRITING? WHEN LAST VALIDATED?**

- Yes. Passenger waivers for the CH -46 and 53 were granted by DC/S Air.

## **TRAINING**

### **WHAT SYLLABUS IS USED FOR TRAINING?**

- There is a WHLO syllabus which prescribes the required training.

### **WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF LOSS OF GREEN TOP AIRCRAFT ON TRAINING??**

- The effect on training is not significant; however, an additional aircraft would be useful for lifts.

### **IS ADEQUATE SIMULATOR SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR THE EXECUTIVE SUPPORT MISSION?**

- Yes. The squadron uses simulators at NAS Jacksonville, FL. Crews are sent TAD two days a year for that training.

### **HOW ARE EVALUATORS SELECTED FOR UPGRADE?**

- In terms of WHLOs, any WHLO can certify a new WHLO; however as the department head, I try to do the evaluation whenever possible.

### **DO YOU HAVE DEDICATED FACILITIES FOR CLASSROOM TRAINING?**

- Yes.

### **HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH "WEAK" PILOTS / AIRCREW?**

- This has not been a problem at HMX-1. In the case of a WHLO, the individual would be moved to a less demanding position.

## **ORGANIZATION**

### **WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN SQUADRON ACTIVITIES?**

- Excellent.

### **HOW IS AIRCREW RETENTION?**

- Excellent.

### **HOW DO YOU ASSESS MORALE OF THE ORGANIZATION?**

- Excellent.

### **IS C2 SUFFICIENT TO KEEP YOU IN THE LOOP?**

- Yes.

### **WHAT CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE TO ENHANCE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?**

- An improved manifest system for White side operations would enhance the Presidential support mission. Getting an accurate manifest, quickly, without delaying departure from the zone is always a hassle. This is the result of changes in the passenger list, primarily among the media, which is not relayed until they actually check in aboard the aircraft.

### **ARE FACILITIES ADEQUATE?**

- They are workable, but really need improvement. For example, since flights must frequently divert to Andrews when Quantico is below TACAN minimums, an ILS capability at the airfield would especially enhance operations.

### **EQUIPPED**

#### **WHAT ARE YOUR RESOURCE SHORTFALLS?**

- The capability to download computer files on the road when an unanticipated site to site aircrew move occurs would be a real asset. This would allow access to information such as lessons learned, canned routes, and other Quantico based mission planning tools.

#### **ARE OPERATIONS AFFECTED BY NOT HAVING INTEGRATED GPS AND TCAS II ?**


- Operations could be improved by adding these systems, particularly if used by Nighthawk 3 and 4. These aircraft frequently must land in the zone ahead of Marine One and Nighthawk 2.

### **SAFETY**

#### **IS THERE ANY EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO INCREASE MISSION SAFETY?**

- Yes. GPS, Weather Vision, and TCAS in all Green side aircraft would improve safety. Weather Vision is also needed in VH-3 aircraft

**I HAVE REVIEWED AND CONCUR WITH THE ABOVE INTERVIEW SUMMARY.**

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
**SIGNATURE**



**89 LSS C-21 Quality Assurance Representatives**  
**Interview Summary, 18 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**  
**Maj Robert S. Sherouse, 89 LSS/CC**  
**CMSgt Ronald L. Cunningham, 89 LSS/LGL**  
**SMSGT Ronald Allen, 89 LSS/LGLT**  
**MSgt Lynn J. Elmwood, 89 LSS/C-21 QAR Superintendent**  
**TSgt Warren A. Pegram, 89 LSS/C-21 QAR Production Chief**  
**SSgt Juan Lopez, 89 LSS/QAR**

**BACKGROUND**

All maintenance and supply support for the ten assigned C-21 aircraft are provided through the Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) program. Quality Assurance Representatives (QARs) assigned to the 89 Logistics Group monitor contract compliance and ensure the contractor supports the mission in accordance with the Statements of Work (SOW) contained in the CLS contract. Individuals from the QAR office, the squadron commander, and maintenance superintendent were interviewed to assess the current health of QAR programs and obtain information regarding the quality of aircraft maintenance support provided by Raytheon Corp.

**MANNING**

The QAR office is adequately manned with sufficient numbers of qualified military aircraft maintenance technicians available to assess contractor services.

**TRAINING**

Each QAR is trained on the provisions of the CLS contract and the SOW, surveillance inspection requirements, QAR duties and responsibilities, and C-21 aircraft systems familiarization.

**CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE**

Mission Capability rates for 89 AW C-21 aircraft have been above the minimum contract requirements for six of the last eight months. Compared to the previous contractor, Raytheon seems to have less parts and manning to support the operation. Relationships with the Raytheon site supervisor and mechanics are good, cordial, and professional. A problem with aircraft time accounting was discovered by QAR personnel. This problem was properly documented in accordance with established procedures through the site supervisor, HQ Air Mobility Command, and the C-21 CLS manager at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center. Raytheon has sent an individual from their corporate office to assess the problem and implement corrective action.

//SIGNED//

ROBERT S. SHEROUSE, Maj, USAF  
Commander, 89th Logistics Support Squadron

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
The interviewee's statements were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**89 LSS Logistics Program Management  
Interview Summary, 19 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD  
Maj Robert S. Sherouse, 89 LSS/CC  
CMSgt Ronald L. Cunningham, 89 LSS/LGL  
SMSgt Richard R. Watters, 89 LSS/LGLOM  
MSgt James H. Vehr, 89 LSS/LGLOM**

**BACKGROUND**

Due to the unique type of aircraft assigned to the 89th AW, the Logistics Group (LG) established a Program Management Office to handle the commercial derivative aircraft. This 11 man office is unique in Air Mobility Command (AMC). Each type of aircraft has an associated manager who is responsible for coordinating with HQ AMC and Air Force Material Command (AFMC) depot personnel. This office oversees research, evaluation, preparation, and submission of aircraft modification proposals, material/quality deficiency reports, and technical order improvement reports. They are also the 89 AW focal point for written and oral communications with Air Mobility Command, air logistics centers, and civilian contractors. Managers are essentially aircraft maintenance technicians who perform much like program managers at AMC and AFMC, but operate at unit level.

**AIRCRAFT MODIFICATION AND CONFIGURATION**

Aircraft modification and configuration is a difficult challenge for the 89 LG. The Programs Management Office was designed to help manage and control the various modifications and configuration problems on assigned aircraft. One of the most difficult problems in the 89 Airlift Wing (AW) is that even in a single MDS, each aircraft has unique characteristics; this includes differences in interior accommodations / layout, avionics and communications packages, and even color schemes. Some of these differences were due to the original aircraft acquisition and others were due to modifications for systems enhancements and other directed modifications.

Often, direction to modify and reconfigure specific aircraft demand immediate response. The Programs Management Office works these issues and also coordinates with the supporting Systems Programs Director (SPD) for mandatory aircraft configuration management requirements. The 89 LG developed a local operating instruction to document the proper aircraft modification process to ensure all proper agencies are notified and approvals obtained prior to aircraft modification. This is necessary to maintain the aircraft in accordance with applicable Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness certification requirements.

### **AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL DATA**

One of the other primary and critical tasks of the Programs Management Office is to maintain aircraft technical data. Since most of the assigned aircraft are commercial derivatives, the technical data is not in the normal configuration expected by Air Force maintenance personnel who are accustomed to using military aircraft technical orders. The Programs Management Office coordinates with the primary functional managers within the Systems Program Management (SPD) to ensure the aircraft technical data is current and available. Aircraft maintenance technicians use technical data either directly from the manufacturer or manufacturer technical data reformatted to Air Force technical data standards. Bottom line: commercial derivative aircraft are maintained using technical data developed and updated by the original aircraft or the system manufacturer.

//SIGNED//

ROBERT S. SHEROUSE, Maj, USAF  
Commander, 89th Logistics Support Squadron

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Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

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## **89 LSS Training Management Interview Summary, 23 Sep 96,**

**Andrews AFB, MD**

**Maj Robert S. Sherouse, 89 LSS/CC**

**CMSgt Ronald L. Cunningham, 89 LSS/LGL**

**SMSgt Ronald Allen, 89 LSS/LGLT**

**MSgt Steve R. Herb, 89 LSS/LGLT**

**TSgt Gussie M. Sykes, 89 LSS/LGLT**

### **BACKGROUND**

Air Force directives assign the overall responsibility for all training programs within the maintenance complex to Training Management. Since the 89 Airlift Wing (AW) is assigned commercial derivative aircraft, training Air Force maintenance personnel in the proper maintenance procedures for these aircraft is critical. Most Air Force maintenance personnel have prior experience on military aircraft maintenance procedures, but have not been exposed to the commercial technical data and techniques associated with maintaining commercial derivative aircraft. SMSgt Allen is the newly appointed supervisor and he was interviewed along with TSgt Sykes who has been in the office for a longer period of time.

### **TYPICAL TRAINING PROCESS**

Nearly all the technicians selected for assignment to the 89 AW are experienced. These individuals may have been previously assigned to the 89 AW or worked on other military aircraft assigned to other Air Force units. The Air Force uses a combination of on-the-job (OJT) training and Maintenance Qualification Training Program (MQTP). MQTP classes are taught by a highly experienced maintenance technician and consists of a combination of classroom and hands-on training. Trainees in MQTP are pulled from their primary workcenter and focus all their activities on training and gaining proficiency in the new tasks. After graduating from MQTP, the technician is certified and evaluated by his workcenter supervisor prior to actually performing maintenance on aircraft. If additional training is required, but not covered by the MQTP, the supervisor assigns another qualified technician to conduct the training through OJT.

### **COMMERCIAL TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES**

The 89 AW has been able to adequately train its personnel through OJT and MQTP. Use of commercial training was limited due to lack of funds. The unit is currently coordinating with Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center and contractor technical representatives to identify and schedule commercial training opportunities. This training will enhance the technical competency of the already highly qualified aircraft maintenance technicians.

**SUPERVISORY OVERSIGHT**

Logistics group managers and supervisors are keenly aware of the need for a comprehensive training program. The 89 Logistics Group (LG) Commander and his subordinate squadron commanders are briefed by the 89 LG Training Management or the squadron training managers on the current training status.

//SIGNED//

ROBERT S. SHEROUSE, Maj, USAF  
Commander, 89th Logistics Support Squadron

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Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

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## SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Mister Lee Shifflet, VH Program Manager, Sikorsky Aircraft Company

Conducted by Colonel Robert Leavitt, USMC, on 25 September 1996.

### Mission/Mission Support Aircraft:

- The current SPAR contract calls for 6.5 months for SPAR and an additional month for correction of over and above workload.
- VH-3D SPAR is scheduled for 17,500 manhours
- VH-60N SPAR is scheduled for 16,500 hours
- Average in process time for VH-3D SPAR over the last 10 years has been 7.7 months
- Average in process time for VH-60N SPAR has been 7.4 months and 2.5 months for MTR.
- Normally anticipate between 4 and 6 VH aircraft in for SPAR or Mid Term Refurbishment
- The PMA is currently in negotiations with Sikorsky on the procurement for CNSU/SLEP and CNSU/MUG kits
- CNSU/SLEP will add an additional 13,500 manhours of work and extend in process time to 9 months
- CNSU/MUG will add an additional 11,500 manhours of work and extend in process time to 9 months.
- Increased utilization rates coupled with projected out of service times to incorporate CNSU/SLEP or CNSU/MUG will drive increasing numbers of aircraft into SPAR.
- Sikorsky is in the middle of a process improvement effort to see how the current maintenance hangar facility can be made to accommodate 8 aircraft.
- Aircraft painting is most difficult task in SPAR. Aircraft 352 has taken in excess of 5 1/2 weeks to paint. Reason is the use of EPA directed high solids paint.
- A schedule for incorporation of CNSU/SLEP and CNSU/MUG kits has been developed. Schedule will put up to 8 VH aircraft in work.

### Logistics Elements:

#### Supply

- Added an additional parts warehouse to accommodate VH-60N bonded parts
- Current issue rate at Quantico is close to 100%
- Range and Depth of bonded storerooms is near 98% collectively.

**Office of the Secretary of Defense, Legislative Affairs  
Telephone Interview, 20 Sep 96**

**MEMO FOR RECORD**

Mr. Shockley described the process used to validate Congressional requests for use of DoD Aircraft. He said request are processed in accordance with DODD 4515.12, Department of Defense Support for Travel of Members and Employees of the Congress. For CONUS Originating Missions, after validation, he passes the requests to AF/CVAM who sources an aircraft. He said that in recent years congressional travel has been substantially reduced and that therefore OSD/LA requests can normally be fulfilled by the 89th AW. However, on those infrequent occasions when no 89th asset is available, CVAM will request, through the TACC, other aircraft such as the DC ANG C-22 (Boeing 727).

For overseas missions, 89th aircraft may be used or if not appropriate or available, other resources are requested. On occasion, a CINC support (C-137/135) may be used or perhaps the USAFE T-43 (Boeing 737, recently destroyed--being replaced with a C-9). When an OCONUS aircraft is used, tasking goes directly from OSD/LA to the overseas command.

//SIGNED//

WALTER S. HOGLE, Jr., Maj Gen, USAF  
Executive Travel Review Board

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
Executive Support Air Fleet Review, provides instructions for handling.

## Communications Department

Interview with: Maj B.W. Smith      Communications Officer

**1. What training does your department receive to be able to perform its "airborne" mission?**

Enlisted Communication System Operators (CSO) are screened for medical and swimming qualifications to meet aviation standards before they are considered for assignment. They then attend the Naval Air Crew Candidate School at Pensacola. Upon arrival at HMX-1, trainees receive aircraft systems training taught by contractors and enter a fifty hour flight syllabus conducted under the CSO Naval Aviation Training and Operating Standards manual requirements. This is augmented by a CSO Trainer, a computer based training device available in the squadron. To meet specific mission training requirements, all CSOs go through "saturation" at the Anacostia facility.

In addition to mission specific training, all CSOs are qualified on aircraft ground support equipment, augment Greenside aircrews as aerial observers, and receive fleet aircraft training as result.

**2. How well does the communication monitor support personnel selection and assignment to HMX-1?**

Support from the monitor and Headquarters, Enlisted Assignments has been excellent. The monitor has been very proactive, to include assisting with securing re-enlistment quotas for personnel we want to retain.

**3. What part does your department play in screening communication personnel?**

We make routine visits to the comm school and fleet units to pre-screen personnel. With monitor assistance, our recruiting efforts have been very successful, and we are able to quickly swap our personnel with clearance problems.



**CAPTAIN RICHARD SMITH USN**  
**JOSAC TRANSCOM**

Telephone Interview Date: 1 October 1996

The Army, Navy, and Air Force OSA generally carry Service flag and general officers, and respond to CODEL request from their respective offices of Legislative Affairs. Each service has about five dedicated aircraft for Service secretaries, Service chiefs, and deputy chiefs. These airplanes are not tasked through CVAM and particularly do not respond to DV Code 2 or DV Code 1 VIPs, which are carried by the 89th Airlift Wing and HMX-1.

Occasionally, the dedicated Service VIP airplanes can respond to a need by 89 AW for CODEL, support, but have not carried DV Code 2 or DV Code 1.

## **305 AMW/CV, 514 AMW/CV**

### **Interview Summary, 24 Sep 96, McGuire AFB, NJ**

**Col Philip W. Spiker, Col Alfred E. Cronk**

#### **BACKGROUND**

McGuire AFB, NJ is home to the 305th Air Mobility Wing (active duty) and the 514th Air Mobility Wing (reserve). The wings support AMC's Global Reach Mission by providing strategic

airlift and aerial refueling forces. The units fly C-141 Starlifters and dual-role KC-10 Extenders. Col Philip Spiker is the 305 AMW Vice Commander. Col Alfred Cronk is the 514 AMW Vice Commander. Vice Commanders are responsible for assisting their respective commanders in all aspects of organizing, training, and equipping the forces assigned to their wing and exercising operational control of those forces.

#### **SILVER BULLET**

The Joint Task Force Command and Control Module (JTFCCM) is a converted Airstream trailer designed for use on C-141 and KC-10 aircraft (recently used on C-17s). The trailer is palletized in three 12-foot sections. The module contains a communications suite and DV amenities including lavatory with shower, TV/Stereo, and kitchenette. The unit is commonly known as the Silver Bullet.

#### **SAFETY**

The wings' senior leadership has increased safety emphasis as McGuire AFB continues to develop the KC-10/Silver Bullet mission. While they have visibility over all DV and DV support missions, the command section's extra oversight has included personally reviewing aircraft and crew selection for the DV Bullet missions. As an added safety measure, a field grade officer accompanies crews as a mission commander on all DV missions. This allows the aircraft commander and crew to concentrate on flying duties while the mission commander provides a customer/crew interface to coordinate items such as itinerary changes.

#### **DV MISSION PROCEDURES**

Published guidance governing "special mission" procedures includes MCR 55-89, Banner mission briefing guide, and a wing policy letter. MCR 55-89 provides guidance concerning Banner/Silver/Copper missions including the requirement for "highly qualified" crewmembers. The briefing guide is a crew checklist for Banner-type missions while the wing letter provides alert aircraft and crew guidance. Presently, there is no guidance for Silver Bullet missions. However, the wings' commanders have asked squadron commanders or their operations officers to personally brief crews scheduled to fly Banner or DV/Silver Bullet missions. The wing policy letter provides guidance concerning alert aircraft and crew complement. Although the usual mission length drives taskings to the 305 AMW, reserve crewmembers do interfly with active-duty

crews on the KC-10/Silver Bullet missions. The opportunity to select the "best" crew for a mission increases with more advance notice of missions. Squadron commanders and operations officers know who their "high caliber" individuals are and they 're expected to use them on 1A1 missions. However, there is no guidance directing specific experience levels for particular missions.

### **TRAINING**

The wings are not experiencing any problems retaining quality C-141 pilots. As expected, the reserve experience level is substantially higher than their active duty counterparts. Additionally, almost all the reserve KC-10 pilots arrive with KC-10 or other wide-body aircraft experience. Although Silver Bullet and Banner missions don't require specific training or certification, "first-time" crewmembers are matched with counterparts experienced in those missions.

### **PNAF/DV COMPARISON**

While DV airlift and PNAF (Primary Nuclear Airlift Force) missions seem comparable, PNAF aircrew and aircraft requirements are much more extensive and specific.

### **AIRLINE COMPARISONS**

Reserve crewmembers flying with commercial airlines have not really voiced opinions on equipment differences between commercial and military aircraft. However, a hot topic is differences in procedures and support equipment. The weather last winter (first "real" winter with KC-10s on the ramp) highlighted substantial deficiencies with military deicing equipment and procedures. McGuire AFB has a team led by an airline reservist discussing differences in fluid types and equipment. Newer deicing trucks capable of using both Type 1 and 2 deicing fluid would significantly increase operations efficiency in winter months. AMC is presently assisting with the necessary equipment upgrades.

//SIGNED//

PHILIP W. SPIKER Col, USAF  
305th Air Mobility Wing Vice Commander

//SIGNED//

ALFRED E. CRONK, Col, USAF  
514th Air Mobility Wing Vice Commander

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**S-1 (Admin/Personnel) Office**

**Interview with:**      Maj D.T. Spurrier                      S-1 Officer

**1. Do you have personnel assigned for reasons other than primary duty with HMX-1 (for instance, personnel assigned to the squadron for access to D.C. area medical facilities)?**

Some Marines are assigned to the squadron for such reasons. For instance, there are currently thirteen Marines who are enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member program. Support for this program has not adversely impacted our ability to do our mission. In other cases an individual's status may change while in the squadron or the circumstances that caused transfer from fleet units may limit a Marine's ability to deploy since they may be recalled at any time due to personal or family emergencies. This situation is difficult for the Marine who wants to fully contribute to the squadron's mission but feels less than 100% effective. The squadron must create "workarounds" in billet assignments and, ultimately, has less personnel to man detachments.

**2. How many Marines were not screened in the field before receiving orders to HMX-1?**

Our statistics show that in CY95 inbound orders were canceled on twenty-three (23) individuals due to unsuitability for duty with the squadron, and, at this point in CY96, orders on sixteen (16) inbound orders have been canceled. Total personnel rejected after receipt of orders has dropped significantly due to an aggressive screening program.

As to the success of field screening, the only statistics available are a Security Administration estimate of about 10% of arriving Marines either not screened or poorly screened by the parent unit before transfer. During CY95 and CY96 respectively, twenty-nine (29) and seventeen (17) individuals were transferred out of the squadron early, but this was for a variety of reasons, not necessarily due to clearances alone.

For assigned Marines who are unclearable or whose clearance has been revoked, transfers out of the squadron are handled on a case-by-case basis and take time to accomplish. This impacts squadron manning by reducing the personnel base for assignment to Presidential support and causes "bottlenecks" of uncleared Marines in primarily the Greenside maintenance department. When Marines are prematurely transferred, long gaps occur in manning while the assignment process generates replacements for the unplanned losses.

Some "unclearable" Marines are retained as circumstances permit, but there can be an element of risk associated with such practices if these individuals have had personal problems and become involved in incidents that receive publicity.

**3. Does the current assignment process meet your needs? Does it support your training and mission requirements?**

The roster of inbound personnel is very unstable and does not allow the squadron to accurately project fills for specific billets. Aborted assignments result in delays while the monitors regroup, and this often requires extensions of tours for on-hand personnel so that critical billets are not vacated. As Marines are extended, a "bow wave" of personnel with mature assignment dates is created in the Whiteside maintenance department which in turn increases the demand on the Greenside for replacements.

**4. How much do individuals generally deploy during the year?**

Since there is no Accumulated Deployment Time credit for a tour at HMX-1, this data is not officially tracked for individuals. The deployment record for this year is a good indication of operational tempo and each of these deployments requires a minimum of 20 to 25 enlisted Marines. The S-1 officer counted 121 days of Temporary Additional Duty from claim records for his first year in the squadron and stated that this is not an unusual amount of deployed time.

**5. What would you change in your current T/O?**

More experienced mechanics are needed for maintenance efficiency. When inexperienced Marines without their full qualifications are assigned, their flexibility and utility are very poor. Putting more senior mechanic billets on the T/O would encourage acquisition of NCOs who have the experience to be useful upon arrival at the squadron.

If the Marine Corps Air Facility security mission is picked up by HMX-1, an increase in the Security T/O will be necessary.

**6. Have you looked at assignment/screening policies of other organizations such as 8th & I, Camp David, or the Marine Security Guard program?**

The assignment policies of other organizations has been reviewed with the realization that Yankee White clearance is the priority at HMX-1. The psychological screening used for Marine Security Guard assignments is being reviewed for application in HMX-1.

MCO 1326.7C is very specific as to assignment policy, but getting everyone involved in the assignment process to comply is very difficult.

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**1 HS/MA Interview Summary, 27 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**  
**Capt Tuan V. Tran, 1 HS/MA**  
**CMSgt Shelton G. Lacy, 1 HS/MA**

**BACKGROUND**

Capt Tran is the Chief of Maintenance for the 1st Helicopter Squadron (1 HS). His immediate supervisor is the commander of the 1 HS. The 1 HS is organizationally aligned under the 89th Airlift Wing. He is directly responsible for all helicopter maintenance activities. The unit maintains alert commitments and provides support of DV airlift missions in the Andrews AFB area. The unit recently celebrated an unprecedented milestone in helicopter safety, surpassing 38 years and 175,000 hours of accident-free flying. Additionally, Headquarters Air Mobility Command selected the 1 HS maintenance as the best rotary wing aircraft maintenance in 1995.

**RESOURCES/FUNDING**

Maintenance personnel are responsible for the inspection and repair of 21 assigned Bell UH-1N "Huey" helicopters. There are no significant funding shortfalls impacting maintenance support.

**SUPPLY/PARTS**

Parts support for assigned aircraft is acceptable. The percent of possessed aircraft not capable of performing its mission for lack of spare parts was 8.8 percent in FY95. Standards established by Headquarters Air Mobility Command is 7.0 percent. There are sufficient aircraft available to fly tasked missions. The unit receives outstanding support from depot managers at Warner Robins Air Logistics Center and San Antonio Air Logistics Center.

**MANNING**

Maintenance manning is healthy. Currently, the unit has 108 people assigned against 111 authorizations. Authorized manning was validated by a manning standards study in 1993. Personnel are selectively manned and individuals who desire assignment to the 1 HS must submit a special duty application. This application is reviewed by supervisors to ensure the individual has the demonstrated technical skills, professionalism, and motivation. Brand new mechanics and first term airman are not assigned to the unit.

**LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION**

Effective supervision is available on all shifts. The unit maintains 24 hour coverage during the week and standby coverage on weekends. The minimum rank of the on-duty supervisor is a SMSgt.

**FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT**

Maintenance personnel are co-located in same facility along with aircrew personnel. Assigned work and office areas are adequate for assigned mission.

**TRAINING**

The unit training is effective and comprehensive. Training includes a comprehensive on-the-job (OJT) and Maintenance Qualification Training Program (MQTP) program. Supervisors selected one of the best qualified mechanics as an MQTP instructor. MQTP classes are taught by a highly



experienced maintenance technician and consists of a combination of classroom and hands-on training.

Although there is a 25 percent turnover of personnel each year, availability of qualified mechanics is not a problem. Helicopter crew chiefs have their own unique specialty code. Consequently, newly assigned crew chiefs are experienced helicopter mechanics. This is not always true for avionics and engine specialists. These specialists are experienced within their specialty, but need familiarization and upgrade training. This training is obtained through OJT and MQTP.

### **AIRCRAFT GENERATION**

Aircraft mission requirements are coordinated with operations personnel on a weekly basis. The unit normally launches nine aircraft each day and each aircraft flies two missions. Selected aircraft are inspected, maintained, and prepared according to Air Force technical data requirements.

Maintenance supervisors select the most reliable aircraft for DV missions. This selection process includes a detailed review of discrepancies to ensure the aircraft does not have a history of repeat and recurring discrepancies. They also ensure the aircraft is thoroughly clean inside and outside.

The squadron maintains a comprehensive Process Improvement Program (PIP). This program mirrors the Logistics Group PIP. The unit uses the program to assess the quality of maintenance. The PIP is process oriented and requires numerous assessments of on-going tasks and completed inspection and repair tasks.

### **SAFETY**

The unit's outstanding record of 38 years and 175,000 hours of accident-free flying is indicative of a comprehensive safety program. Additionally, there have not been any on-duty related ground mishaps in FY96.

### **OUTSIDE AGENCIES**

The unit maintains on-going coordination and crosstell program with other helicopter units and the supporting depot. Although not directly responsible to the 89 LG, the 1 HS maintenance complex maintains a continuing dialogue with the 89 LG.

//SIGNED//

TUAN V. TRAN, Capt, USAF  
Chief of Maintenance

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statements were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support Air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

# **Tanker Airlift Control Center**

## **Interview Summary, 21 Sep 96, Scott AFB, IL**

### **Maj Gen Gary A. Voellger, Brig Gen William Welser III**

#### **BACKGROUND**

Scott AFB IL is home to Headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC), the air component of US Transportation Command. As AMC Director of Operations, Maj Gen Voellger is responsible for command policy that governs and operational plans that employ, DoD air refueling and military/civil airlift systems. Additionally, through the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), a DRU to the Directorate of Operations, he maintains oversight of missions employing these assets. As the TACC commander, Brig Gen Welser commands the single-management center for integrating AMC forces to execute Global Reach missions supporting NCA and other government agency requirements.

#### **DV 1/2 and BANNER TASKING**

CVAM forwards requirements to TACC for DV 1 & 2 airlift that cannot be accommodated on available 89 AW VIP SAM. TACC/XOF, USTRANSCOM (JOSAC) effective 1 Oct 96, processes requirements for Operational Support Airlift (OSA), while TACC/XOO handles requirements for strategic aircraft. CVAM must approve all DV party itinerary changes. Banner requirements on the other hand, originate with the White House Military Office (WHMO) Airlift Operations. Airlift Operations schedules and directs changes to these missions. In both cases, TACC tasks the appropriate units and maintains operational control of mission aircraft. Aircraft requirement is based on load volume and weight. NOTE: On 1 Oct 96, the Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) assumed all TACC functions except for those retained by DOT as lead command responsibilities. JOSAC will schedule Air Force and Marine Corps assets starting 1 Oct, incorporate NAVY OSA on 1 Dec, and add Army assets on 1 Feb 97.

#### **GROUP TRAVEL SUPPORT**

When 89 AW aircraft are not available for DV 2/Group travel, CVAM will determine availability and coordinate the use of "CINC" aircraft and other similar assets. The various "CINC Aircraft" are usually not available for group travel missions; however, the Air National Guard possesses several suitable aircraft. The 201st Airlift Squadron (DC ANG) has three C-22s (B-727s) at Andrews. Under an existing MOA, 70 percent of the flying hours are used for Air Force group travel requirements. If unsuccessful, CVAM will pass specific mission requirements (i.e. aircraft type, passengers, itinerary, etc.) to TACC. TACC/XOO manages taskings requiring the Joint Task Force Command and Control Module or "SILVER Bullet" on C-141, C-17, or KC-10 aircraft. On 1 Oct 96, the Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) will stand up at USTRANSCOM and assume TACC/XOF responsibilities. JOSAC is the multi-service scheduling agency for all CONUS OSA missions.

### **SAAM PLANNING**

TACC plans many operational AMC strategic airlift missions (channel, exercise, contingency). The exceptions are 89AW and normally all SAAMs which include the BANNER missions. In the case of these exceptions, the executing wing plans the missions. AMC/XPM is conducting manpower studies to determine the number of SAAM planners required to centralize the SAAM planning function within TACC. (NOTE: A BANNER cell has been temporarily established to plan missions for strategic assets prepositioned to Andrews during the election year to handle the extra work load.)

### **SILVER BULLET OPERATIONS**

Customers usually request specific aircraft types such as the KC-10, C-17, or C-141. CVAM passes the requirement to TACC/XOOM, they in-turn task the appropriate unit. Depending on mission priority and visibility, TACC may also task the unit for a spare aircraft or even a spare crew. Wings usually schedule augmented crews on SILVER Bullet missions. The extra crewmembers extend the crew's maximum duty day from 16 hours to 24 hours. Crews fly to McGuire AFB NJ to onload the SILVER Bullet and then "preposition" to the customer's onload location (usually Andrews AFB) to enter crew rest. This allows crews to provide the customer a full crew duty day. AMC does not task specific crew qualifications.

### **BANNER MISSION SUPPORT**

BANNER, SILVER, and COPPER missions provide airlift for personnel and equipment supporting the President, Vice President, First Lady, and US Secret Service (non-Presidential or Vice Presidential) respectively. For purposes of this interview, "BANNER mission" includes all three. The White House Military Office (WHMO) Airlift Operations section passes BANNER requirements directly to TACC/XOOM. Airlift Operations provides load data and aircraft preference and lets TACC determine the aircraft type for the mission. No AMC policy dictates specific crew qualifications or experience for BANNER missions. All AMC mission qualified crews are capable of executing BANNER missions; however, the requirement is that the wing will, IAW MCR 55-89, provide a "highly qualified" crew. Furthermore, it is expected that the wing will expend extra effort to ensure the highest maintenance standards are met for the aircraft assigned to these missions. BANNER and SILVER missions carry the highest possible priority, 1A1. TACC will request Air National Guard and unit-equipped AF Reserve support for BANNER missions. However, the stability required in Guard and Reserve crew schedules is usually not compatible with BANNER missions. TACC coordinates BANNER mission taskings for C-130s with ACC, and ACC selects the appropriate wing. TACC maintains Operational Control (OPCON) for all BANNER missions. The TACC Senior (USAF Colonel) and C2 Controllers flight-follow and provide direct command and control oversight to BANNER missions. TACC tasks alert aircraft and crews to backup BANNER missions in accordance with the Multi Command Regulation 55-89.

**MISSION CHANGES**

In September 1996, there were 157 BANNER/SILVER missions with over 280 changes. WHMO understands the turbulence changes cause in the airlift system. However the nature of the customers' requirements make short-notice changes unavoidable.

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GARY A. VOELLGER, Maj Gen, USAF  
Air Mobility Command  
Director of Operations

//SIGNED//

WILLIAM WELSER III, Brig Gen, USAF  
Air Mobility Command  
Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statements were provided voluntarily, and were not sworn.  
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**Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC)  
Interview Summary, 23 Sep 96, Scott AFB, IL  
Maj Gen Voellger, Brig Gen Welser**

**SCHEDULING PROCESS**

All requirements for VIP priority codes 1 & 2 airlift comes to the TACC current operations division from the Special Missions Office, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff (CVAM). The VIP may request a certain type of aircraft (C-17/KC-10 with VIP configuration). The same scheduling and tasking process is used for the Presidential and Vice Presidential support missions (Phoenix Banner/Silver/Copper). Missions transporting the VIP are CVAM directed, and VIP support cargo missions are scheduled/directed by the White House Military Office (WHMO). The aircraft requirement is based on the planned cargo load. WHMO stated a preference to give the load to TACC and let TACC decide the aircraft required. A lack of loadmasters planners in the TACC makes this a challenge. A manpower study is underway to determine how many load planners are in AMC wings, and how many planners are required to centralize SAAM planning within the TACC. Extensive scheduling discussions are taking place between the TACC and WHMO.

**TACC TASKING OSA VIP MISSIONS**

For VIP OSA missions, TACC/XOF is the tasking and flight following agency until 1 Oct. 96, when Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) will stand-up at USTRANSCOM and assume these responsibilities. CVAM will schedule and manage their silver bullet missions. TACC receives a fax copy of 89th SAM missions and these are passed to AMC/CC & CV as information only. CVAM is the manager for the 89th missions.

**VIP CODE 2 SUPPORT ON C-21 AIRCRAFT**

The scheduling timeframe for VIP code 2 support can range widely from weeks in advance down to an immediate launch from a C-21 sitting alert. Depending on the nature of the mission, the TACC will infrequently schedule a back-up aircraft to the primary mission aircraft. VIP 2 support missions require no unusual crew qualifications. There are usually 3 alert C-21 aircraft operating continuously in the airlift system to support the alert launch requirements.

**MISSION SCHEDULING CHANGES**

In September 1996, there are 154 Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM) on the TACC books. Currently there are over 200 changes to these missions. Numerous short-notice changes to mission loads and itineraries the nature of the business.

**GROUP TRAVEL SUPPORT**

Group travel is handled through AF/XOF in the TACC (C-21,C-22, Navy C-9, Marine C-130s) and CVAM (C-17/KC-10 with VIP configuration). On 1 Oct 96 the Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) will stand-up at USTRANSCOM. The support for team travel will be

handled through JOSAC. There are three C-22s (B-727) available at the 201st Airlift Squadron, DCANG, Andrews AFB. Usually, only one is available for airlift support. The T-43 aircraft of the Colorado Air National Guard are also used for team travel. Commander-In-Chief (CINC) aircraft are usually operationally constrained. Scheduling is accomplished through the appropriate CINC staff and availability may be marginal.

### **SILVER BULLET OPERATIONS**

The aircraft with a VIP configuration kit (Silver Bullet) usually require augmented crews, dependent on the mission scenario, and may include a mission commander. Once the Silver Bullet mission is airborne, the on-board mission commander is in contact with the TACC to work on any problems, get diplomatic clearances, etc. The advanced communications capabilities of the Silver Bullet aid both the VIP and the mission commander.

### **BANNER MISSION SUPPORT**

Specific crew qualifications (instructor or evaluator crew members required) and experience levels (flying hour minimums) are no longer directed in the Air Force regulations. A qualified crew has already met a stringent series of mission qualification training and evaluation rides. Normally, the wing CC/CV would brief the crew, have a special trip kit built, and emphasize the importance of safe and effective operations. The TACC expects the wings to handle predeparture crew selection and mission preparation. If there is a significant change to the mission, the senior controller on duty will personally manage the operation.

GARY A. VOELLGER, Maj Gen, USAF  
Director of Operations

WILLIAM W. WELSER, Brig Gen, USAF  
Commander, TACC

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## **89 AW/CC Interview Summary, 17 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD Brig Gen Charles J. Wax**

### **SAFETY**

As the closest Air Force base to our nation's capital, Andrews AFB is unique in its mission of VIP travel support and "showcase" status. The base often supports VIP and media visits for those seeking a view of USAF facilities and operations. The base also supports a greater variety of aircraft owned by more different agencies than any other base. In spite of the challenges, safety is always first. The commander communicates his safety philosophy and policy through quarterly safety meetings, the base paper, commander's calls, and action. Best example; AF-1 was held for take-off for over one hour and forty minutes until RCR (Runway Condition Reading) and crosswind component met safety standards. "We will not fly an unsafe airplane and not take a safe airplane into unsafe conditions." The commander's main safety concern is fleet aging, specifically C-137 corrosion.

### **MATCHING CREWS & MISSIONS**

Less experience in the C-21 force compared to other 89 AW aircraft is not a major factor concerning VIP travel. The crews are more than qualified to handle the CONUS missions with relatively simple divert possibilities. One option to increase aircraft availability to senior DVs and improve crew standardization is to consolidate all larger USAF aircraft configured for VIPs under the 89 AW. Senior VIPs "requesting" specific aircraft (tail #s) causes mission inefficiencies. Large aircraft are often mismatched to missions with small parties and short distances because of DV preference for particular interior configuration.

### **PERSONNEL**

The 89 AW has no problem recruiting highly qualified personnel, both officer and enlisted, to meet the mission. For example, the present commander has not waived the minimum flight crew standards to interview for C-9, C-20, or C-137 positions (i.e., 2000 flying hours minimum, 2500hrs desired). MPC assigns personnel to the wing on four-year controlled tours. Additionally, the wing's experience level is elevated by numerous personnel recycling through for second and third assignments. Wing promotion rates, except PPO are excellent. The commander expressed concern over increased commercial air carrier hiring. The wing's unique mission, requiring pilots highly qualified in large commercial aircraft, makes this significant.

### **C<sup>3</sup>I**

The wing incorporates the best combination of command, control, communication and intelligence into its mission. Real-time communication with crews world-wide is possible through Special Air Missions Communications and Presidential Communications. Mission planners and crews have access to intelligence information from local agencies such as DIA and US Secret Service in addition to the standard USAF wing information. The wing commander stated he has OPCON of the forces assigned to his wing regardless of their location. Crews

notify the wing of itinerary changes as soon as possible through 89 OG/DOO (Current Operations) who in-turn advises HQ USAF/CVAM. While CVAM must approve all itinerary/schedule changes, authority for waivers to USAF Regulations or written guidance is within USAF command channels.

### **TRAINING & STANDARDS**

Blue and white wing aircraft are tasked by CVAM, often by tail number and often to maximum availability. If an aircraft is FMC or PMC, a mission will be tasked regardless of the impact on other requirements, e.g. flying and maintenance training, or unscheduled but not urgent aircraft maintenance. This has not been a major problem in the past, and training is accomplished by turning uncommitted aircraft to the maximum extent possible. Presently, aircraft availability is causing a C-20 upgrade backlog. The unit has eleven Instructor Pilots although they're authorized 24. Unlike most Air Force wings which have large numbers of one or two types of aircraft and associated crews, the 89 AW has small numbers of eight different types of aircraft/aircrews. Small numbers of each type of crew tend to create compartmentalized "in-house" groups. The wing takes several steps to integrate the small crew groups and avoid the "flying club" perception. Most notable are the unusually tight supervision and a rigorous wing stan/eval program. For example, any subarea, not just critical subareas, graded "unsatisfactory" during a composite (basic proficiency) evaluation make the overall evaluation Q3 (unsatisfactory). This means that the crewmember must receive additional training and be re-evaluated before flying operational missions. Additionally, select crew members maintain dual qualification. This allows more efficient use of crewmembers and helps integrate the different crew groups.

### **Ops & TDY Tempo**

Operations and maintenance personnel TDY rates are not significantly high. However, unusually high commitments are beginning to impact the security police unit.

### **Presidential Pilot's Office (PPO)**

The PPO operates significantly outside the normal wing organization. For example, PPO is not under the wing commander's direct supervision, he does not rate the senior officers, and PPO doesn't fall under the wing safety program. Recommended realignment includes converting the PPO to a group under the 89 AW/CC with two squadrons. The operations squadron would contain two flights (VC-25 and C-20) and the support squadron three flights; maintenance, communications, and security. This realignment would bring PPO within the normal USAF chain of command with appropriate authority, responsibility, and supervision at each level and would also place command responsibility within the PPO organization. Additionally, the reorganization would enhance career progression for personnel within the Presidential Airlift mission. The wing would selectively fill PPO group billets from applicants already highly qualified in their field for initial tours. After serving extended initial tours, personnel would fill career broadening assignments essential to promotion in today's Air Force. The second or third assignment to PPO would be in the group's command/supervisory positions. The more consistent career progression should also provide more consistent experience progression which



will improve the unit's long-range mission continuity. Experience levels will not build to peaks then drop as personnel retire.

**FUNDING**

The wing's O&M budget is rather tight considering the unusually high number of high-visibility DVs, both civilian and military, and media visits, the wing must host.

**BOTTOM LINE**

"Due to their location and unique mission, the 89 AW is under a microscope everyday and the people know it. Senior US DVs or foreign dignitaries can show up on the ramp at a moments notice and the wing's people are ready."

//SIGNED//

CHARLES J. WAX, Brig Gen, USAF  
89th Airlift Wing Commander

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
*Executive Support air Fleet Review*, provides instructions for handling.

**23 WG, Operations Group Staff  
Interview Summary, 23 Sep 96, Pope AFB, NC  
Col Bobby Wilkes, 23 OG/CC**

**BACKGROUND**

The 23rd Wing, Pope AFB, NC, is one of four active duty wings that operate the C-130. 23rd Wing is responsible for training, organizing and equipping units to support the needs of the operational Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). The 23rd Operations Group handles the day to day mission execution for the wing. The group interviewed included experts in training, standardization/evaluation, and airlift operations. It also included the chief representatives of each crew position and safety personnel. In the context of our review, 23rd Wing is the force provider for C-130s that fly the Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) supporting Presidential and Vice-Presidential travel (i.e. Phoenix Banner/Silver/Copper). They are the primary carrier of the Secret Service and communication equipment.

**PERSONNEL/MANNING**

There are no special hiring requirements for C-130 crew members to be assigned to 23d Wing. When executing the SAAM mission the wing follows the guidance found in Multi-Command Regulation 55-89, the Air Force basic policy for providing airlift in support of the President of the United States, Vice-President and United States Secret Service. This guidance does not specify a minimum experience level for SAAM missions, therefore any qualified crew member is able to fly the SAAM mission. Although the overall manning in the aircraft is high, the Group Commander characterized his C-130 crew members as young. Many of the wing's pilots were first assignment instructors at Undergraduate Flying Training, thus they have high flying time totals, but low C-130 flying time. 23rd Wing's next higher headquarters, Headquarters Air Combat Command, has directed the SAAM mission be designated a "Special Interest Item." This means that commanders should treat these missions at a level above "normal." Training, crew qualifications, mission accomplishment and other mission related areas receive added emphasis. Squadron schedulers assign crew members to the missions with oversight from squadron commanders and operations officers. Although not required specifically by SAAM mission regulations, there are restrictions on certain airfields and operations published in Air Mobility Command's Summary of Airfield Restrictions, the Wing ensures these restrictions are met. The Operations Group staff has turned down missions due to non-availability of qualified crews.

**OPS TEMPO AND TASKING**

The Operations Group staff all concurred the Ops Tempo of the SAAM mission is a not a problem. However, considering the total mission requirements to train and support worldwide contingencies, they have an impact. Mission taskings arrive short notice (between 24-72 hours before mission launch) and are highly susceptible to itinerary changes. This impacts the unit's ability to fill the rest of their flying schedule because these missions have a high priority. Since AF guidance demands the proper pre-mission crew rest, qualified crewmembers are taken from

their scheduled tasks to fill these short notice taskings. This means the unit loses valuable training sorties and could lose an instructor pilot for three or four days. Taskings flow from the White House Military Office, through the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) at Scott AFB, IL to HQ ACC, and finally to the Wing. The schedulers in the wing stated if missions could be tasked with more advance notice they could use the Air Force Reserve and Guard components (ARC) more. 65% of the Air Force's C-130 fleet resides in the ARC. With more stable taskings, more effective use of these assets would aid the unit's training plan to attain combat readiness.

**C<sup>3</sup>I**

In most cases, once a SAAM mission is active, ACC relinquishes operational control. The TACC assumes the responsibility for flight following and mission execution. The 23rd operations staff feels they have good visibility into this mission, since it is of high interest to the AF, the TACC keeps the wing well-informed. The squadron commanders stated their crews inform them if anything out of the ordinary happens while they are executing the missions. They have high confidence their aircraft commanders will make safe decisions when faced with choices while accomplishing the mission.

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BOBBY J. WILKES, Colonel, USAF  
Commander, 23rd Operations Group

This interview was conducted and summarized by the Air Force  
Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

The interviewee's statement was provided voluntarily, and was not sworn.  
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**COLONEL DOUGLAS WOOD, USAF (ret)**

Former 89th Pilot and CVAM Officer

Interview Date: 20 September 1996

Had nine years experience in Presidential Lift. There are two entirely separate missions; for the 89th Airlift Wing for DV Code 1 and DV Code 2, and two for AMC squadrons tasked by CVAM. These latter squadrons fly C-5, C-130, C-17 and C-141 airplanes flown in support of DV Code 1 and DV Code 2. There is a large difference between these two missions. The 89th Airlift Wing is totally VIP mission oriented. They know what can be done safely and will inform all concerned if this cannot be achieved. Frequently, these crews are consulted in the planning process before being tasked. The AMC crews tend to look at the assigned mission as "just another airlift mission." The command post does all the planning and the crew simply flies the cargo (cars, boxes, and miscellaneous support personnel) from point A to point B. There is no special or extra training for these missions.

The 89 AW crews will assert their will for flight safety if the tasking does not meet the criteria. The AMC crews will have varied experience and could be subjected to imperative tasking. Crew experience is lower in the USAF now than ten years ago. The norm can be 2,500 to 3,000 hours in tactical lift flight crew members. The training is good and the crews are tactically qualified. They just have less flying experience.

The Presidential Pilot Office (PPO) in the 89th Airlift Wing is physically separated from the wing. Communication occurs primarily when PPO needs support. The airlift wing commander has the responsibility for PPO but frequently has little say in how the office is managed. PPO reports to the Director of the White House Military Office and keeps the 89th Airlift Wing commander informed.

## **1 AS/Training and Standardization/Evaluation**

**Interview Summary, 19 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

**Lt Col Lester D. Worley, Lt Col Loail M. Sims, Capt Daniel P.**

**Stenson, MSgt Carolyn D. Healy, MSgt Kurt A. Walker, TSgt Glenn A. Sparkman, SSgt Marcus W. Holling**

### **BACKGROUND**

The group listed above represents primary training and/or standardization and evaluation crew positions in the 1st Airlift Squadron (1 AS). These crewmembers teach and instruct a typical Air Force Two aircrew. Their motto, the SAM FOX motto, is: Safety, Comfort, and Reliability.

### **TRAINING**

Mission-Oriented Simulator Training (MOST) missions are conducted during the annual currency cycle. The frequency of simulators is increasing from 4 sims once per year to 3 sims twice per year. Both initial training and recurring training for pilots and flight engineers are accomplished in the simulator.

### **ASSIGNMENT POLICY AND SELECTION**

The 89 AW takes a few select individuals from a small pool of highly qualified applicants, so quality of selection during the hiring process is not compromised. Although the quality is good, there does not appear to be as many experienced crewmembers available to hire. Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), a good ally in the selection process, applies rules and screening criteria before they forward application packages to the 89 AW. AFPC pre-screens packages for minimum total hours, time on station, and minimum crew qualification. After hiring, the 4 year controlled tour provides only minimum time to fully receive the benefits of the person who has received SAM training. That is, since it takes two to two and a half years to "home grown" an instructor pilot - only one and a half to two years remains for that individual to fully apply his/her SAM training to benefit the squadron. Moreover, an important point to remember is that during that one and a half to two year time frame as a SAM instructor, usually Operations Group or Wing jobs do not always allow those individuals to fly as much as is needed to "spread" their SAM expertise to other crewmembers.

### **STANDARDIZATION AND TRAINING**

The 12-month evaluation cycle for pilots, navigators, and engineers is more restrictive than the AMC evaluation cycle of 17 months. Pilot evaluations are particularly stringent. If any areas for improvement are identified in the upgrade process, the trainee may be delayed in upgrade. This delay provides more time for additional seasoning and concentration of training in substandard areas.

**POLICY AND GUIDANCE**

HQ AMC, as a result of the Dubrovnik incident, instituted a policy of reviewing Jeppesen instrument approach, departure, and arrival procedures before use by an AMC aircrew. This adds a delay time between planning a mission itinerary and receipt of approval for use by the aircrew. It makes the most sense for a first-time non-precision approach into a strange airfield, but less sense when applied to a precision approach into an international hub airport.

**CREW REST**

Interruptions during the crew rest period are rarely a problem. The tough part is to balance the requirement for adequate crew rest with the demands of flexibility to accomplish missions with national security interests at stake. Those interests can drive the need for last-minute mission changes.

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LESTER D. WORLEY, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief Navigator

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Executive Support Airlift Working Group.

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**1HS AFORMS NCOIC**

**Telephone Interview, 25 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD**

**MEMO FOR RECORD**

**BACKGROUND**

Per telecon, 0830, 25 Sep 96, average grand total flying hours per pilot is 2101.6 for all helicopter pilots assigned to 1 HS.

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MATHIAS C. BODDICKER, II., Major, USAF  
Executive Travel Review Board

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Executive Support Airlift Working Group.  
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**89 DLG (Deputy Logistics Group Commander)  
Interview Summary, 30 Sept 96, Andrews AFB, MD  
Lt Col Michael Wright**

**BACKGROUND**

Lt Col Wright is the 89 AW (Air Wing) Deputy Logistics Group Commander. The logistics group is responsible for the supply, transportation, and contracting for the 89 AW plus aircraft maintenance on and backshop maintenance in support of 89 AW aircraft. Lt Col Wright was interviewed concerning the relationship between the 89 logistics group and the presidential pilots maintenance (PPM) section. Interview was conducted by Maj Gen Hogle with Lt Col Moschella in attendance.

1. What is the 89th logistics groups relationship with the presidential pilots maintenance section.?

Answer: There is no direct command relationship, PPM is a separate entity which is provided a lot of support by the 89th logistics group. The logistics group does not direct activities within the PPM but does coordinate on issues brought to the LG for assistance. Backshop support such as wheel and tire and structural repair is provided on a regular basis. PPM receives its personnel from the experienced pool within the 89th AGS and PPM receives its budget from the 89th AGS.

2. What is the relationship of the 89th logistics group with the 89th AGS?

Answer: The 89th AGS works for the 89th Logistics Group Commander. The 89th AGS receives all of its support from the logistics group. The logistics group helps set priorities, provides resources and key leadership oversight. The LG staff functions of training management and product improvement provide no management or oversight into PPM functions.

3. Is relationship between PPM and the 89th logistics group a healthy one?

Answer: Relationship is very healthy. There is no adversarial relationship. There is a very qualified maintenance officer in PPM and most of the people within PPM came out of the 89th logistics group. When 89th people have to provide support to PPM they feel good about it because they know the importance of the aircraft.



4. Would there be any value added by having the logistics group provide oversight to PPO?

Answer: Current informal system seems to be working. Many informal lines of communication have been established. However, oversight of the Presidential Pilots mission is very important and should be vested in 89 AW leadership.

5. In terms of a wiring diagram how would you portray PPM?

Answer: A light dotted line to the logistics group.

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MICHAEL WRIGHT, Lt Col, USAF  
Deputy Logistics Group Commander

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# 89 LG Senior Non-Commissioned Officers, Interview and Questionnaire Summary, 20 Sep 96, Andrews AFB, MD

## BACKGROUND

Three senior NCOs from the 89th Aircraft Generation Squadron (AGS) and four senior NCOs from the 89th Maintenance Squadron (MXS) were asked to complete a questionnaire and interviewed as a group. The AGS is directly responsible for all flightline maintenance activities and the MXS is responsible for all backshop maintenance activities. These senior supervisors are key senior level supervisors tasked with managing many facets of the maintenance program within their respective squadrons

## SUMMARY ANSWERS TO QUESTIONNAIRE

1. How long have you been assigned to the 89th Airlift Wing?

Summary: Compared to other wings, most felt the average time on station was higher.

2. How does this assignment compare to ones you've had in the past? Would you recommend this assignment?

Summary: In general, these senior NCOs felt this was a good assignment with lots of job satisfaction due to the high priority mission. Most would recommend this assignment.

3. In your opinion, did you receive adequate training?

Summary: In general, they felt they were adequately trained and prepared for their assigned duties.

4. In your opinion, are maintenance personnel receiving adequate training?

Summary: Training technicians is a problem due to the different types of aircraft assigned to Andrews. Most newcomers have never worked on the aircraft assigned to Andrews. Some of the necessary training is difficult to schedule due to the non-availability of aircraft for hands-on training.

5. How would you compare the opstempo here compared to other assignments? Are you overworked?

Summary: The opstempo at Andrews is not necessarily higher than other units, but stress is high due to the priority DV mission. The unique configuration of each aircraft results in only one aircraft being able to satisfy a particular tasking. There is not a backup aircraft available.

General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense memo, 13 September 1996,  
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# Logistics Groups, Air Mobility Command, Telephone Interview, 23 Sep 96

## MEMO FOR RECORD

### BACKGROUND

The Logistics Group commander or their representative from the 437AW Charleston AFB, SC; 436AW Dover AFB, DE; 60AMW Travis AFB, CA; 60AW McChord AFB, WA; and the 21AF McGuire AFB, NJ were interviewed. These units were selected because they operate aircraft (C-141, C-5, KC-10, or C-17) which fly PHOENIX Banner, Silver, and Copper missions. The interviews provided data on the availability of unit produced guidance.

### OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS, CHECKLISTS, OR POLICY LETTERS

Units were clearly aware of and possessed MCR 55-89 dealing with Phoenix Banner, Phoenix Silver, and Phoenix Copper missions.

All units did not have local operational instructions, technical data, checklists, or policy letters concerning maintenance activities for Phoenix Banner, Phoenix Silver, and Phoenix Copper mission taskings. However, they clearly understood the high priority of these missions and had great confidence their people also clearly understood the same priority.

The normal process of generating aircraft for missions places a high degree of emphasis on a comprehensive inspection program to ensure the aircraft will successfully and safely complete the mission.

//SIGNED//

DANNY STEELE, Lt Col, USAF

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